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INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court held, in the 
exercise of its "supervisory authority," that a district court 
erred in appointing counsel for an interested party to prose-
cute a criminal contempt action. In Young v. United States 
'" Associate, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1991 • present; J.D. 
1991, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A. 1988, University of 
Minnesota at Minneapolis. 
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ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,l the Supreme Court ruled that 
the appointment of counsel for an interested party created 
opportunities for conflicts of interest to arise and created at 
least an appearance of impropriety.2 Noting irreconcilable 
differences in the ethical obligations of public and private 
advocates, the Supreme Court-refusing to apply "harm-
less error" analysis-reversed the contempt convictions of 
several defendants.3 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's pronouncement 
in Young, several jurisdictions in the United States still al-
low the use of privately retained prosecutors for interested 
parties.4 These prosecutors are usually employed by victims 
or their families (or by those interested in collateral civil 
lawsuits) to assist the district attorney in the criminal pro-
ceeding. Although private prosecutors are supposed to re-
main under the direction· and control of the public 
prosecutor, such prosecutors often play significant roles at 
trial or during pre-trial activities. At trial, for example, pri-
vate prosecutors often examine key witnesses, make objec-
tions, or conduct opening and closing arguments.5 
1. 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
2. [d. at 807. 
3. [d. at 813. For an analysis of the Young decision, see Terri L. Braswell, 
Comment, Criminal Procedure-Young v. United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A.: 
The Right to a Disinterested Prosecutor in a Federal Criminal Contempt Proceeding 
Arising from the Underlying Civil Litigation, 18 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 143 (1987) 
[hereinafter Braswell]. 
4. See infra notes 71-117 and accompanying text. Unless otherwise noted, the 
phrase "private prosecutor" will be used to mean a private prosecutor for an inter-
ested party. This article only addresses the constitutionality of private prosecutors 
for interested parties. The use of the term "private prosecutor" should not be con-
fused with state laws that specifically allow disinterested private attorneys to prose-
cute cases in the absence of a county attorney. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 388.09 
(Supp. 1993); Keiver v. Koochiching County, 169 N.W. 254 (Minn. 1918) ("When 
there is no county attorney, the county board may employ any competent attorney 
to perform legal services for the county."). 
5. See infra notes 76-89 and accompanying text. Notably, some state statutes 
specifically require public prosecutors to conduct certain trial activities. Compare 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-7-401 (1988) ("The district attorney general or his deputies 
[sic] shall make the final and concluding argument.") with State v. Bennett, 798 
S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (Section 8-7-401 of the Tennessee Code 
"does not prohibit a private prosecutor from making the opening argument to the 
jury. Only the rebuttal, or last argument, must be made by the district attorney 
general or his assistant. "). 
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In general, the post-Young cases allowing the use of 
private prosecutors have either ignored the Young deci-
sion,6 distinguished Young as a "supervisory authority" 
case,7 or held that Young merely precludes private prosecu-
tors from taking complete or effective control of criminal 
prosecutions.8 One pending habeas corpus case is challeng-
ing the use of two private prosecutors, hired by a murder 
victim's son, where the death penalty was ultimately im-
posed.9 Because prosecutors have nearly unbridled discre-
6. See State v. Camacho, 406 S.E.2d 868, 871 (N.C. 1991) (no citation to 
Young); State v. Woodruff, 392 S.E.2d 434 (N.C. App. 1990), affd, 399 S.E.2d 114 
(N.C. 1991) (per curiam) (same); State v. Bennett, 798 S.W.2d 783, 785·86 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1990) (same); State v. Dunbar, 566 A.2d 970 (Vt. 1989) (same); cf Dick 
v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1989) (no citation to Young in the majority opin-
ion); Hughes v. Bowers, 711 F. Supp. 1574, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 558 
(11th Cir. 1990) (Without citing Young, the court held that "[t]he presence of a spe-
cial prosecutor hired by the family of the victim is not constitutionally improper per 
se. "); Kerns v. Wolverton, 381 S.E.2d 258, 262 (W. Va. 1989) (Without citing Young, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court stated in dicta that "this Court has countenanced 
the participation of a private prosecutor at trial."). 
7. Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 198 n.2 (6th CiT. 1989) (Celebrezze, J., con-
curring); New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747, 752 (D. N.J. 1991); New Jersey 
v. Kinder, 701 F. Supp. 486, 490 & n.6 (D. N.J. 1988); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 
777 S.W.2d 882, 883 (Ky. 1989). See Sassower v. Sheriff of Westchester County, 824 
F.2d 184, 191 (2d CiT. 1987) (Young distinguished on the ground that no pretrial 
investigation or other prosecutorial conduct was required in order to make a crimi-
nal contempt determination; a private party's motion for criminal contempt "simply 
concerns the routine New York State practice of bringing contempts to the attention 
of the court by motion," and the criminal contempt conviction was enforceable "be-
cause the court already had before it all the facts needed to establish Sassower's 
commission of the multiple contempts" [i.e., failure to make a required appear-
ance]); see also Ex parte Williams, 799 S.W.2d 304, 307 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) 
(Noting that Young was decided pursuant to the Supreme Court's "supervisory pow-
ers," the court stated that "[w]e have found nothing in our rules of procedure or 
prior case law which requires that prosecution of criminal contempt arising out of 
Texas civil suits be deemed a separate proceeding from that suit, or be brought on 
behalf of the State."). It is well-established that Supreme Court decisions based on 
the Court's supervisory authority over federal courts are not binding on the states. 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982). 
8. Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 663 (4th CiT. 1988). 
9. Joseph Stanley Faulder v. James Collins, Case No. 6:92-CV-755 (E.D. Tex.) 
(Brief in Support of Petitioner's Proposed Conclusions of Law, Jan. 1994; Peti-
tioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Jan. 1994) (copies on file 
with The Arkansas Law Review); see also Powers v. Hauck, 399 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 
1968) (approving the use of a private prosecutor where the death penalty was 
imposed). 
In Faulder, two private prosecutors were paid approximately $90,000 to prose-
cute the defendant. Although a public prosecutor was assigned to work on the case 
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tion with respect to the crimin;ll process, this Article 
addresses the question of whether·the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Young merely foreshadows a constitutional preclu-
sion of private prosecutors for interested parties. 
In addressing this question, Part I of this Article dis-
cusses the history of private and public prosecution in the 
United States. The Supreme Court's decision in Young is 
the focus of Part II, while Part III discusses existing statu-
tory provisions and case law. In Part IV, the standards reg-
ulating prosecutorial ethics are outlined, with Part V 
analyzing the constitutionality of the use of private prosecu-
tors. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the use of pri-
vate prosecutors is unethical and violative of a defendant's 
constitutional rights. In particular, this Article asserts that 
the use of such prosecutors violates the due process guaran-
tee and creates, at the very least, an unacceptable appear-
ance of impropriety. 
In reaching this conclusion, this Article also asserts 
that the use of private prosecutors violates the "public in-
terest"-what Justice Felix Frankfurter once called "that 
vague, impalpable, but all-controlling consideration."l0 
While public interest considerations are normally reserved 
for legislatures, this Article argues that a "public interest" 
analysis, which is appropriate because of a prosecutor's ob-
ligation to serve the "public interest," provides an addi-
tional theoretical basis for declaring unconstitutional the 
use of private prosecutors under due process principles. 
Thus, this Article concludes that the public's interest in not 
having its members erroneously charged or convicted in the 
in Faulder, his involvement was limited to jury selection, where he questioned some 
prospective jurors. During trial, however, the public prosecutor examined no wit-
nesses, made no objections, and made no arguments to the jury. Indeed, his only 
contact with the jury was reading into the record the testimony of a deceased hear-
say declarant. The public prosecutor even took one afternoon off during trial to 
play golf. Although Young was decided before Faulder's conviction was affirmed by 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the private prosecutor issue was not addressed 
on direct appeal. Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). 
Another pending habeas corpus case in Texas is also challenging the use of a 
private prosecutor where a death sentence was imposed. Telephone interview with 
Sandra Babcock, Texas Resource Center (Mar. 8, 1994) (discussing Wayne East v. 
James Collins, Case No. 1:92-CV-087-C (N.D. Tex». 
10. FELIX FRA·NKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 72 (1960). 
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criminal process outweighs an interested party's right to re-
tain a private prosecutor. 
/. HISTORY OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC 
PROSECUTION 
Several scholars have attempted to trace the historical 
origins of private prosecution in the United StatesY With-
out exception, these scholars have determined that the no-
tion of private prosecutions originated in early common law 
England, where the legal system primarily relied upon the 
victim or the victim's relatives or friends to bring a criminal 
to justiceP According to these historians, private prosecu-
tions developed in England as a means of facilitating pri-
vate vengeance.13 Although two English public authorities, 
11. See 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1286-88 (Sanford H. Kadish 
ed. 1983); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDEN· 
TlTY 3-39 (1980) [hereinafter JACOBY]; ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800-1880 (1989) [hereinafter STEINBERG]; 
Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 357, 359-71 (1986) [hereinafter Cardenas]; Josephine Gittler, Expanding the 
Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117, 125-32 (1984) 
[hereinafter Gittler]; Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law En-
forcement: Some Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 290-96 (1989) [here-
inafter Krent]; Joan Meier, The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal 
Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 101-03 
(1992) [hereinafter Meier]; Thomas J. Robinson, Comment, Private Prosecution in 
Criminal Cases, 4 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 300 (1968) [hereinafter Robinson]; An-
drew Sidman, Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. 
U.L. REV. 754, 756-65 (1976) [hereinafter Sidman]; W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., Com-
ment, The District Attorney-A Historical Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125 [hereinaf-
ter Van Alstyne]. 
12. Sidman, supra note 11, at 756; Robinson, supra note 11, at 302; see also 
Sidman, supra note 11, at 758-59 (English law explicitly allowed a person to prose-
cute crimes committed upon others); Robinson, supra note 11, at 302 (same); Sid-
man, supra note 11, at 759 n.35 (the charging party bore the cost of a criminal 
prosecution in England until 1908, when courts were empowered by law to order 
that the reasonable costs of a prosecution be repaid to the private litigant out of 
public funds). Notably, even in nineteenth-century America, in places such as Phila-
delphia, it was often not required that the aggrieved party be the one to prosecute. 
See generally STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 46, 66. 
13. Sidman, supra note 11, at 756; Meier, supra note 11, at 102. According to 
an early British historian, Sir James Stephen: 
The fact that the private vengeance of the person wronged by a crime was 
the principal source to which men trusted for the administration of justice 
in early times is one of the most characteristic circumstances connected 
with English criminal law, and has had much to do with the development of 
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the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney Gen-
eral, have placed severe limitations on the ability of private 
citizens to prosecute criminal actions,14 British citizens to-
day maintain the right to institute criminal proceedings. IS 
In the United States, public prosecutions began to re-
place the system of private prosecutions long before the 
colonies gained their independence.16 For example, in 1643, 
Virginia established the office of Attorney GeneralP Pat-
terned largely after its English counterpart, this office al-
lowed the Attorney General to initiate prosecutions of 
special importance to the Crown. IS Although Connecticut 
was the first colony to enact a statute specifically providing 
for a system of local public prosecution,19 Virginia estab-
lished a formal system of county prosecuting attorneys in 
1711.20 Dutch settlements in the American colonies, includ-
ing settlements in Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
what may perhaps be regarded as its principal distinctive peculiarity, 
namely the degree to which a criminal trial resembles a private litigation. 
SIR JAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 245 (1883). 
For a detailed history of private prosecutions in England, see Cardenas, supra note 
11, at 359-66. 
14. Sidman, supra note 11, at 756. The English Parliament established the Of-
fice of Director of Public Prosecutions in 1879 by passing the Prosecution of Of-
fenses Act. Sidman, supra note 11, at 760; Robinson, supra note 11, at 301. The 
Director of Public Prosecutions was to be under the supervision of the Attorney 
General. Cardenas, supra note 11, at 361. The Office of Director of Public Prosecu-
tions exists to the present in England. Cardenas, supra note 11, at 361. Notably, in 
the nineteenth century, British reformers, including Jeremy Bentham and Sir Robert 
Peel, argued that the system of private prosecutions was breeding unacceptable 
evils. Among those evils was the initiation of prosecutions for revenge and personal 
animosity and arrangements between attorneys and police to secure prosecutions. 
Cardenas, supra note 11, at 362. 
15. Sidman, supra note 11, at 756. 
16. Sidman, supra note 11, at 762. 
17. Sidman, supra note 11, at 763. 
18. Cardenas, supra note 11, at 369. 
19. Sidman, supra note 11, at 763. Connecticut's statute providing for a system 
of local public prosecution was enacted in 1704. Sidman, supra note 11, at 763; 
Robinson, supra note 11, at 308. 
20. Sidman, supra note 11, at 763; Robinson, supra note 11, at 309. At this 
time, the Virginia Attorney General appointed deputies to each county in the state 
to prosecute both important and routine cases. Private prosecutions became even 
less common in 1751, when the Virginia courts forced all crime victims to consult 
with the deputy attorney general before filing criminal complaints. The deputy at-
torney generals assumed complete control over all prosecutions within their respec-
tive counties in 1789. Cardenas, supra note 11, at 370. 
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Pennsylvania, and Delaware, often had the services of a 
scout, a figure akin to a sheriff and public prosecutor.21 
While the origin of the American public prosecutor re-
mains an "historical enigma,"22 academics generally trace 
the roots of this figure to one of three European anteced-
ents: the English, the Dutch, or the French.23 Moreover, 
despite the fact that the American public prosecutor has 
something in common with each of these predecessors, it is 
undisputed that the American prosecutor has "powers and 
discretion" that are "vastly greater than those of any Euro-
pean prosecutor."24 The importance of the office of public 
prosecutor in the United States was further reinforced by 
its shift in the nineteenth century from an appointive office 
to an elective office.25 
21. Cardenas, supra note 11, at 370. "When the English took over Dutch settle-
ments in the Seventeenth Century, the English governor revoked all Dutch law and 
government-except for the scout, who eventually took control of prosecutorial 
power." [d. (citing Robinson, supra note 11, at 308). According to one scholar: 
"The scout was a combination sheriff, public prosecutor and financial agent for the 
Dutch West India Company." Robinson, supra note 11, at 308. For experiences of 
other colonies with respect to the growth of the public prosecutor, see Gittler, supra 
note 11, at 126 n.31 (listing citations for the colonies of New York, New Hampshire, 
Maryland, and Rhode Island). 
22. Gittler, supra note 11, at 127. 
23. See JACOBY, supra note 11, at 3; Sidman, supra note 11, at 763. These influ-
ences include the Dutch scout, the English Attorney General or Justice of the Peace, 
or the French advocate general, procurer publique or procurer du roi. See JACOBY, 
supra note 11, at 3; Gittler, supra note 11, at 127-129 & n.34. 
24. JACOBY, supra note 11, at 3. According to one scholar: 
Although the local American prosecutor shares characteristics with all 
three of [its] European officers, he is very different in many respects. He 
has the power, like the procurer, to initiate all public prosecutions; he is a 
local official of regional government like the scout; he has the power to 
terminate all criminal prosecutions like the Attorney General. Yet, his 
powers and discretion are vastly greater than those of any European prose-
cutor. The American prosecutor enjoys an independence and discretionary 
privileges unmatched in the world. 
JACOBY, supra note 11, at 3. 
25. JACOBY, supra note 11, at 37-38. According to Joan Jacoby: 
After Andrew Jackson was elected in 1828, the expansion of democ-
racy in the form of elected positions swept the country. Hanging on the 
coattails of the movement to elect local judges was the prosecutor. In 1832, 
Mississippi became the first state to include in its constitution a provision 
for the popular election of local district attorneys. By 1859 the trend was 
clear and irreversible-the prosecutor was a locally elected position. 
JACOBY, supra note 11, at 37-38. At present, county attorneys continue to be elected 
officials. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 388.01 (Supp. 1993). 
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Notwithstanding the meteoric rise of public prosecu-
tions in the United States, American citizens continued to 
privately prosecute criminal cases in many locales during 
the nineteenth century.26 In Philadelphia, for example, all 
types of cases were privately prosecuted, with assault and 
battery prosecutions being the most common.27 However, 
domestic disputes short of assault also came before the 
court. Thus, "[p]arents of young women prosecuted men 
for seduction; husbands prosecuted their wives' paramours 
for adultery; wives prosecuted their husbands for deser-
tion. "28 Although many state courts continued to sanction 
26. See STEINBERG, supra note 11 '(detailing private prosecutions in Philadel-
phia); see also id. at 1-2 ("Private prosecution-one citizen taking another to court 
without the intervention of the police-was the basis of law enforcement in Phila-
delphia and an anchor of its legal culture, and this had been so since colonial 
times."); id. at 25 ("Early in the century, private cases were overwhelmingly domi-
nant, but as the decades passed state prosecution became ever more prominent."). 
Notably, Allen Steinberg defines "private prosecution" as "the system by which pri-
vate citizens brought criminal cases to the attention of court officials, initiated the 
process of prosecution, and retained considerable control over the ultimate disposi-
tion of cases-especially when compared with the two main executive authorities of 
criminal justice, the police and the public prosecutor." [d. at 5. 
27. STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 44, 50. Under Philadelphia's system of pri-
vate prosecution, many defendants sought to control the criminal process by becom-
ing prosecutors themselves and initiating "cross-bills." /d. at 46. According to one 
account: 
Lewis Conrad's squirrel was attacked by Benjamin Morris's dog. Conrad 
kicked the dog, Morris kicked Conrad, and "a regular scraping took place." 
Morris accused Conrad before Alderman Binns, and Conrad brought Mor-
ris before Alderman Mitchell. "The dog and squirrel came off without 
harm, and have thus far avoided lawsuits," added the reporter. 
[d. at 46. 
Occasionally such "cross-prosecutions" resulted in dual convictions. [d. at 67. 
28. STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 48. Some private prosecutions in Philadelphia 
bordered on the bizarre. For example, "Henry Blake's wife prosecuted him for re-
fusing to come to bed and making too much noise, preventing her from sleeping. He 
was bound over to come to bed when called." [d.; see also id. at 57 (defining "bound 
over" as "bound over for trial"). Likewise, a Southwark man "charged a fortune 
teller with conspiracy for beguiling his wife into believing that for a fee information 
could be provided about his infidelities." [d. (footnote omitted). Thus, private pros-
ecutions "gave citizens the power, in practice, to define crime. Because the minor 
judiciary let them do so, almost anything that annoyed or irritated a person could be 
treated as a crime, for whatever motives a prosecutor might have." [d. at 77. 
According to an 1863 article published by the Philadelphia Society for Alleviat-
ing the Miseries of Public Prisons, honest private prosecutors were rare: "Most of 
the complaints that come before our aldermen are brought by those who seek to 
gratify personal animosity and a sudden desire of vengeance rather than any wish to 
punish the wrong-doer for the sake ofright." [d. at 199. To discourage abuses of the 
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the practice of private prosecutions without significant scru-
tiny during the nineteenth century,29 a few state courts out-
lawed the practice. For instance, in 1849, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court suggested in dicta that a privately retained 
prosecutor would void a criminal conviction.30 Likewise, 
Michigan prohibited the employment of private prosecutors 
in 1875.31 
In Wisconsin, the propriety of private prosecutors was 
left unquestioned until 1888 when the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in Biemel v. State.32 In 
Biemel, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that "public 
policy, and the fair, just, and impartial administration of the 
criminal law of this state, make it the duty of the courts to 
private prosecution system, Philadelphia did-for approximately twenty years-tax 
court costs against unsuccessful private prosecutors: 
Between 1854 and 1874, the major weapon used by grand jurors to discour-
age petty prosecutions was still the power to place the court costs in ig-
nored cases on the prosecutors. Judges told grand jurors that "by far the 
largest number of cases which will be submitted to you belong to a class 
originating in private spite. With those public justice has no concern. 
Criminal courts were not created to foment or to pander to either malice or 
extortion. We do not sit for the collection of bad debts or the accumulation 
of costs. All cases which fall within this category should be promptly ig-
nored and the prosecutors ordered to pay the costs." Such an approach 
would "teach a few prosecutors not to repeat a costly experiment." 
[d. at 183. 
29. See People v. Powell, 25 P. 481 (Cal. 1891); State v. Rue, 75 N.W. 235 
(Minn. 1893); Gardner v. State, 26 A. 30 (N.J. 1892); State v. Kent, 62 N.W. 631 
(N.D. 1895); People v. Tidwell, 12 P. 61 (Utah 1886), reh'g denied, 12 P. 638 (Utah 
1887); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 30 S.E.2d 452 (Va. 1898). 
30. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 582 (1849) (although a 
private attorney was permitted to assist the prosecutor at trial, there was no evi-
dence that the private attorney received any pecuniary compensation for his serv-
ices). The use of a private prosecutor was formally. prohibited in Massachusetts in 
1855. Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 146 (1855). But cf Common-
wealth v. Herman, 149 N.E. 198 (Mass. 1925) (allowing a privately retained attorney 
to sit with the prosecutor at counsel's table and consult with him). 
31. See Meister v.People, 31 Mich. 99 (1875). Although the Michigan Supreme 
Court flirted with a retreat from its prohibition in a 1889 case, the ban on private 
prosecutors was reaffirmed only a year later. Compare People v. Schick, 42 N.W. 
1008 (Mich. 1889) (although the record failed to establish that an assistant prosecu-
tor had been retained by private parties, the court stated that even if such facts were 
established, the questioning of one witness and the argument of one motion would 
not require reversal) with People v. Hillhouse, 45 N.W. 484, 485-86 (Mich. 1890) 
(regardless of a private prosecutor's fairness toward a criminal defendant, the pri-
vate prosecutor's participation constituted error). 
32. 37 N.W. 244,245-48 (Wis. 1888). 
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exclude the paid attorneys of private persons from appear-
ing as prosecutors. "33 According to the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court: 
[A]n attorney employed and paid by private parties 
should not be permitted either by the courts or by the 
prosecuting attorney to assist in the trial of such crimi-
nal cases . . . . "The prosecuting officer represents the 
public interests, which can never be promoted by the 
conviction of the innocent. His object, like that of the 
court, should be simply justice; and he has no right to 
sacrifice this to the pride of professional success." ... 
[The prosecutor has a duty to present evidence 
favorable to the defendant]. This method of presenting 
a case is not that favored or pursued in civil cases, 
where the paid attorneys of the respective parties con-
duct them. And criminal cases are not likely to be so 
presented if the prosecution is permitted to be con-
ducted by the paid attorneys of parties who from pas-
sion, prejudice, or even an honest belief in the guilt 
[sic] of the accused, are desirous of procuring his 
conviction.34 
Although a subsequent Wisconsin decision allowed a pri-
vately retained attorney to perform minor pretrial tasks,35 
the Wisconsin courts have reaffirmed repeatedly the ban on 
the use of private prosecutors.36 
33. [d. at 245. 
34. [d. at 245-48. In State v. Peterson, 218 N.W. 367 (Wis. 1928), a case decided 
forty years after Biemel, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reiterated its disdain for pri-
vate prosecutors. According to the Peterson court: 
In an early day in England private parties prosecuted criminal wrongs 
which they suffered. They obtained an indictment from a grand jury, and it 
became the duty and the privilege of the person injured to provide a prose-
cutor at his own expense to prosecute the indicted person. Our scheme of 
government has changed all this. It is now deemed the better public policy 
to provide for the public prosecution of public wrongs without any interfer-
ence on the part of private parties, although they may have been injured in 
a private capacity different from the general public injury that accrues to 
society when a crime is committed. So under our system we have private 
prosecution for private wrongs and public prosecution for public wrongs. 
[d. at 369. 
35. Scheldberger v. State, 235 N.W. 419 (Wis. 1931) (a private attorney was 
permitted to take witnesses' statements and do investigatory work). 
36. See State v. Scherr, 101 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. 1960); State v. Peterson, 218 N.W. 
367 (Wis. 1928); Rock v. Ekern, 156 N.W. 197 (Wis. 1916). 
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Currently, a split of authority exists regarding whether 
private prosecutors are constitutionally permissible. While 
some jurisdictions prohibit the practice in its entirety,37 
other jurisdictions allow the use of such prosecutors under 
the condition that the district attorney retain appropriate 
control over the prosecution.38 Only a few modern-day 
court decisions allow private prosecutors to retain unbri-
dled discretion over a criminal prosecution.39 In some juris-
dictions, the trial court has the discretion to determine 
whether a private attorney may assist a district attorney in 
the prosecution of a case.40 
II. YOUNG v. UNITED STATES EX REL. VUITTON ET 
FILS S.A. 
In Young v. United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,41 
Louis Vuitton, S.A., a French leather goods manufacturer, 
brought suit in 1978 against several defendants alleging that 
Vuitton's trademark was being infringed by the manufac-
37. See infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text. 
38. See infra note 72 and accompanying text; Donald J. Hall, The Role of the 
Victim in the Prosecution and Disposition of a Criminal Case, 28 V AND. L. REV. 931, 
976 (1975). The practice of requiring public prosecutors to control a criminal prose-
cution is at odds with some local nineteenth century practices, such as those of 
Philadelphia: 
The discretion of the private parties in criminal cases was not checked by 
the public prosecutor. Instead, the public prosecutor in most cases adopted 
a stance of passive neutrality. He was essentially a clerk, organizing the 
court calendar and presenting cases to grand and petit juries. Most of the 
time, he was either superseded by a private attorney or simply let the pri-
vate prosecutor and his witnesses take the stand and state their case. 
STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 82. 
39. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. In a few states, adultery statutes 
only permit the injured spouse to initiate a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1408(B) (1989); MICH. COMPo LAWS § 750.31 (1990); MINN. 
STAT. § 609.36(2) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-09(2) (1985); see also Lee V. 
State, 231 P. 324, 325 (Okla. Crim. App. 1924) (adultery is a "private wrong" that 
must be initiated by the injured person); State V. La Bounty, 116 P. 1073 (Wash. 
1911) (the crime of adultery can only be prosecuted by a spouse). 
40. People V. Powell, 25 P. 481, 486 (Cal. 1891); State V. Best, 186 S.E.2d 1 
(N.C. 1972); State V. Woodruff, 392 S.E.2d 434, 436 (N.C. App. 1990), affd, 399 
S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1991) (per curiam). In such jurisdictions, it is often held that the 
trial judge's discretion in such matters will only be interfered with upon a showing of 
abuse of discretion. State V. Boykin, 259 S.E.2d 883 (N.C. 1979); Woodruff, 392 
S.E.2d at 436. 
41. 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
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ture, sale, and distribution of imitation· Vuitton goods. 
Three years later Vuitton's trademark was upheld by the 
Ninth Circuit, and Vuitton and the defendants then entered 
into a settlement agreement in 1982. Under the agreement, 
the defendants paid Vuitton $100,000 in damages, and they 
consented to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibit-
ing them from engaging in any economic activity related to 
Vuitton's registered trademark.42 
In early 1983, however, a Florida investigation firm 
employed by Vuitton discovered possible violations of the 
permanent injunction in an undercover "sting" operation. 
Subsequently, Vuitton's attorney, J. Joseph Bainton, re-
quested that the district court appoint him and his col-
league, Robert Devlin, as special counsel to prosecute a 
criminal contempt action for violation of the permanent in-
junction. The district court granted Bainton's request, with 
the court finding probable cause to believe that the defend-
ants in the earlier action were engaged in conduct violating 
the court's injunctive order.43 Although Bainton informed 
the United States Attorney's Office of his appointment and 
impending investigation, the head of that office merely 
wished Bainton good luck.44 Ultimately, despite the de-
fendants' objections to the appointment of Bainton and 
Devlin as special prosecutors, the five defendants were con-
victed of criminal contempt for violating the injunction 
prohibiting the infringement of Vuitton's trademark. The 
defendants received sentences ranging from six months to 
five years.45 
Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit, the defendants urged that the appointment of 
Bainton and Devlin violated their right to be prosecuted by 
an impartial prosecutor. Citing its previous decision in 
42. Young, 481 U.S. at 790-92. The permanent injunction prohibited the de·· 
fendants from, among other things, "manufacturing, producing, distributing, circu-
lating, selling, offering for sale, advertising, promoting or displaying any product 
bearing any simulation, reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation" of 
Vuitton's registered trademark. [d. 
43. [d. at 792-93. 
44. [d. at 793. 
. 45. [d. at 790-91 n.1, 793. 
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Musidor, B. V. v. Great American Screen,46 however, the 
Second Circuit rejected the defendants' arguments.47 In 
particular, the Second Circuit held that the supervision of 
contempt prosecutions by a judge is adequate protection 
against the "danger that the special prosecutor will use the 
threat of prosecution as a bargaining chip in civil negotia-
tions."48 Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed the defendants' 
contempt convictions. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants first 
contended that the district court lacked the authority to ap-
point any private attorney to prosecute the contempt action 
against them. However, in rejecting the argument that only 
the U.S. Attorney's Office could have permissibly brought 
a contempt prosecution, a majority of the Supreme Court 
stated as follows: "[Ilt is long settled that courts possess 
inherent authority to initiate contempt proceedings for dis-
obedience to their orders, authority which necessarily en-
compasses the ability to appoint a private attorney to 
prosecute the contempt."49 According to Justice Brennan's 
majority opinion: 
Courts cannot be at the mercy of another Branch in de-
ciding whether such proceedings should be initiated. 
The ability to appoint a private attorney to prosecute a 
contempt action satisfies the need for an independent 
means of self-protection, without which courts would be 
"mere boards of arbitration whose judgments and de-
crees would be only advisory."5o 
46. 658 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982). In Musidor, 
the Second Circuit held that neither due process nor Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure requires a court to select counsel from the staff of the United 
States Attorney's Office to prosecute a criminal contempt. [d. at 64. 
47. See United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Klayminc, 780 F.2d 179 (2d 
Cir.1985). 
48. [d. at 184. 
49. Young, 481 U.S. at 794. 
50. [d. at 797 (citing Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 
(1911)). According to another passage of Justice Brennan's majority opinion: 
While contempt proceedings are sufficiently criminal in nature to warrant 
the imposition of many procedural protections, their fundamental purpose 
is to preserve respect for the judicial system itself. As a result, courts have 
long had, and must continue to have, the authority to appoint private attor-
neys to initiate such proceedings when the need arises. 
Young, 481 U.S. at 801-02. 
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While recognizing that courts have the authority to ap-
point private attorneys to prosecute contempt violations, 
the Supreme Court specifically held that the exercise of that 
authority must be restrained by the principle that "only 
'[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed' 
should be used in contempt cases. "51 In so stating, the 
Court held, in the exercise of its supervisory power,52 that 
the district court erred in appointing counsel for an inter-
ested party in connection with the contempt prosecution. 
According to the Court: "Regardless of whether the ap-
pointment of private counsel in this case resulted in any 
51. Young, 481 U.S. at 802 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309,319 
(1975) and Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (1821». "This principle of re-
straint in contempt counsels caution in the exercise of the power to appoint a private 
prosecutor." Young, 481 U.S. at 802. 
52. Several United States Supreme Court cases have delineated the scope of a 
court's "supervisory powers." For instance, in United States v. Hasting, the Court 
held that a federal court "may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifi-
cally required by the Constitution or the Congress." 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983). But 
cf Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985) ("Even a sensible and efficient use of the 
supervisory power ... is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provi-
sions."). In so holding, the Hasting Court ruled that a court could not, by an asser-
tion of its supervisory power, avoid the rule that a prosecutorial comment on the 
failure of an accused to testify is not per se error requiring automatic reversal of a 
conviction if the whole record indicates that the error was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court outlined the three 
purposes underlying the use of a court's supervisory powers: (1) "to implement a 
remedy for violation of recognized rights," (2) "to preserve judicial integrity by en-
suring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before the jury," 
and (3) "as a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct." [d. at 505. 
In a subsequent case, Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, the Supreme Court 
also held that a court's supervisory power may not be invoked "to circumvent the 
harmless error inquiry prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)." 
487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a». Justice Kennedy wrote the 
following: 
Rule 52 is, in every pertinent respect, as binding as any statute duly enacted 
by Congress, and federal courts have no more discretion to disregard the 
Rule's mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory provi-
sions. The balance struck by the Rule between societal costs and the rights 
of the accused may not casually be overlooked "because a court has elected 
to analyze the question under the supervisory power." 
Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 255 (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 
736 (1980». 
In Bank of Nova Scotia, for an error not to be harmless, the Court held that the 
prosecutorial misconduct involved in that case must have "substantially influ-
ence[d]" the grand jury's decision to indict, thereby creating a "grave doubt" that 
the indictment was free from substantial influence. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 
256. 
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prosecutorial impropriety (an issue on which we express no 
opinion), that appointment illustrates the potential for pri-
vate interest to influence the discharge of public duty. "53 
Citing numerous statutory and ethical duties related to con-
flicts of interest, the Young Court emphasized that "repre-
sentation of other clients may compromise the prosecutor's 
pursuit of the Government's interest" because a prosecutor 
owes an ethical duty to those other clients.54 The Court 
stated as follows: "'[I]t is the highest claim on the most no-
ble advocate which causes the problem-fidelity, unques-
tioned, continuing fidelity to the client."'55 
Having found that the trial court erred in appointing 
counsel for an interested party, the Young Court was then 
compelled to address whether the government should have 
the opportunity to demonstrate that it was "harmless error" 
for the court to appoint such counsel.56 Writing for four 
members of the Court with respect to this issue, Justice 
Brennan's opinion noted that "some errors 'are so funda-
53. Young, 481 U.S. at 806; id. at 807 (footnote omitted) ("[T]he appointment 
of counsel for an interested party to bring the contempt prosecution in this case at a 
minimum created opportunities for conflicts to arise, and created at least the appear-
ance of impropriety."). According to the Court: "The prosecutor is appointed solely 
to pursue the public interest in vindication of the court's authority. A private attor-
ney appointed to prosecute a criminal contempt therefore certainly should be as 
disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes such a prosecution." [d. at 805 
(footnote omitted). 
54. [d. at 804-05. That a lawyer cannot serve "two masters" is a recurring 
theme in Supreme Court opinions. E.g., United States v. Mississippi Valley Gener-
ating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549 (1961) (statute prohibiting financial conflict-of-interest 
"has its foundation in the Biblical admonition that no man may serve two masters"); 
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942) (representation of multiple code-
fendants created impermissible "struggle to serve two masters"). 
55. Young, 481 U.S. at 805 (quoting Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & 
Enginemen v. United States, 411 F.2d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 1969». In a footnote, Jus-
tice Brennan asserted that the potential for misconduct that arises through the ap-
pointment of an interested prosecutor is not outweighed by the fact that an attorney 
for the beneficiary of the court order may often be the most familiar with the under-
lying facts of the dispute. In so stating, Justice Brennan suggested in dicta that 
"[t]hat familiarity may be put to use in assisting a disinterested prosecutor in pursu-
ing the contempt action, but cannot justify permitting counsel for the private party 
to be in control of the prosecution." Young, 481 U.S. at 807 n.17. 
56. The harmless error rule provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 52(a). A constitutional error at trial requires the reversal of a conviction 
unless the government can establish that the error was harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.s. 18 (1967). 
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mental and pervasive that they require reversal without re-
gard to the facts or circumstances of the particular case.' "57 
Reiterating the general rule that an error is fundamental if 
it undermines confidence in the integrity of the criminal 
proceeding, 58 Justice Brennan concluded that "[t]he ap-
pointment of an interested prosecutor raises such doubts. "59 
According to his opinion: 
Prosecution by someone with conflicting loyalties "calls 
into question the objectivity of those charged with 
bringing a defendant to judgment." It is a fundamental 
premise of our society that the state wield its formidable 
criminal enforcement powers in a rigorously disinter-
ested fashion, for liberty itself may be at stake in such 
matters.60 
57. Young, 481 U.S. at 810-11 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 
681 (1986)). Only four members of the Supreme Court joined Part III B of the 
Young opinion, which holds, among other things: 
[W]e establish a categorical rule against the appointment of an interested 
prosecutor, adherence to which requires no subtle calculations of judg-
ment. Given the fundamental and pervasive effects of such an appoint-
ment, we therefore hold that harmless-error analysis is inappropriate in 
reviewing the appointment of an interested prosecutor in a case such as 
[Young]. 
Id. at 814. 
Notably, in New Jersey v. Imperiale, the State of New Jersey argued that crimi-
nal defendants in private prosecutor cases only suffer due process violations if their 
actual trial was fundamentally unfair. 773 F. Supp. 747 (D. N.J. 1991). The court in 
Imperiale noted: "This is the 'harmless error' approach, which stands bruised but 
intact given that Part III B of the [Young] opinion only carried four votes." Imperi-
ale, 773 F. Supp. at 753 (footnote omitted). But see In re Davidson, 908 F.2d 1249, 
1251 (5th Cir. 1990) (The Fifth Circuit has adopted as its own rule the position put 
forth by a plurality of the Young Court that "where as here, there is a Young viola-
tion, 'harmless error analysis is inappropriate."') (citing Matter of Hipp, Inc., 895 
F.2d 1503, 1509 (5th Cir. 1990)); see also Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th 
Cir. 1967) (harmless error analysis inappropriate where constitutional deficiency of 
conviction arises from conflicting roles of private attorney and prosecutor). 
58. Young, 481 U.S. at 811 (citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986); 
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681-82; Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986)). 
59. Young, 481 U.S. at 811. 
60. Id. at 811 (quoting Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 263). According to one scholar: 
In its basic form, a conflict of interest arises when a person who has a duty 
to make decisions affecting others has some independent interest in the 
decision. We identify a lawyer's conflict by holding up relevant interests 
(of self or of others) against the lawyer's primary duties to her client. The 
duties required by conflict of interest rules are generally loyalty, confidenti-
ality, and independent professional judgment exercised in the best interests 
of the client. 
1994] PRIVATE PROSECUTORS 527 
Emphasizing that the public perception of the integrity of 
the criminal justice system is at stake, Justice Brennan 
stated that a concern for actual prejudice "misses the 
point."61 "'[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice,' 
and a prosecutor with conflicting loyalties presents the ap-
pearance of precisely the opposite. "62 Accordingly, 
"[s]ociety's interest in disinterested prosecution ... would 
not be adequately protected by harmless-error analysis, for 
such analysis would not be sensitive to the fundamental na-
ture of the error committed."63 
In contrast to Justice Brennan's opinion, Justice Pow-
ell's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
O'Connor, would have remanded the case to the Second 
Circuit to determine whether the error of appointing pri-
vate counsel to prosecute the contempt proceeding was 
harmless error. Although Justice Powell's opinion asserted 
that, "as a general matter, courts should not appoint inter-
ested private lawyers to prosecute charges of criminal con-
tempt," his opinion also took the position that Supreme 
Court precedents did not call for a "per se reversal."64 In-
deed, noting that the Second Circuit had found "[no] rea-
Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of In-
terest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 
33-35 (1990) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Nolan]. 
61. Young, 481 U.S. at 813. 
62. Id. at 812-13 (quoting Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14). 
63. Young, 481 U.S. at 813. Justice Brennan also concluded that the appoint-
ment of an interested prosecutor is "an error whose effects are pervasive." Id. Ac-
cording to his opinion: 
Such an appointment calls into question, and therefore requires scrutiny of, 
the conduct of an entire prosecution, rather than simply a discrete 
prosecutorial decision. Determining the effect of this appointment thus 
would be extremely difficult. A prosecution contains a myriad of occasions 
for the exercise of discretion, each of which goes to shape the record in a 
case, but few of which are part of the record. 
Id. at 813-14. 
See also id. at 814 (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (rejecting 
application of the harmless-error rule to a defense attorney's conflict in representing 
three codefendants)). In Holloway, the Supreme Court stated as follows: "[I]n a 
case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil-it bears repeating-is in 
what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but 
also as to possible pretrial negotiations and in the sentencing process." Holloway, 
435 U.S. at 490-91. 
64. Young, 481 U.S. at 827 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
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son to believe" that the private prosecutor acted unethically 
before the trial court, Justice Powell's opinion intimated 
that the Second Circuit's findings strongly suggested that 
the error of appointing private counsel to prosecute the 
contempt proceeding was harmless. Nevertheless, Justice 
Powell's opinion would have remanded the case to the Sec-
ond Circuit for further findings regarding the "harmless er-
ror" issue.65 Neither Justice White's dissenting opinion66 
nor Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, which argued for 
the reversal of the defendants' convictions on different 
grounds,67 reached the "harmless error" issue. 
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Young was 
based upon its "supervisory powers,"68 Justice Blackmun, in 
a lone concurrence, would have held that "the practice-
federal or state-of appointing an interested party's coun-
sel to prosecute for criminal contempt is a violation of due 
process. "69 According to Justice Blackmun's terse opinion, 
the concept of due process "requires a disinterested prose-
cutor with the unique responsibility to serve the public, 
rather than a private client, and to seek justice that is 
unfettered. "70 
65. [d. 
66. Justice White's dissenting opinion merely stated that "there was no error, 
constitutional or otherwise, in the appointments made in this action and that peti-
tioners were not denied due process of law by being tried and convicted of con-
tempt." Young, 481 U.S. at 828 (White, 1., dissenting). 
67. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion argued that the appointment of private 
prosecutors was defective because prosecution of individuals who disregard court 
orders is not an exercise of "[t]he judicial power of the United States." Young, 481 
U.S. at 816 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST., ART. III, §§ 1,2). According 
to Justice Scalia, "[T]he federal courts have no power to prosecute condemners for 
disobedience of court judgments, and no derivative power to appoint an attorney to 
conduct contempt prosecutions." [d. at 826. 
68. Justice Brennan's opinion in Young noted that the Court was relying on its 
supervisory authority "to avoid the necessity of reaching any constitutional issues." 
Young, 481 U.S. at 810 n.21. 
69. Young, 481 U.S. at 815-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
70. [d. at 816 (citing Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. 
United States, 411 F.2d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 1969». 
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III. EXISTING STATUTES AND CASE LAW 
A. Jurisdictions Allowing Private Prosecutors 
529 
Although a growing number of states prohibit the use 
of private prosecutors, many jurisdictions adhere to the rule 
allowing interested parties to retain such prosecutors. 
These latter jurisdictions differ as to the permissible scope 
private prosecutors can play in such actions. While three 
states, Alabama, Montana, and Ohio, allow private prose-
cutors to participate without the consent or supervision of 
the district attorney,71 the majority of jurisdictions allow 
participation only with the public prosecutor's consent and 
retention of control over the case.72 Another restriction 
placed upon the use of private prosecutors in most states is 
71. See Alabama, Hall v. State, 411 So. 2d 831, 838 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) 
("[T]he appearance by a qualified attorney [for a private person] ... does not re-
quire an 'appointment by any court, the District Attorney, or any of his assistants."); 
Montana, State v. Cockrell, 309 P.2d 316 (Mont. 1957) ("[T]he court will indulge the 
presumption that the appointment was regularly made in the absence of a showing 
to the contrary."); Ohio, State v. Ray, 143 N.E.2d 484 (Ohio App. 1956) (private 
prosecutor was permissible despite fact that private counsel admitted that he was 
not affiliated with the city solicitor's office in any manner). However, in these states, 
the trial court has the discretion not to permit private prosecutors. See Hall, 411 So. 
2d at 838-39 (trial court can, for good cause, preclude the participation of a private 
prosecutor). 
72. E.g., California, People v. Powell, 25 P. 481 (Cal. 1891); Colorado, Davis v. 
People, 238 P. 25 (Colo. 1925); Florida, Ates v. State, 194 So. 286 (Fla. 1940); Geor-
gia, Allen v. State, 257 S.E.2d 5 (Ga. App. 1979); Brown v. State, 250 S.E.2d 438 
(Ga. 1978); Illinois, People v. Farnsley, 293 N.E.2d 600, 605 (III. 1973); Hayner v. 
People, 72 N.E. 792 (III. 1904); Kansas, State v. Baker, 819 P.2d 1173 (Kan. 1991); 
State v. Berg, 694 P.2d 427, 431 (Kan. 1985); State v. Sandstrom, 595 P.2d 324 (Kan. 
1979); Kentucky, Stumbo v. Seabold, 704 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying Ken-
tucky law); Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1989); Earl v. Com-
monwealth, 569 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. App. 1978); Louisiana, State v. Hopper, 203 So. 2d 
222 (La. 1967); Maine, State v. Bartlett, 74 A. 18,19 (Me. 1909); New Jersey, State v. 
Wouters, 177 A.2d 299 (N.J. Super. 1962); New Mexico, State v. Baca, 688 P.2d 34 
(N.M. 1984); North Carolina, State v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507 (N.C. 1984); North 
Dakota, State v. Kent, 62 N.W. 631 (N.D. 1895); Oklahoma, Ryals v. State, 434 P.2d 
488 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Musto, 35 A.2d 307 
(Pa. 1944); South Carolina, State v. Addis, 186 S.E.2d 415 (S.C. 1972); South Dakota, 
State v. Basham, 170 N.W.2d 238 (S.D. 1969); Tennessee, State v. Bennett, 798 
S.W.2d 783 (Tenn. App. 1990); Texas, Urdiales v. Canales, 475 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. 
Tex. 1979); Ballard v. State, 519 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Lopez v. State, 
437 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969); Utah, People v. Tidwell, 12 P. 61 (Utah 
1886); Vermont, 566 A.2d 970 (Vt. 1989); Virginia, Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 
S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1985); Virgin Islands, Tonkin v. Michael, 349 F. Supp. 78 (V.l. 1972); 
West Virginia, State ex rei. Koppers Co. v. International Union of Oil, Chemical & 
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the rule prohibiting their participation in related civil mat-
ters.73 Several states have statutes that explicitly authorize 
the use of private prosecutors.74 
Atomic Workers, 298 S.E.2d 827 (W. Va. 1982); State v. Riser, 294 S.E.2d 461 (W. 
Va. 1982). 
A handful of states allow only minimal participation by private prosecutors. 
E.g., State v. Newman, 568 S.W.2d 276, 282-83 (Mo. App.1978) (prosecution witness 
has right to have private attorney appear, but witness' counsel had no right to other-
wise participate in process of examination). Other jurisdictions have yet to articu-
late the permissible level of assistance that private prosecutors can provide. E.g., 
Smith v. State, 426 N.E.2d 364 (Ind. 1981) (private attorney introduced as "assis-
tant" sat with public prosecutor at trial but did not participate); Sedelbauer v. State, 
455 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (Ind. App. 1983) (private prosecutor may assist in criminal 
trial); State v. von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1003 (R.I. 1984) (stating merely that claim 
of private prosecution is "utterly without merit"). 
73. See Patricia Moran, Note, Private Prosecutors in Criminal Contempt Ac-
tions Under Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1141, 1154 n.54 (1986) (citing cases) [hereinafter Moran]. Indeed, an Alabama 
case decided in 1983 "is the only 20th century case holding unequivocally that a 
private prosecutor who also represents plaintiffs in a civil action arising out of the 
same proceeding presents no inherent due process or ethical problems." Id. at 1155 
n.57 (citing Hopkins v. State, 429 So. 2d 1146, 1154 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983». For a 
discussion of case law with respect to prosecutors' conflicts of interest, see Moran, 
supra, at 1155-62; Richard H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of 
Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 Ky. L.J. 1 (1992-93) [hereinafter 
Underwood]. 
74. E.g., ALA. CODE § 28-4-314 (1990) (private parties given the right to prose-
cute violations of laws prohibiting "the evils of intemperance"); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19-717 (1988) (allowing the employment of a private prosecutor to assist the 
county attorney in any criminal matter); MINN. STAT. § 211A.08 (1992) (allowing 
any person to employ an attorney to assist the county attorney in the investigation 
and prosecution of any violation related to a statute entitled "Fair Campaign Prac-
tices"); MINN. STAT. § 211B.16 (1992) (allowing any person to employ an attorney to 
assist the county attorney in the investigation and prosecution of any violation of a 
statute related to campaign financial reports); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-63 (West 
1989) (allowing any citizen to employ an attorney to assist the prosecutor, and re-
quiring that such attorney be recognized by the prosecutor and the court as associate 
counsel); NEW JERSEY LOCAL COURT RULE 7:4-4{b) (authorizing "any attorney" to 
prosecute an action); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.165 (1990) (allowing the employment of 
a private prosecutor to assist the county attorney in any criminal matter); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 131.025 (1990) (prosecuting party in criminal case is State of Oregon 
"[e]xcept for offenses based on municipal or county ordinances"); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 8-7-401 (1993) ("A victim of crime or the family members of a victim of 
crime may employ private legal counsel to act as co-counsel with the district attor-
ney general or his deputies in trying cases, with the extent of participation of such 
privately employed counsel being at the discretion of the district attorney generaL"); 
cf W. VA. CODE 7-7-8 (1993) ("No provision of this section shall be construed to 
prohibit the employment of any person of a practicing attorney to assist in the prose-
cution of any person or corporation charged with a crime."). 
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The application of such a statute was recently at issue 
in a Tennessee case, State v. Bennett,75 where a murder vic-
tim's family employed two attorneys to serve as private 
prosecutors. Although the common law of Tennessee had 
recognized the right of a victim or the family of a deceased 
victim to employ private counsel to assist in a criminal pros-
ecution, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted a statute 
in 1978 which expressly codified this common law right. 
According to the statute: 
A victim of crime or the family members of a victim of 
crime may employ private counsel to act as co-counsel 
with the district attorney or his deputies in trying cases, 
with the extent of participation of such privately em-
ployed counsel being at the discretion of the district 
attorney general. The district attorney general or 
his deputies shall make the final and concluding 
argument.76 
Despite the vigorous opposition of the defendant in 
Bennett to the participation of the private prosecutors at 
trial, the two private attorneys both actively participated in 
all phases of the prosecution against the defendant. On ap-
peal, the constitutionality of the use of private prosecutors 
was upheld, with the court merely noting that the private 
prosecutors did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct or 
represent the family of the victim in a related civil suit. 
Noting that this prosecution was not a contempt prosecu-
tion arising out of a civil proceeding, the court rejected the 
defendant's due process and equal protection challenges to 
Tennessee's private prosecution statute.77 Although Ben-
nett was decided in 1990, the Bennett court made no refer-
ence to the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Young. 
In assessing the constitutionality of private prosecu-
tions, courts generally focus on the extent of trial participa-
tion by the private prosecutors. For example, in State v. 
Baker,78 the Kansas Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether the defendant's right to a fair trial was violated 
75. 798 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). 
76. [d. at 786 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-7-401 (1988». 
77. [d. at 785-86. 
78. 819 P.2d 1173 (Kan. 1991). 
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where it was alleged that an assistant private prosecutor ex-
ceeded the scope of his involvement permitted by Kansas 
law.79 Noting that the attorney hired by the victims' fami-
lies was an "assistant prosecutor," rather than a "special 
prosecutor," under Kansas law,80 the Baker court held that 
an assistant prosecutor "may take an active role in the pro-
ceedings, and need not confine himself to taking notes and 
advising the district attorney .... "81 The privately retained 
attorney in Baker performed (1) the voir dire of the jury, 
(2) the direct and redirect examination of his client, (3) the 
direct and cross-examination of the psychiatric expert wit-
nesses relative to the defendant's insanity defense, (4) the 
cross-examination of the defense witnesses, and (5) the sec-
79. Section 19-717 of the Kansas Statutes provides as follows: 
That the prosecuting witness in any criminal action or proceeding may, 
at his own expense, employ an attorney or attorneys to assist the county 
attorney to perform his duties in any criminal action or proceeding under 
any of the laws of the state of Kansas, and such attorney or attorneys shall 
be recognized by the county attorney and court as associate counsel in such 
action or proceeding, and no prosecution shall be dismissed over the objec-
tion of such associate counsel until the reason of the county attorney for 
such dismissal, together with the objections thereto of such associate coun-
sel, shall have been filed in writing, argued by counsel, and fully considered 
by the court. 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-717 (1988). 
80. Section 19-717 of the Kansas Statutes governs the use of assistant prosecu-
tors, while section 22-2202(17) of the Kansas Statutes governs the use of special 
prosecutors. Section 22-2202(17) of the Kansas Statutes defines a "(p]rosecuting at-
torney" as "any attorney who is authorized by law to appear for and on behalf of the 
state of Kansas in a criminal case, and includes the attorney general, an assistant 
attorney general, the county or district attorney, an assistant county or district attor-
ney, and any special prosecutor whose appearance is approved by the court." In 
State v. Berg the Kansas Supreme Court discussed the difference between a special 
prosecutor and an assistant prosecutor. 
[A]n attorney hired by the complaining witness to assist the prosecutor 
pursuant to 19,717 is not a "special prosecutor" within the meaning of 22-
2202(19). Although we find no Kansas cases which define "special prose-
cutor," we are of the opinion that ... it refers to one who is temporarily 
appointed by the court to replace the absent county attorney pursuant to 
K.S.A. 19-711 or 19-715. The 19-717 attorney does not take over the role 
of the prosecutor. The controlling word in 19-717 is "assist." The attorney 
is to assist the prosecutor who will maintain ultimate control of the case. 
Berg, 694 P.2d 427, 431 (Kan. 1985). 
81. Baker, 819 P.2d at 1184. In Berg, the Kansas Supreme Court held that an 
assistant prosecutor retained by the complaining witness did not have the right to 
take appeal from an order dismissing the criminal complaint. Berg, 694 P.2d at 429-
31; see also State ex rei. Rome v. Fountain, 678 P.2d 146, 153 (Kan. 1984) (a com-
plaining witness has no right to challenge a decision by the prosecutor to dismiss). 
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ond half of the State's closing argument. Rejecting the de-
fendant's contention that the privately retained attorney 
was acting as the "lead" counsel for the State,82 the Baker 
court affirmed the defendant's conviction for, among other 
things, first degree murder and kidnapping.83 
The high profile case of Person v. Mille,s4 provides a 
good illustration of how lower courts have analyzed the 
constitutionality of private prosecutors. In that case, Bobby 
Person, a black citizen of North Carolina, filed a class ac-
tion suit in 1984 against the Carolina Knights of the Klu 
Klux Klan ("CKKKK"), and, among others, its leader, 
Glen Miller. The suit alleged that the defendants had en-
gaged in a series of violent and intimidating acts against 
blacks throughout North Carolina, thereby depriving blacks 
of their rights under state and federal law. After the district 
court certified a class consisting of "all black citizens in the 
State of North Carolina," the parties to the lawsuit entered 
into a consent decree in 1985 which, inter alia, prohibited 
Miller and the CKKKK from "operat[ing] a paramilitary 
organization and do[ing] other acts" prohibited by North 
Carolina law. During the course of the litigation, Person 
was represented at all times by Morris Dees, a leading civil 
rights activist.85 
In April 1986, Person's counsel, Dees, sought to cite 
Miller and the White Patriot Organization ("WPP"), the 
successor organization of the CKKKK, for criminal con-
tempt of court. In this respect, Person's complaint alleged 
that Miller and the WPP had violated the court's order by 
operating a paramilitary organization and engaging in con-
duct in violation of North Carolina law. The court initially 
authorized Dees to prosecute the contempt action.86 Based 
upon the court's authorization, Dees actively prepared the 
82. Baker, 819 P.2d at 1183. 
83. [d. at 1176, 1190. Notably, the Kansas Supreme Court has recognized that 
"[a]n attorney who is hired by a complaining witness must act in the interest of his 
client which may not be in the interest of the general public." Berg, 694 P.2d at 432. 
But cf Rome, 678 P.2d at 152 (a person representing the State must be a "Iaw-
trained, independent public prosecutor rather than a vengeful prosecutor"). 
84. 854 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1988). 
85. See MORRIS DEES, A SEASON FOR JUSTICE (1991). 
86. Person, 854 F.2d at 659. 
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case until June 1986. He filed several amendments to the 
original complaint, moved the court to add various parties 
as defendants, and conducted discovery. However, in June 
1986, the attorney for Miller moved to have Dees disquali-
fied on the grounds that Dees' appointment violated the 
North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct and Miller's 
due process right to be prosecuted by an impartial prosecu-
tor. Ultimately, the district court ruled that the prosecution 
of the case must be under the "direct supervision and con-
trol" of the United States Attorney's Office, although Dees 
was authorized to "assist" the United States Attorney's Of-
fice "prior to and during the course of the trial. "87 At trial, 
Dees examined witnesses, participated in both opening and 
closing argument, as well as made and responded to objec-
tions and arguments.88 
After Miller was convicted of criminal contempt, 
Miller appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, arguing that Dees' trial participation vi-
olated the rule established by the Supreme Court in Young. 
In particular, Miller contended that Dees functioned as 
"lead" or "primary" counsel, effectively controlling Miller's 
prosecution. In support of this contention, Miller asserted 
that 
(1) Dees singly conducted the prosecution until the 
case was referred to the United State's Attorney's Of-
fice some two weeks prior to the original trial date; 
(2) Dees took substantially more time in opening and 
closing arguments than did government trial counsel; 
(3) Dees examined virtually all the significant wit-
nesses, and 
(4) Dees made and responded to most of the objections 
and arguments at tria1.89 
Accepting the accuracy of these assertions regarding 
the degree of Dees' participation, the Fourth Circuit held 
that the participation by Dees in the criminal contempt 
prosecution did not constitute reversible error. According 
to the opinion of Judge Phillips: "Dees' participation was 
87. Id. 
88. [d. at 663. 
89. [d. 
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limited in its total compass to assisting government counsel 
in a subordinate role. "90 While acknowledging that the 
Supreme Court's decision in Young was relevant to the is-
sue of Dees' trial participation, the Fourth Circuit distin-
guished the Young decision. According to the Fourth 
Circuit: 
Young flatly proscribes turning the prosecution com-
pletely over to private counsel for interested parties, 
but it certainly did not proscribe all participation by 
such counsel. Indeed, and to the contrary, the Young 
Court was at pains to point out that private counsel's 
greater familiarity with the case might properly "be put 
to use in assisting a disinterested prosecutor in pursuing 
the contempt action." The limits of such allowable 
assistance were also suggested: assistance may not ex-
tend to the point that "counsel for the private party [is] 
... in control of the prosecution."91 
Thus, the Person court read Young "at least implicitly 
to approve (or certainly not to forbid) the practice of al-
lowing private counsel for interested parties to participate 
formally with government counsel in the prosecution of 
contempt citations" so long as three conditions were met. 
First, the participation of private counsel must have been 
approved by government counsel. Second, the private par-
ticipation must consist solely of rendering assistance in a 
90. [d. 
91. Person, 854 F.2d at 663 (quoting Young, 481 U.S. at 806 n.17). According to 
the Person court: 
The more appropriate analytic focus is on the evil at which the Young rule 
forbidding total abdication to private counsel for interested parties was 
aimed. That evil was the possibility that the criminal contempt sanction 
would be invoked and prosecuted by private counsel, operating in the ad-
versarial mode, solely to secure advantage to his client and hence without 
regard for any interests of the defendant and the public in fairness of the 
criminal process. That evil is sufficiently guarded against-both in appear-
ance and reality-by the presence of disinterested government counsel ef-
fectively in a position and manifestly prepared to exercise control over the 
critical prosecutorial decisions-most critically, whether to prosecute, what 
targets of prosecution to select, what investigative powers to utilize, what 
sanctions to seek, plea bargains to strike, or immunities to grant. It is con-
trol over these critical prosecutorial decisions which determine the fairness 
of particular prosecutions that is the important consideration; operational 
conduct of the trial is actually of subordinate concern, except as it may 
actually impact upon the more fundamental prosecutorial decisions. 
[d. at 663-64 (citations omitted). 
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subordinate role to government counsel. Finally, the partic-
ipation must not rise "in practice to the level of effective 
control of the prosecution. "92 
In several other post-Young cases, the families of crime 
victims have been allowed to retain private counsel to pros-
ecute the accused. For example, in Commonwealth v. Hub-
bard,93 the Kentucky Supreme Court allowed an attorney 
for the decedent's family to prosecute a defendant charged 
with reckless homicide. Likewise, in State v. Worley,94 the 
West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed a murder conviction 
where a county prosecutor withdrew an offer to accept the 
defendant's plea of gUilty to the charge of first degree mur-
der with a recommendation of mercy. This withdrawal 
came after a private prosecutor hired by the deceased's 
family relayed the family's wish that the case be vigorously 
prosecuted.95 
Significantly, many pre-Young cases also approved of 
the use of private prosecutors retained by crime victims or 
their families. 96 For instance, in Woods v. Linahan,97 the 
Fifth Circuit held that a defendant charged with murder and 
armed robbery was not denied due process by the participa-
92. [d. In this final respect, the Person court stated as follows: "We can con-
ceive of situations in which without ever relinquishing effective control of the prose· 
cution government counsel might for tactical reasons give over even more 
substantial portions of the actual conduct of trial to particularly skilled or knowl-
edgeable private counsel." [d. 
93. 777 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1989). 
94. 369 S.E.2d 706, 718-19 (W. Va. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 895 (1988). 
95. As one commentator has noted: 
Because the allegiance owed by a private prosecutor to a possibly vengeful 
client must coexist with the impartiality demanded in the role of solicitor, a 
fair termination of any plea bargaining based on the equities of the situa-
tion is highly unlikely. The public solicitor who is in control of the plea 
bargain is less likely to be fair if he is assisted and counseled by a private 
advocate. If the private prosecutor is given control of the plea bargaining, 
the interest of his client might override those of the public in determining 
whether a plea to a lesser crime should be accepted. 
John A.J. Ward, Note, Private Prosecution-The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C. L. 
REV. 1171, 1175-76 (1972) (footnote omitted). 
96. Park v. State, 170 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. 1969), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 935 
(1972) (attorney allowed to assist prosecutor in murder case despite representation 
of widow in wrongful death action); State v. Addis, 186 S.E.2d 415 (S.C. 1972) (at-
torney representing family of deceased in wrongful death action allowed to partici-
pate in involuntary manslaughter prosecution). 
97. 648 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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tion at trial of a private attorney retained and paid for by 
the family and friends of the victim. Although the private 
prosecutor's initial activities in Woods were said to "border 
on a constitutional violation,"98 the Fifth Circuit ultimately 
decided that the activities of a new district attorney, who 
took a more active role in the prosecution,99 "cured any de-
fect that may have occurred in the pretrial stages" of the 
case. tOO Although the use of a private prosecutor was ap-
proved in Woods, the Fifth Circuit was not without 
reservations: 
While we find that no error is shown in this case, 
we note our concern about the practice of using a pri-
vate attorney, paid by family and friends of the victim, 
to prosecute persons accused of murdering a person 
dear to the person paying the private prosecutor. 
Human experience indicates that an attorney who is 
paid by a group of people to provide a service has some 
loyalty to those persons paying his fee. This loyalty may 
serve to prejudice the well recognized rights of a de-
fendant accused of committing a crime. While we do 
not intimate that a defendant will always be prejudiced 
by the participation of a private attorney in a criminal 
prosecution, the chances are greater in this situation 
than where the state's attorney, or an attorney ap-
pointed and paid by the state, prosecutes the case.lOt 
Private prosecutors have been approved in pre-Young cases 
for all types of prosecutions, including murder 
prosecutions.102 
98. The private prosecutor's initial activities in Woods included interviewing 
witnesses, filing motions, and developing trial strategy without the knowledge and 
consent of the district attorney. 
99. The new district attorney made the opening statement, examined witnesses, 
and made the closing statement. 
100. Woods, 648 F.2d at 977. 
101. Id. In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Young that harmless error 
analysis is inappropriate, the Woods case is superseded by Young in that "prejudice" 
to the defendant is no longer the appropriate focus when considering whether a due 
process violation has occurred. Indeed, because the focus in Young was on the ap-
pearance of justice, the notion in Woods that prejudice is important is no longer 
relevant. See In re Davidson, 908 F.2d 1249, 1251 (5th Cir. 1990) (adopting as its 
own rule the position put forth by a plurality of the Young Court that "where, as 
here, there is a Young violation, 'harmless error analysis is inappropriate"'). 
102. Powers v. Hauck, 399 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1968) (murder); Brooks v. State, 
228 So. 2d 24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1969) (murdE;r); Lopez v. State, 437 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. 
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In some states, such as North Carolina, the use of pri-
vate attorneys to assist in criminal prosecutions is said to 
have existed in North Carolina courts "from their incipi-
ency."103 For example, in the pre-Young case of State v. 
Moose,104 the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that 
"[t]he law in [North Carolina] with respect to private prose-
cutors is clear: absent some evidence that the private pros-· 
ecutor has in fact ignored the interests of justice in seeking 
a conviction, his assistance of the public prosecutor is not a 
per se constitutional violation. "105 The court further stated 
the following: 
[T]he defendant's concerns over the "fundamental fair-
ness" of the use of private prosecutors in general are 
adequately addressed by existing safeguards. Private 
prosecutors, like all attorneys, are officers of the court, 
bound by the ethical responsibilities set forth in the 
Code of Professional Responsibility; guided by statu-
tory rules and case law; and always controlled by the 
trial judge whose overriding concern is to insure orderly 
and evenhanded conduct in his courtroom.106 
Nevertheless, when a trial court permits a private prosecu-
tor to be employed in North Carolina,t°7 the district attor-
App. 1968) (murder); see also Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District 
Attorneys' Unwarranted Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 220 & n.57 (1955) (citing cases 
where private prosecutors have been used to prosecute, among other crimes, mur-
der, manslaughter, burglary, larceny, criminal libel, adultery, and rape). 
103. State v. Best, 186 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. 1972). In North Carolina, the use of 
private prosecutors has been upheld in numerous cases. State v. Westbrook, 181 
S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1971), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); State v. Carden, 183 
S.E. 898 (N.C. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936); see also State v. Branch, 220 
S.E.2d 495, 517 (N.C. 1975), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909 (1977) (the use of a private 
prosecutor did not create an atmosphere in which it was impossible for the defend-
ant to receive a trial consistent with the requirements of due process). Nevertheless, 
the permissibility of private prosecutors in North Carolina rests within the discretion 
of the trial judge. Branch, 220 S.E.2d at 577; State v. Lippard, 25 S.E.2d 594, 599 
(N.C. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 749 (1943). 
104. 313 S.E.2d 507 (N.C. 1984). 
105. [d. at 512 (citations omitted). 
106. Id. at 513. 
107. In North Carolina, trial courts have the discretion to allow the use of pri-
vate prosecutors. State v. Boykin, 259 S.E.2d 883, 891 (N.C. 1979), cert. denied, 446 
U.S. 911 (1980). The trial court's discretion in this regard is only interfered with 
upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Id.; State v. Carden, 183 S.E. 898 (N.C. 
1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 682 (1936). 
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ney must remain in control of the prosecution. lOS Post-
Young cases in North Carolina have permitted the use of 
private prosecutors without citation to Young. 109 
In the state of West Virginia, the right to obtain a pri-
vate prosecutor is likewise not absolute and has always 
been subject to judicial control and review,uo However, in 
order to overturn a conviction on appeal, a defendant must 
show that the private prosecutor's misconduct in some way 
prejudiced the defendant.11l A defendant is not subject to 
impermissible "prosecutorial overmatch" simply because a 
private attorney is retained by the victim's family to prose-
cute the case against the defendant. As the West Virginia 
Supreme Court stated in Acord v. Hedrick: "A mere imbal-
ance between defense counsel and prosecution does not in-
validate a criminal trial. Due process of law does not 
require that every criminal case be prosecuted by a Thomas 
Dewey, defended by a Clarence Darrow, and tried before a 
John Marshall."112 
Pre-Young cases from other jurisdictions also have up-
held the constitutionality of private prosecutors. For exam-
ple, in Jones v. Richards,113 the defendant claimed that his 
constitutional right to an impartial prosecutor was violated 
by the simultaneous involvement of private attorneys (re-
tained by the victim's family) in filing civil actions and as-
108. State v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507, 513 (N.C. 1984) ("The record before us 
discloses that the district attorney was at all times in control of the prosecution; that 
he adequately supervised the participation of the private prosecutor; and that the 
two attorneys worked as a team sharing the workload evenly."); State v. Page, 206 
S.E.2d 771, 772 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied,209 S.E.2d 287 (N.C. 1974). 
109. State v. Camacho, 406 S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1991); State v. Woodruff, 392 
S.E.2d 434 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990), affd, 399 S.E.2d 114 (N.C. 1991) (per curiam). 
110. Acord v. Hedrick, 342 S.E.2d 120, 126 (W. Va. 1986); State v. Atkins, 261 
S.E.2d 55, 58 (W. Va. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980). 
111. Acord v. Hedrick, 342 S.E.2d 120, 126 (W. Va. 1986); State v. Riser, 294 
S.E.2d 461, 466 (W. Va. 1982); see also State v. Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55, 59 (W. Va. 
1979) (it was not reversible error for private prosecutor not to disclose the amount 
of his fee). 
112. Acord, 342 S.E.2d at 123 (citing MACKLIN FLEMING, THE PRICE OF PER-
FECT JUSTICE 5 (1974»; see also State v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507, 513 (N.C. 1984) 
("Nor do we find persuasive the argument that assistance of a private prosecutor 
results in a 'mismatching' of legal talent and experience to a defendant's disadvan-
tage. We know of no law that requires counsel to be equal to or better or greater in 
number than counsel for the opposition."). 
113. 776 F.2d 1244 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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sisting in North Carolina's· prosecution of his criminal 
casey4 Although the Fourth Circuit, applying North Caro-
lina law, noted that the private attorneys had a financial in-
terest in the outcome of the civil actions, the Fourth Circuit 
held that no evidence demonstrated the private attorneys 
attempted to use their position as prosecuting attorneys "to 
exact a more generous settlement of the civil actions."1l5 In 
another case, Sedelbauer v. State,116 an Indiana appellate 
court upheld the conviction of an adult bookstore worker 
for distributing an allegedly obscene film depicting homo-
sexual acts, despite the trial court's decision to allow a 
member of an anti-obscenity group, Citizens for Decency 
through Law, to act as the public prosecutor's co-counsel.117 
B. Jurisdictions Prohibiting Private Prosecutors 
Several pre-Young cases either restricted or outlawed 
the use of private prosecutors on behalf of interested par-
tiesYS For instance, in State v. Harrington,119 the defendant 
114. But see Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 713 (4th Cir. 1967) (where a prose-
cutor was representing the defendant's wife in a divorce action at the same time that 
he was prosecuting the defendant, the defendant's prosecutor "was not in a position 
to exercise fair-minded judgment with respect to (1) whether to decline to prosecute, 
(2) whether to reduce the charge to a lesser degree of assault, or (3) whether to 
recommend a suspended sentence or other clemency"). 
115. Jones, 776 F.2d at 1246; see also North Carolina State Bar Ethics Opinion 
595 ("It is ethical for an attorney who has represented the private prosecution in a 
criminal action growing out of an automobile collision to later represent the same 
party in a civil action for damages growing out of the same collision."). 
116. 455 N.E.2d 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
117. [d. at 1164. 
118. Some state laws specifically prohibit the use of private prosecutors. For 
example, in Georgia, Superior Court Rule 42.1 provides that "[pJrivate special pros-
ecutors retained by the family or. relatives of one named as a victim in an indictment 
or accusation may not participate in the prosecution of a criminal case." But see 
Sustakovitch v. State, 290 S.E.2d 77 (Ga. 1982) (the victim's attorney, who was al-
lowed to sit at counsel table, was not a special prosecutor); Rutledge v. State, 267 
S.E.2d 199, 200 (Ga. 1980) (participation of special prosecutor hired by the victim's 
family did not violate the defendant's due process rights in a murder prosecution 
where the special prosecutor (1) was subject to the control and direction of the dis-
trict attorney and (2) was not paid or reimbursed for his expenses by the district 
attorney's office); Rogers v. State, 348 S.E.2d 888 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (there was no 
violation of Rule 42.1 where a private attorney, representing the parents of a victim, 
assisted in arranging for the appearance of an expert witness in the defendant's pros-
ecution where (1) the parents' attorney did not sit at counsel table, (2) the attorney 
took no part in the actual trial of the case, (3) the attorney did not assist in the 
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was convicted of second degree murder after a private at-
torney, hired by the victim's father, assisted in the prosecu-
tion of the defendant's case. On appeal, however, the 
Supreme Court of Missouri held that "the practice of al-
lowing private prosecutors, employed by private persons, to 
participate in the prosecution of criminal defendants, is fun-
damentally unfair."120 Thus, the court held that the use of a 
private prosecutor should not be permitted on retrial of the 
case or "in any case tried after publication of this opinion in 
the Southwestern Reporter."121 Likewise, in Cantrell v. Vir-
ginia,122 the Virginia Supreme Court held that an attorney 
retained by an interested party could not prosecute the 
case. According to the court: "[A] private prosecutor hav-
ing a civil interest in the case so infects the prosecution with 
the possibility that private vengeance has been substituted 
for impartial application of the criminal law, that no preju-
dice to the defendant need be shown. "123 
In the post-Young era, a handful of cases have held 
that the use of a private prosecutor violates a defendant's 
constitutional rights. For example, in People v. Calder-
preparation of the State's case and was not present when the expert witness was 
interviewed, and (4) the expert was paid by the State). 
119. 534 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. 1976) (en banc). 
120. [d. at 48. According to the Harrington court: 
The modern day prosecutor wields the power of the State's investigatory 
force, decides whom to indict and prosecute, decides what evidence to sub-
mit to the court, negotiates the State's position in plea bargaining and rec-
ommends punishment to the court. The entry of a private prosecutor into a 
criminal prosecution exposes all of these areas to prejudicial influence. We 
consider such exposure intolerable. 
[d. at 50. 
121. [d. at 48. A dissenting opinion in Harrington would have upheld the use of 
private prosecutors. According to that opinion: "The practice of employing private 
counsel is rarely used in this state. I see no necessity for this court, however, to 
decree that the practice is absolutely outlawed." Ed. at 52 (Holman, J., dissenting). 
In State ex rei. Wild v. Otis, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, absent 
legislative authority, a system of private prosecution would not be permitted. 257 
N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978). Noting that it could 
find no such authority, the court stated, "[t]his [lack of authority] is not surprising 
because to permit such prosecutions would entail grave danger of vindictive use of 
the processes of the criminal law and could well lead to chaos in the administration 
of criminal justice." [d. at 365. 
122. 329 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1985), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 911 (1990). 
123. [d. at 26. 
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one,124 a prosecution for criminal mischief in the fourth de-
gree was commenced by the law firm of De Maio and 
Hughes on behalf of the owner of a condominium, Vincent 
Riso. The defendant was served with the summons and ar-
raigned on the accusatory instrument which alleged that he 
caused damage to the carpet, walls, and doors of the condo-
minium building in which Riso had an interest. Signifi-
cantly, De Maio and Hughes, the law firm retained by Riso, 
was also representing Riso in a civil lawsuit against the de-
fendant, who was a condominium unit owner.125 
Under the facts of Calderone, a New York court 
granted the defendant's motion to disqualify the law firm of 
De Maio and Hughes. In so holding, the court concluded 
that private prosecutions by interested parties or their at-
torneys present inherent conflicts of interest which violate a 
defendant's due process rights.126 According to the court: 
Compelling support for this conclusion is found in the 
opinions of Justices Brennan and Blackmun in Young v. 
United States. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, one 
hundred years ago in Biemel v. State, 37 N.W. 244, 244-
45 (Wis. 1888), stated, "We think public policy, and the 
fair, just, and impartial administration of the criminal 
law of the state, make it the duty of the courts to ex-
clude the paid attorneys of private persons from ap-
pearing as prosecutors." This court agrees and goes 
further, holding that due process requires that the indi-
vidual who prosecutes a criminal case not have any per-
sonal or financial interest in the prosecution nor an 
attorney-client relationship with any of the parties.127 
124. 573 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
125. [d. at 1005. 
126. [d. at 1007. 
127. [d. at 1009 (citing Young v. United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 
U.S. 787, 810, 814-15 (1987) (Justice Brennan's and Justice Blackmun's opinions». 
Significantly, several other New York cases have discussed the propriety of private 
prosecutors. Compare People v. Garfield, 574 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502 (N.Y. Just. Ct. 
1991) ("[I]n the opinion of this Court ... the failure to provide a professional evalu-
ation of such cases by a neutral prosecutor may result in improper charges and con-
victions and denies a defendant the due process of law."); People v. Benoit, 575 
N.Y.S.2d 750, 757 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991) (private prosecution of tenant by landlord 
violates the tenant's due process and equal protection rights); People v. Zimmer, 434 
N.Y.S.2d 206 (N.Y. 1980) (conviction of a corporation manager reversed where the 
district attorney had a financial interest in the corporation); People v. Franklin, 369 
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In another New York case, People v. Benoit,128 a city statute 
providing for prosecutions by private citizens was held to 
violate not only the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also the New 
York Constitution's due process clause. In Benoit, a land-
lord commenced a private prosecution against a tenant af-
ter the local district attorney declined to prosecute the 
tenant. 
IV. PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS 
Prosecutors in the United States occupy a dual role in 
the criminal justice system. "They are the only governmen-
tal officers responsible for obtaining convictions of the 
guilty in litigated criminal cases; but they also bear alone 
the state's considerable responsibility to see that no inno-
cent person is prosecuted, convicted, or punished."129 This 
dual role is in sharp contrast to the role of private counsel, 
whose primary obligation is to protect a client's interests. 
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly 
states that "[t]he duty of a lawyer ... is to represent his 
N.Y.S.2d 531 (A.D.2d 1975) (permitting attorney representing one of complaining 
witnesses who was under indictment on unrelated charge to sit at counsel table and 
to object to questions put to witness on cross-examination was error that required 
new trial); People v. Vlasto, 355 N.Y.S.2d 983 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1974) (private prose-
cution of a Class A misdemeanor not authorized) with Read v. Sacco, 375 N.Y.S.2d 
371 (N.Y.A.D. 2d Dept. 1975) (private prosecution of a Class A misdemeanor au-
thorized); People v. Cuozzo, 412 N.Y.S.2d 748, 752 (City Ct. White Plains 1978) 
(court denied private attorney leave to prosecute a police officer involved in a traffic 
accident with his client-defendant because it was "virtually impossible to ask [the] 
defense attorney, or any defense attorney so situated, to act with objectivity and 
complete impartiality as a prosecutor in a criminal proceeding against a police of-
ficer who is responsible for the charge against his client"); People v. Vial, 502 
N.Y.S.2d 930 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1986) (attorney for defendant prosecuted by district 
attorney permitted to act as prosecutor in cross-complaint against his accuser); Peter 
L. Davis, The Crime Victim's "Right" to a Criminal Prosecution: A Proposed Model 
Statute for the Governance of Private Criminal Prosecutions, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 329 
(1989) (detailing New York case law regarding the use of private prosecutors); see 
also Rochez v. Mittleton, 1993 WL 530947 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 1993) (dismissal of a 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of New York, the Bronx District Attorney, 
and others alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights because of a municipal pol-
icy allowing private prosecutions to be commenced by any "complaining witness," 
including interested parties). 
128. 575 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1991). 
129. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, § 13.10.1, at 759 (1986) 
[hereinafter WOLFRAM]. 
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client zealously within the 1?ounds of the law. "130 This situa-
tion has lead one scholar to remark that the prosecutor's 
role is "much nearer that of a judicial officer than that of 
partisan advocate. "131 
In Berger v. United Statesp2 the United States 
Supreme Court formally recognized the distinctive role that 
a prosecutor plays in American society. The Court de-
clared the following: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of 
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is 
in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the 
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not es-
cape nor innocence suffer. He may prosecute with ear-
nestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to 
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring 
about a just one.133 
130. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1984). 
131. WOLFRAM, supra note 129, § 13.10.1, at 759 (footnote omitted); see also 
Fred Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecu-
tors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991) (outlining the ethical duty of prosecu-
tors to "do justice"). Indeed, a "quasi-judicial" label has been attached to 
prosecutors. E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 (1976) (citations omit-
ted) ("It is the fundamental comparability of their [discretionary] judgments to those 
of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to 
as 'quasi-judicial' officers, and their immunities being termed 'quasi-judicial' as 
well."); id. at 438 (White, J., concurring) ("the prosecutor performs a 'quasi-judicial' 
function"); see also Ganger, 379 F.2d at 714; State v. Chambers, 524 P.2d 999, 1002-
03 (1974), cert. denied, 524 P.2d 988 (N.M. 1974); McGinley v. Hynes, 432 N.Y.S.2d 
689,412 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981); State ex rei. Mo-
ran v. Ziegler, 244 S.E.2d 550, 552 (W. Va. 1978); State v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d 710, 717 
(W. Va. 1977); Sidman, supra note 11, at 792 & n.193 (citing additional cases where 
prosecutors have been described as "quasi-judicial"); ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Standard 3-1.1 cmt. (1979) ("[T]he prosecutor has sometimes been described 
as a 'minister of justice' or as occupying a quasi-judicial position."). 
132. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
133. [d. at 88; see also Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers Int'l, Inc., 760 F.2d 
698, 705 (6th Cir. 1985) ("It is too much to expect an attorney committed to his 
client and the client's cause to recognize the 'twofold aim' referred to in Berger 
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This duty of fairness has been held to apply even where the 
prosecutor strongly believes that the accused is guilty.134 
The unique role of the prosecutor was originally 
codified in Ethical Consideration 7-13 of Canon 7 of the 
American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. That Ethical Consideration reads as 
follows: 
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from 
that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not 
merely to convict. This special duty exists because: (1) 
the prosecutor represents the sovereign and therefore 
should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of gov-
ernmental powers, such as in the selection of cases to 
prosecute; (2) during the trial the prosecutor is not only 
an advocate but he also may make decisions normally 
made by an individual client, and those affecting the 
public interest should be fair to all; and (3) in our sys-
tem of criminal justice the accused is to be given the 
benefit of all reasonable doubts. With respect to evi-
dence and witnesses, the prosecutor has responsibilities 
different from those of a lawyer in private practice: the 
prosecutor should make timely disclosure to the de-
fense of available evidence, known to him, that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of 
the offense, or reduce the punishment. Further, a pros-
ecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evi-
dence merely because he believes it will damage the 
prosecutor's case or aid the accused.135 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which have re-
placed the Model Code in most states, also make the prose-
when acting as prosecutor in proceedings which, if successful, can benefit immeasur-
ably that client and his cause."). 
134. State v. Sha, 193 N.W.2d 829 (Minn. 1972). 
135. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1982); ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-1.1(c) (1979) ("The duty of the prosecu-
tor is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Standard 3-1.1 cmt. (1979) ("[I]t is fundamental that the prosecutor's obligation is to 
protect the innocent as well as convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused 
as well as to enforce the rights of the public."); see Polo Fashions, 760 F.2d at 704-05; 
cf Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974) ("The function of the 
prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is not to tack as many skins of victims as 
possible to the wall. His function is to vindicate the right of people as expressed in 
the laws and give those accused of crime a fair triaL"). 
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cutor's role explicit: "A prosecutor has the responsibility of 
a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. 
This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see 
that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that 
gUilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. "136 
Thus, the Supreme Court has "long emphasized" that a 
prosecutor is held to "a higher standard of behavior" than 
defense counsel. 137 
As attorneys, all prosecutors are subject to the applica-
ble ethical codes and laws in their respective jurisdictions. 
For example, under federal law, the Justice Department 
mandates that its attorneys follow the ABA's Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility,138 which contains numerous 
provisions relating to conflicts of interest.139 Furthermore, 
federal prosecutors are prohibited by statute from repre-
senting the government in any matter in which they, their 
family, or their business associates have any interest,14o 
136. MODEL RVLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDver Rule 3.8 cmt. (1984). 
137. United States v.Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
138. 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-1(b) (1986). 
139. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1982) 
(lawyer should refuse to accept or continue employment if the interests of another 
client may impair the exercise of his or her independent judgment); EC 5-1 (profes-
sional judgment of lawyer should be exercised solely for the benefit of client, free of 
"compromising influences and loyalties"); EC 5-2 (lawyer should not accept prof-
fered employment if reasonable probability that personal interests will "affect ad-
versely the advice to be given or services to be rendered the prospective client"); EC 
5-14 (independent professional judgment compromised when lawyer asked to repre-
sent two or more clients "who may have differing interests, whether such interests 
be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant"); EC 5-15 (if possibility 
of conflict in representation of mUltiple clients, lawyer "should resolve all doubts 
against the propriety of the representation"); EC 9-6 (lawyer has duty to avoid "not 
only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety"). For an arti-
cle discussing prosecutorial conflict of interest issues, see Susan Brenner & James 
Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor Conflicts of Interest, 6 OEO. J. LEGAL ETH· 
ICS 415 (1993). 
140. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1988); see also United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (prosecutor cannot participate in case in which he has 
a pecuniary interest in the outcome), cert. denied sub nom., Hubbard v. United 
States, 456 U.S. 926 (1982); Nolan, supra note 60, at 47-50 (detailing the conflict of 
interest provisions to which federal prosecutors are subject). Notably, the United 
States Attorney's Manual also cautions against activity that "creates or appears to 
create a conflict of interest." United States Attorney's Manual, TItle 10-2.664 
(1984); see also id. at § 10-2.666 (cautioning lawyers about membership in bar 
groups, public commissions, and private business organizations because of the po-
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State laws have similar ethics provisions for prosecutors,141 
with all attorneys being subject to professional discipline, 
a court's contempt power, and a court's "supervisory 
authority. "142 
Aside from these regulatory constraints, prosecutors 
have ethical duties to defendants during every stage of the 
criminal process. For example, a prosecutor has an obliga-
tion to deal fairly in presenting an ex parte case to the grand 
jury. Thus, in United States v. Hogan,143 an indictment was 
dismissed because a prosecutor's misconduct before the 
grand jury was fundamentally unfair. l44 Likewise, prosecu-
tors are obligated to protect an individual's pretrial rights145 
and are obligated not to seek convictions in cases that are 
not supported by "probable cause."146 
tential for an appearance of a conflict of interest); id. at § 10-2.660 (incorporating 
the Department of Justice Standards of Conduct, 28 C.F.R. § 45 (1984), which con-
tain broad restrictions regarding the permissible activities of employees in order to 
avoid any actual or apparent conflict of interest). 
141. E.g., MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONouer Rule 3.8 (1988); see 
also State v. Marshall, 586 A.2d 85 (N.J. 1991) (court can disqualify prosecutor for 
personal interest or financial stake in outcome of criminal prosecution). Signifi-
cantly, many states have enacted laws which prohibit prosecutors from accepting 
fees from private parties and from participating in civil actions whose facts form the 
basis of a criminal case. Sidman, supra note 11, at 778 & n.132 (citing statutes). For 
a recent annotation addressing the issue of when a prosecuting attorney must be 
disqualified based upon a relationship with the alleged victim or the victim's family, 
see Christopher Vaeth, Disqualification or Recusal of Prosecuting Attorney Because 
of Relationship With Alleged Victim or Victim's Family, 12 A.L.R. 5TH 909 (1993) 
(citing cases). 
142. WOLFRAM, supra note 129, § 13.10.2, at 760-61 (citations omitted); see also 
State v. Wilson, 545 A.2d 1178, 1183 (Del. 1988) ("[a] court may, through its inher-
ent authority to regulate the status of those who appear before it in a representative 
capacity, preclude the privatization of prosecutions initiated by a public 
prosecutor"). 
143. 712 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983). 
144. [d. at 759-62; see also United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979); 
United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 
(1977). 
145. Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a prosecutor "shall ... 
make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, 
and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity 
to obtain counsel .... " MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONouer Rule 3.8(b) 
(1984). Likewise, a prosecutor cannot "seek to obtain from an unrepresented ac-
cused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing 
.... " MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONouer Rule 3.8(c) (1984). 
146. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1982); 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONouer Rule 3.8(a) (1984); Calif. R. 7-102; 
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At trial, the prosecutor is obligated not to present false 
evidence. As the Supreme Court has stated in numerous 
cases, the violation of this duty offends due process and re-
quires the reversal of a defendant's conviction.147 Thus, as 
soon as the prosecutor is aware of false testimony, he or she 
has a duty to correct it, usually by disclosing the correct in-
formation to the defendant.148 Due process jurisprudence 
developed by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland149 
also requires prosecutors to produce to defendants exculpa-
tory material and evidence useful to impeach government 
witnesses.15o 
Prosecution Function Standards § 3-3.9 (approved 1979); see also MINNESOTA 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 3.8(a) (1988); United States v. Lovasco, 
431 U.S. 783 (1977) (it is "unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an 
indictment on less than probable cause"); Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 469 A.2d 252, 
255 (Pa. Super. 1983) (action should not go forward absent probable cause); In re 
Gonyo, 245 N.W.2d 893 (Wis. 1976) (prosecutor disciplined for breach of obligation 
to prosecute only on probable cause). Notably, some scholars have argued that 
prosecutors should be required to be personally convinced that the accused is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt before commencing a prosecution. M. FREEDMAN, 
LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 85-88 (1975). 
Significantly, the Supreme Court's decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, where the 
conviction of a Chinese person for operating a laundry without a license was re-
versed, also prohibits selective prosecution that is discriminatory in nature. 118 U.S. 
356 (1886). In Yick Wo, the record demonstrated that almost all Chinese who ap-
plied for a license were refused, while nearly all non-Chinese applicants received 
licenses. Under these facts, the Yick Wo Court held that discriminatorily selective 
enforcement is a complete bar to prosecution; it was irrelevant that the accused was 
guilty of the underlying criminal offense. 
147. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); see also United States v. Kelly, 543 F. 
Supp. 1303, 1309-10 (D. Mass. 1982) (a prosecutor may not present evidence that 
"he actually knows, or should know, to be false"). 
148. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103 (1935). 
149. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Court in Brady held that "suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due pro-
cess where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment." Id. at 87. 
150. Id. at 87; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). In Bagley, the Supreme Court held that the prose-
cution must disclose evidence "if there is some reasonable probability that, had the 
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." A "reasonable probability" is one that is "sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. For a discussion of this issue, 
see Terrence Galligan, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Af-
ter United States v. Bagley, 1 GEO. J. L. ETHICS 213 (1987). 
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In the United States, several court decisions have cited 
ethics provisions in rejecting the use of private prosecu-
tors.151 For example, in Young, the United States Supreme 
Court relied upon ethics provisions which require that law-
yers avoid conflicts of interest and avoid the mere appear-
ance of impropriety.152 Although courts disagree about the 
effect of a prosecutor's breach of the ethical rules,153 the 
Supreme Court's language in Young strongly suggests that 
professional ethics are an important consideration in ana-
lyzing a criminal defendant's due process rightS.154 
151. E.g., Young, 481 U.S. at 803-06 & nn.14-16; State v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 
44, 50 (Mo. 1976); see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-2.1 
(1979) (emphasis added) ("The prosecution function should be performed by a pub-
lic prosecutor who is a lawyer subject to the standards of professional conduct and 
discipline."). 
152. Young, 481 U.S. at 805 & nn.14-15; accord ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Standard 3-1.2 (1979) ("A prosecutor should avoid the appearance or reality 
of a conflict of interest with respect to official duties."); ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Standard 3-1.2 cmt. (1979) ("It is of utmost importance that the prosecutor 
avoid participation in a case in circumstances where any implication of partiality 
may cast a shadow over the integrity of the office."); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1983) ("A lawyer should avoid even the appear-
ance of professional impropriety."). Although the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct do not contain the "appearance of impropriety" language, largely because 
the drafters of the Model Rules felt the standard was too vague, the principle of 
Canon 9 is very much alive. First Am. Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d 669, 
671-72 (Ark. 1990) ("The fact that Canon 9 is not in the Model Rules does not mean 
that lawyers no longer have to avoid the appearance of impropriety .... [T]he 
principle [of Canon 9 still] applies because its meaning pervades the Rules and em-
bodies their spirit."); see also ANDREW KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY 54 (2d ed. 1984) (The term "appearance of impropriety" "evoke[s] the 
potential erosion of confidence in the profession that may occur if its members are 
seen in situations that carry the potential for improper conduct even if in particular 
cases there is no actual misconduct."). 
153. Compare Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational & 
Athletic Sales Equip. Corp., 546 F.2d 530, 539 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 
984 (1977) (holding that ethical rules regulate attorney conduct but do not "deline-
ate the rules of evidence") with United States v. Hammad, 858 F.2d 834, 840 (2d Cir. 
1988) (holding that suppression or exclusion of evidence may be a proper remedy 
for a prosecutor's ethical breach); United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981) (same); United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 
1344, 1353-54 (7th Cir. 1972) (same); United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433 
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (same). 
154. Accord Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) ("Federal courts 
have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within 
the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all 
who observe them."). 
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V. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRIVATE 
PROSECUTORS 
A. The Law of Due Process 
The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment pro-
hibits the federal government from depriving an individual 
"of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."155 
The states are similarly restricted by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which provides in part, "nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law."156 Above all else, "[t]he fundamental re-
quirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."157 Although 
it would be impossible for the Supreme Court to define 
what process is due in all circumstances,158 the Supreme 
Court, over time, has used several methods to determine 
whether a specific procedure is required in a given case. 
According to two legal scholars, Martin Redish and 
Lawrence Marshall, the Supreme Court has used three ap-
proaches in the last two centuries to determine how much 
process is due.159 Initially, the Supreme Court looked to 
what procedures were required by the English common 
law. For example, in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement CO.,t60 the Supreme Court analyzed the types 
of procedures that the framers of the Fifth Amendment 
155. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
156. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. It is firmly established that prosecutors' ac-
tions "may constitute state action within the purview of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); see also Sidman, supra note 11, at 
787-88 (same). 
157. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citation omitted). The 
Supreme Court "consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before 
an individual is finally deprived of a property interest." Id.; accord Wolff v. McDon-
nell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). 
158. "[D]ue Process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
159. See generally Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory In-
dependence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 468-72 
(1986)[hereinafter Redish & Marshall]; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-13, at 714-15 (1988) (outlining the Court's shifting 
methods of determining what process is due) [hereinafter TRIBE]. 
160. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
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would have considered "the law of the land."161 However, 
this "frozen-in-history" approach did not last long.162 Thus, 
in Twining v. New Jersey,163 the Supreme Court stated that 
the meaning of the due process clause "should be gradually 
ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the 
course of decisions of cases as they arise. "164 In essence, the 
Supreme Court abandoned the historical approach in favor 
of asking "whether a given procedure was essential to mod-
ern-as opposed to 17th century-notions of fairness. "165 
Having decided that history provides neither a floor nor 
a ceiling to modern due process, the Court began to 
struggle with the task of determining on a case-by-case 
basis whether a given procedure violated due process. 
For a long time, the Court seemed to deal in a rather 
intuitive way with the question of how much process 
was due .... During the Court's "intuitive" period, the 
Justices generally tended to treat due process as Justice 
Stewart treated obscenity-as recognizable, albeit 
undefinable.166 
In Mathews v. Eldridge,167 the Supreme Court em-
barked on its third due process approach. This approach, 
which involves a "mechanical" balancing of interests,168 ar-
ticulates three areas of critical importance for a court to 
consider in determining what process is due: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the of-
ficial action; second, the risk of an erroneous depriva-
tion of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
161. [d. at 277. 
162. Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 469. 
163. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
164. [d. at 100 (emphasis added). 
165. Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 468 (citing Twining, 211 U.S. at 101); 
see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(asking whether procedures are necessary for the "protection of ultimate decency in 
a civilized society"); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116 (1934) ("due process 
of law," according to Justice Cardozo, "requires that the proceedings shall be fair"). 
For a source containing essays regarding the "original intent" debate, see INTER-
PRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack Rakove 
ed.1990). 
166. Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 470 (footnote omitted). 
167. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
168. Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 470-71. 
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procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail.169 
Although due process rights are often invoked in cases 
involving actual bias on the part of an adjudicator, the due 
process guarantee also prohibits the mere appearance of 
impropriety on the part of a decision maker. Thus, in Offutt 
v. United States,170 the Supreme Court held that "justice 
must satisfy the appearance of justice."171 This language, 
which is found repeatedly in Supreme Court cases,172 is 
often used to protect due process rights. For example, in In 
re Murchison,173 the Supreme Court cited this language to 
prohibit a trial judge, who acted as a one-man grand jury, 
from finding two of the grand jury witnesses guilty of con-
tempt in a subsequent proceeding. According to the Court: 
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 
due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of 
actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law 
has always endeavored to prevent even the probability 
of unfairness. . .. [T]o perform its high function in the 
best way, "justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice.,,174 
Although this rule "'may sometimes bar trial judges who 
have no actual bias,' it is a necessary prophylactic rule to 
169. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991). 
Notably, U[t)he word 'fairness' did not appear in the balancing test; the Court appar-
ently chose to focus upon considerations of economic efficiency instead. The no-
tions of elemental fairness that had been so dispositive under the 'intuitive' 
approach were now abandoned in favor of the new-economic efficient-due pro-
cess." Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 472. Despite the lack of the word 
ufairness" in the balancing test, the Supreme Court recently reiterated that 
U[p)rocedural due process" remains Ua guarantee of fair procedure." Zinermon v. 
Burch, 494 U.S. 113\ 125 (1990) (emphasis added). 
170. 348 U.S. 11 (1954). 
171. Id. at 14. 
172. E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986) (quoting In re 
Murchinson); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 448 U.S. 
555, 594 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Offutt); Levine v. United States, 
362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (quoting Offutt). 
173. 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
174. Id. at 136 (quoting Offutt). 
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preserve the defendant's fourteenth amendment rights be-
cause proof of actual bias may be too difficult."175 
B. An Unbiased Judicial System and the Appearance of 
Evenhanded Justice 
In numerous cases, the United States Supreme Court 
has ruled that the judicial process must be free of partisan 
influences.176 For instance, in Tumey v. Ohio, 177 the 
Supreme Court ruled that a judge must be disqualified 
when there is a "direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary in-
terest in the matter before the court."178 Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has held that a judge is not allowed "to try 
175. Jon Bancone, Note, Article III and Due Process Limitations on the FSLIC's 
Adjudicatory Role During Its Receiverships, 76 GEO. L.J. 1845, 1861 (1988) (quoting 
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974». 
176. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (defense counsel cannot have an 
actual conflict of interest); Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (per curiam) 
(system invalidated in which justices of the peace were paid for issuance but not for 
non issuance of search warrants); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) (prohibiting 
the trial of a defendant before a judge who had previously held the defendant in 
contempt); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (prohibiting an administrative 
board consisting of optometrists in private practice from hearing charges filed 
against optometrists competing with board members); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471 (1972) (prohibiting parole officers from making parole revocation decisions); 
Thmey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judges must be free from bias); cf Marshall v. 
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (articulating standard for administrative 
prosecutors). 
177. 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
178. As Justice Brennan has noted, due process may also require a judge's 
recusal when his or her participation may affect nonpecuniary interests. See Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 829-30 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring). In-
deed, the mere participation of a judge in a decision may violate due process even if 
the judge's participation would not necessarily affect the outcome of the proceeding. 
See id. at 831 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (a judge's "mere participation in the shared 
enterprise of appellate decision making-whether or not he ultimately wrote, or 
even joined, the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion-posed an unacceptable danger 
of subtly distorting the decision making process"). According to another passage 
from Justice Brennan's opinion: 
[W]hile the influence of any single participant in this process can never be 
measured with precision, experience teaches us that each member's in-
volvement plays a part in shaping the court's ultimate disposition. The par-
ticipation of a judge who has a substantial interest in the outcome of a case 
of which he knows at the time he participates necessarily imports a bias into 
the deliberative process. This deprives litigants of the assurance of imparti-
ality that is the fundamental requirement of due process. 
Id. at 831 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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cases in which he has an interest in the outcome."179 As 
Chief Justice Taft wrote in Tumey: 
Every procedure which would offer a possible tempta-
tion to the average man . . . to forget the burden of 
proof required to convict the defendant, or which might 
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true 
between the State and the accused, denies the latter due 
process of law.1BO 
179. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). Under Murchison, it is not nec-
essary to establish that the judge's interest actually altered his or her decision. On 
the contrary, the relevant inquiry focuses on the "possible temptation" which could 
lead the judge "not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and 
the accused." Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972); see also Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986). Significantly, federal law currently 
requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself "in any proceeding in which [his or 
her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988). Fed-
erallaw also requires the disqualification of a judge where, among other things, the 
judge (1) has "a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party," (2) the judge, a 
spouse, or a minor child residing in the household has "a financial interest in the 
subject matter in controversy ... or any other interest that could be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding," or (3) the judge or her spouse, or a 
person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of 
such a person, is "known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially 
affected by the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at ~ 455(b)(1), (b)(4), (b)(5)(iii). A 
"financial interest" is statutorily defined as the "ownership of a legal or equitable 
interest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active partici-
pant in the affairs of a party." Id. at § 455(d)(4). For an article discussing this fed-
eral disqualification statute, see Susan B. Hoekema, Comment, Questioning the 
Impartiality of Judges: Disqualifying Federal District Court Judges Under 28 U.S.c. 
§ 455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697 (1987). The Supreme Court in Liljeberg v. Health Serv-
ices Acquisition Corp. has interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 455 to require recusal of a judge if 
a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that a judge would 
have actual knowledge of his or her interest or bias in the litigation. 468 U.S. 847 
(1988); see also id. at 865 ("The very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in 
the judiciary by avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible."). 
Although federal law provides for the disqualification of judges under particular 
circumstances, the Constitution itself may mandate disqualification. See Lavoie, 475 
U.S. at 828 ("The Due Process Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial 
disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more 
rigorous standards for judicial disqualification .... "). Notably, the United States 
Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in a case alleging that federal judges 
should be required to disqualify themselves under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) when they 
might appear to be biased because of their courtroom conduct. Marcia Coyle, High 
Court Hears Case for Judge's Recusal, NAT'L L.J. (Nov. 15, 1993), at 10 (discussing 
oral argument in Liteky v. United States, Case No. 92-6921). 
180. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added); see also Peter David Blanck, et 
aI., Note, The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in 
Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1985) (footnotes omitted) (citing support-
ing case law). 
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Likewise, in Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 181 the Supreme 
Court invalidated a procedure in which sums produced 
from a mayor's court accounted for a substantial portion of 
municipal revenues, even though the mayor's salary was not 
augmented by those sums. Although the accused in Ward 
was convicted of only two minor traffic offenses and fined a 
total of one hundred dollars, the Supreme Court ruled that 
due process requires the elimination of the possibility of 
bias. According to the Court: 
Plainly [a] "possible temptation" may ... exist when the 
mayor's executive responsibilities for village finances 
may make him partisan to maintain the high level of 
contribution from the mayor's court. This, too, is a "sit-
uation in which an official perforce occupies two practi-
cally and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan 
and the other judicial, [and] necessarily involves a lack 
of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged 
with crimes before him.,,182 
Thus, the Supreme Court "may disqualify even decision-
makers who in fact 'have no actual bias' if they might rea-
sonably appear to be biased."183 
Although the Supreme Court has consistently held that 
judges must be free from the appearance of impropriety, 
the Supreme Court has also required that other actors in 
The trial judge's "appearance," or conduct and behavior, in a criminal jury 
trial must never indicate to the jury that the judge believes the accused to 
be guilty. The appearance of bias alone is grounds for reversal even if the 
trial judge is, in fact, completely impartial. Due process violations have 
been found when a trial judge's behavior created just the appearance of 
partiality, and courts have held such behavior sufficient to reverse criminal 
convictions. 
Id. at 89-90. 
181. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
182. Id. at 60 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534). 
183. TRIBE, supra note 159, § 10-16, at 745 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 
471,485-86 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970»; see also Aetna Life 
Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813,825 (1986) ("The Due Process Clause 'may some-
times bar trial judges who have no actual bias and who would do their best to weigh 
the scales of justice equally between contending parties."') (quoting Murchison, 349 
U.S. at 136); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980) (quoting Offutt v. 
United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) and In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955» 
("'[J)ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice,''' and this 'stringent rule may 
sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very 
best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties."'). 
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the criminal justice system remain bias-free. For example, 
in cases such as Strauder v. West Virginia,184 Batson v. Ken-
tucky,185 and Taylor v. Louisiana,186 the Supreme Court has 
emphasized that juries must be free of race and gender bias. 
Likewise, other cases have held that juries must be free of 
additional biases, misconceptions, and invidious influ-
ences.187 In Gold v. United States,188 the Supreme Court re-
versed the conviction of an accused who was charged with 
violating the National Labor Relations Act by filing a false 
non-Communist affidavit; three members of the Gold jury 
were approached by an F.B.I. agent and asked if they had 
received any Communist propaganda.189 Likewise, in 
Carter v. Kentucky,t90 the Supreme Court held that "[a] 
state trial judge has the constitutional obligation, upon 
proper request, to minimize the danger that the jury will 
give evidentiary weight to the defendant's failure to 
testify. "191 
In addition to judges and juries, defense counsel must 
also be free of influences which might affect a defendant's 
constitutional rights. Thus, in Glasser v. United States192 the 
184. 100 U.s. 303 (1880). 
185. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (race-based peremptory challenges are unconstitu-
tional); see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991) (ban-
ning race-based strikes by either party in civil litigation); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 
1364 (1991) (peremptory challenges cannot be used to exclude jurors not of the 
same race as the defendant). The Supreme Court is currently considering the ques-
tion 'of whether gender-based peremptory challenges are also unconstitutional. 
Mark Curriden, High Court May Strike Sex-Based Challenges, NAT'L L.J. (Nov. 8, 
1993), at 1,27 (citing J.E.B. v. T.B., No. 92-1239); see also 62 U.S.L.W. 3329 (Nov. 9, 
1993) (containing a summary of the oral argument before the Supreme Court in 
J.E.B. v. T.B.). 
186. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
187. See Remmer v. United States, 350 U.S. 377 (1956). 
188. 352 U.S. 985 (1957) (per curiam). 
189. "In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, di-
rectly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the 
jury is deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of 
the court and with full knowledge of the parties." CHESTER ANTIEAU, MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE GOVERNMENT § 5:62, at 348 
(1969) (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954». As the Supreme 
Court has firmly stated: "Due process requires a fair trial by an impartial jury free 
from outside influences." Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
190. 450 U.S. 288 (1981). 
191. Id. at 305. 
192. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
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Supreme Court held that an attorney's representation of 
two co-defendants whose interests conflict denies a defend-
ant his constitutional right to effective assistance of coun-
sel,193 Another conflict of interest case, Holloway v. 
Arkansas,194 is particularly instructive. In Holloway, the de-
fendant's attorney apprised the court of a conflict of inter-
est in his having to represent three co-defendants in the 
same trial. Holding that an accused's right to counsel was 
denied where the trial court, over the defense attorney's 
objection, refused to provide separate counsel for the co-
defendants, the Supreme Court stated that "whenever a 
trial court improperly requires joint representation over 
timely objection reversal is automatic," and no prejudice 
need be shown.195 
With significant constitutional rules already prohibiting 
biased or improperly influenced judges, juries, and defense 
attorneys, the time has come to end the anachronistic prac-
tice of allowing private prosecutors. While the Supreme 
Court has stated that "[t]he rigid requirements of Tumey 
and Ward, designed for officials performing judicial or 
quasi-judicial functions, are not applicable to those acting in 
a prosecutorial or plaintiff-like capacity,"196 it is equally 
clear that due process requires the imposition of limits on 
193. In Glasser, the record indicated that the attorney failed to cross-examine a 
government witness whose testimony linked Glasser with the conspiracy and failed 
to object to the admission of arguably inadmissible evidence. [d. at 73-75. This fail-
ure was viewed by the Supreme Court as a result of the defense attorney's "struggle 
to serve two masters." [d. at 75. 
194. 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
195. [d. at 488-91; see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981) (Just as 
there is a constitutional right to counsel, "there is a correlative right to representa-
tion that is free from conflicts of interest."). 
To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser as a re-
sult of the [district] court's appointment of Stewart as counsel [for the co-
defendant] is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the 
assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to 
indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its 
denial. 
Glasser, 315 U.S. at 75-76. 
196. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 248; see also id. ("The constitutional interests in accu-
rate finding of facts and application of law, and in preserving a fair and open process 
for decision, are not to the same degree implicated if it is the prosecutor, and not the 
judge, who is offered an incentive for securing civil penalties."). 
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the "partisanship" of prosecutors.197 "Prosecutors are also 
public officials; they too must serve the public interest. "198 
Thus, although prosecutors need not be entirely "neutral 
and detached" and are permitted to be "zealous in their en-
forcement of the law,"199 a prosecutor can be disqualified 
for participating in litigation in which he or she has a per-
sonal interest.2OO As the Supreme Court has recognized: 
"A scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or other-
wise, into the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or 
impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in 
some contexts raise serious constitutional questions. "201 
Because private prosecutors have financial incentives that 
public prosecutors do not, and because private prosecutors 
create, at the very least, an appearance of impropriety, pri-
vate prosecutors violate defendants' due process rights. As 
Justice Harlan stated in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,202 "[T]he 
appearance of evenhanded justice ... is at the core of due 
process . . . . "203 
C. The "Public Interest" 
The "public interest" has always been an elusive con-
cept. It is used by politicians "to justify every engineering 
brainstorm from the building of massive bridges to the sub-
sidization of lunar visits,"204 and it is used by courts to jus-
197. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982) (citations omitted) 
("due process demands impartiality on the part of those who function in judicial or 
quasi-judicial capacities"). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has previously recog-
nized that prosecutors do perform "quasi-judicial" functions. See supra note 131 
(citing cases where prosecutors have been given a "quasi-judicial" label). 
198. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 249. 
199. [d. at 248 (citations omitted). 
200. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (federal prosecutor disquali-
fied from participating in litigation in which he has a personal interest). 
201. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980) (cited in Young, 481 
U.S. at 787, 808 & n.19); see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) 
(a state supreme court's affirmance of a damage award was vacated where a justice 
on the state's highest court with a similar suit pending in a lower state court had cast 
an apparently decisive vote). . 
202. 400 U.S. 455 (1971). 
203. [d. at 469 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
204. AMY KLOBUCHAR, UNCOVERING THE DOME xviii (1982) [hereinafter 
KLOBUCHARj. 
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tify the appropriateness of injunctive relief.205 Although 
one commentator has noted that "[i]t has become fashiona-
ble in some quarters to dismiss the concept of the 'public 
interest' as devoid of content,"206 it is helpful to analyze this 
concept to determine the constitutionality of private prose-
cutors because of the requirement that prosecutors serve 
the "public interest.''207 
205. See generally 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE, § 2948, at 430-31 (1973) (listing the "public interest" as one of four factors for 
a court to consider in determining the propriety of granting a preliminary injunc-
tion). Thus, "[i]t frequently has been emphasized that whether the public interest 
either might be furthered or might be injured by an injunction should be given con-
siderable weight." Id. at 457 (footnote omitted) (citing Yakus v. United States, 321 
U.S. 414 (1944); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944); Inland Steel Co. v. 
United States, 306 U.S. 153 (1939». 
206. BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 207 (1965). 
207. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,249 (1980) (prosecutors "must serve 
the public interest"); Young, 481 U.S. at 804 ("The prosecutor is appointed solely to 
pursue the public interest in the vindication of the court's authority."); Town of 
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395 n.5 (1987) ("[T]he constituency of an elected 
prosecutor is the public, and such a prosecutor is likely to be influenced primarily by 
the general public interest."); see also Haney v. State, 850 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Okla. 
1993) ("[A] district attorney represents the public interest, not the interests of pri-
vate individuals."); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 1985), cert. 
denied, 496 U.S. 911 (1990) ("[I)t is as much the duty of a Commonwealth's Attor-
ney to protect his fellow citizens from unjustified prosecutions as it is to prosecute 
the guilty. His duty is 'to seek justice, not merely to convict."'); cf. MODEL CODE OF 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-4 (1981) (when "the lawyer purports to act on 
behalf of the public, he should espouse only those changes which he conscientiously 
believes [are] in the public interest"). A comment to Standard 3-2.1 of the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice states as follows: 
The idea that the criminal law, unlike other branches of the law such as 
contracts and property, is designed to vindicate public rather than private 
interests is now firmly established. The participation of a responsible pub-
lic officer in the decision to prosecute and in the prosecution of the charge 
gives greater assurance that the rights of the accused will be respected. 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-2.1 cmt. (1979). 
A former United States Attorney, Kenneth Melilli, has reiterated the notion 
that a prosecutor's role is to serve the public interest. "Prosecutors do not have 
individual, identifiable clients. They are lawyers for the state. As such, prosecutors 
represent the public interest. Prosecutors represent the interests of society as a 
whole, including the interests of defendants as members of that society." Kenneth J. 
Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversay System, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 
698 (1992) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Melilli]; see also W.J. Michael Cody, 
Special Ethical Duties for Attorneys Who Hold Public Positions, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. 
REv. 453, 456 (1993) (footnote omitted) ("A prosecutor's duty ... is not to seek 
convictions, but to seek justice."); Carol Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HAS-
TINGS CaNST. L.Q. 537, 537-38 (1986) ("[T]he prosecutor represents society as a 
whole. His goal is truth and the achievement of ajust result."). For an article dis-
560 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:511 
However, before the concept of the "public interest" 
can be applied in the private prosecutor context, at least 
three complimentary definitions of the concept must be ex-
plored. According to one political theorist, Brian Barry, 
the "public interest" should be defined as those interests 
which people have in common as members of the public.208 
This definition is consistent with the views of Rousseau, 
who believed that government must serve the shared inter-
ests of the people and that "it is on the basis of this com-
mon interest alone that society must be governed."209 
According to another theorist, Jeremy Bentham, the "pub-
lic interest" should be defined as "the sum of the interests 
of the several members of the community who compose 
it."210 Under this definition, if "most voters favor a certain 
tax limitation (i.e. the Proposition 13 in California), then its 
adoption coincides with the public interest."211 A final con-
ception of the. "public interest" is provided by Richard 
cussing the concept of the "public interest" as it relates to government lawyers, see 
Nolan, supra note 60, at 36-43. Cf id. at 42 ("The government lawyer has obliga-
tions to the public interest as well as to the mission of her agency. The fact that the 
government lawyer takes instruction from those invested with policy making powers 
does not mean that she does so in the service of the agency without regard to the 
agency's obligations to the public."). 
208. BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 190 (1965). In this regard, Barry 
makes a distinction between the "public interest" and the "common interest." In 
recapping Barry's work, one scholar has articulated the distinction as follows: 
The common interest is simply an interest shared between individuals. 
Legal academics have a common interest in a good pay settlement for uni-
versity teachers, even though we may each gain different amounts. The 
public interest is used to describe where the net interests which people 
have qua member of the public or the community. It is this idea of public 
interest as an interest in our role as members of the community which is 
perhaps the key to seeing public interest as a subspecies of arguments 
about the collective welfare. In this way, "the public interest is simply the 
class of human interests of any group of human beings where the unity of 
the group is determined by its organization under a common public 
authority." 
John Bell, Public Interest: Policy or Principle?, in LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
30 (Proceedings of the 1992 ALSP Conference) (Roger Brownsword ed.) (1993). 
Thus, "public interest emerges as a set of fundamental values in society." Id. 
209. JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, SOCIAL CONTRACT, Book II, at 23 (1947); see 
also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("[s]ociety wins not only when the 
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair"). 
210. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 3 (1948). 
211. KLOBUCHAR, supra note 204, at xviii. 
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Flathman, whose essay describes the public interest as a 
moral concept judged by values such as "promote justice" 
or "maximize human freedom."212 This view originates 
with Aristotle, who wrote that "[t]he good in the sphere of 
politics is justice, and justice consists in what tends to pro-
mote the common interest."213 
Under the first and third definitions of "public inter-
est," members of the public have an undeniable common 
interest in receiving fair treatment from the criminal justice 
system.214 Indeed, because any given individual can be ac-
cused falsely of a crime, each individual in the society has a 
common interest in receiving "just" treatment by the prose-
cuting authority.215 This situation is especially true given 
prosecutors' exercise of almost unbridled discretion. Be-
cause of the common community interest in ensuring that 
212. RICHARD E. FLATHMAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREST: AN ESSAY CONCERNING 
THE NORMATIVE DISCOURSE OF POLITICS 67 (1966). 
213. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 1282b (1962). 
214. The Supreme Court has specifically recognized "[t]he public interest in the 
accuracy and justice of criminal results." Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10,25 
(1980) (quoting United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1093 (3d Cir. 1979». In 
fact, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of un-
reasonable searches and seizures was designed to protect the "common interest" of 
the community against unlawful invasion of the home. Miller v. United States, 357 
U.S. 301, 313 (1958); see also Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 383 
(1979) (noting "public interest" in seeing that justice is "fairly administered," and 
noting the "great public interest" in having a criminal case heard by a jury); Arizona 
v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 510 & n.27 (1978) (recognizing the "public interest" in 
"fair judgments" and "just judgments"). 
215. According to the Supreme Court: 
[T]he use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command 
the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal 
law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a 
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are 
being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every indi-
vidual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government 
cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a 
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
See also Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439 n.2 (1973) (Where a unani-
mous Court held that dismissal of criminal charges was the only possible remedy for 
denying the defendant a speedy trial, the Court stated that "[t]he public interest in a 
broad sense, as well as the constitutional guarantee, command prompt disposition of 
criminal charges."); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (the due process 
requirement "in safeguarding the liberty of the citizen against deprivation through 
the action of the State, embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at 
the base of our civil and political institutions"). 
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prosecutors treat members of the public fairly, the "public 
interest" demands that the use of private prosecutors, who 
by definition consider private interests, be prohibited under 
the due process guarantee. 
Significantly, it could be argued, under the second for-
mulation of "public interest," that state statutes permitting 
the use of private prosecutors merely express the public's 
interest in allowing each member of the public to hire a pri-
vate prosecutor if desired. However, this argument is mer-
itless for at least three reasons. First, the use of private 
prosecutors does nothing to advance the cohesion or devel-
opment of the community.216 On the contrary, the use of 
such prosecutors pits private citizen against private citi-
zen.217 Second, the use of private prosecutors does not fur-
ther the public interest in obtaining truth or justice, because 
the use of private prosecutors creates incentives that under-
mine the pursuit of these goals. For instance, private prose-
cutors have an incentive to err on the side of their private 
clients when deciding what exculpatory material to give to a 
defendant.218 Finally, the argument carries no weight be-
cause the use of private prosecutors affects constitutional 
rights that can only be delineated by courts.219 Thus, while 
216. See supra note 208. 
217. The Supreme Court has stated that "the purpose of a criminal court is not 
to provide a forum for the ascertainment of private rights. Rather it is to vindicate 
the public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law while at the same time 
safeguarding the rights of the individual defendant." Standefer v. United States, 447 
U.S. 10,25 (1980) (quoting United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1093 (3d Cir. 
1979». . 
218. The "public interest" is greatly disserved if the wrong person is convicted. 
According to Justice Brennan, "[a] miscarriage of justice that imprisons an innocent 
accused also leaves a gUilty party at large, a continuing threat to society." Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596 (1980) (Brennan, J. concurring). 
219. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388, 398, 407 (1971) (Harlan, 1., concurring) ("[T]he Bill of Rights is particu-
larly intended to vindicate the interests of the individual in the face of the popular 
will as express in legislative majorities .... "). As Justice Harlan stated in another 
case: 
Legislatures are, as this Court has often acknowledged, the "main guard-
ian" of the public interest, and, within their constitutional competence, 
their understanding of that interest must be accepted as "well-nigh" con-
clusive. This principle does not, however, reach all the questions essential 
to the resolution of this case. The legislative judgments at issue here em-
brace assessments of the necessity and wisdom of procedural guarantees; 
these are questions which the Constitution has entrusted at least in part to 
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it is normally proper for a legislature to declare the public 
interest via statute, it is well established that courts must 
invalidate statutes that disregard constitutional rights?20 In 
this regard, only constitutional provisions, not statutory di-
rectives, can ever be deemed the ultimate expression of the 
public interest for purposes of constitutional interpreta-
tion.221 Indeed, it must be emphasized that "the purpose of 
the due process clause-and indeed, of the entire Bill of 
Rights-is to protect the individual against the govern-
ment."222 As the Supreme Court stated in In re Gault, 223 
courts, and upon which courts have been understood to possess particular 
competence. 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 70 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citation omitted). 
220. Under the positivist view of procedural due process, courts have no role to 
play in defining what procedures are necessary to satisfy the Constitution. "Rather, 
the term 'due process' dictates that individuals be afforded whatever procedures the 
legislature has mandated-no more and no less." Redish & Marshall, supra note 
159, at 457. Although the first Supreme Court case construing the "due process" 
clause rejected this view, the positivist approach has been advocated by some mem-
bers of the Court, including Chief Justice Rehnquist. Compare Murray's Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855) ("It is 
manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which might 
be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and 
judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress 
free to make any process 'due process of law' by its mere will.") with Cleveland Bd. 
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 561 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (the 
Court "ought to recognize the totality of the State's definition of the property 
right"). However, the positivist approach-which would effectively "rubber stamp" 
all legislative enactments-has been thoroughly discredited. Redish & Marshall, 
supra note 159, at 456 ("[T]he historical evidence upon which the positivists rely 
offers no real support for any particular conception of the clause, even if one accepts 
the controversial principle that modern constitutional interpretation is rigidly con-
trolled by the intent of the framers."); see also id. at 457-68 (outlining the flaws in 
the positivist approach and demonstrating, both historically and analytically, why 
courts must determine how much "due process" is constitutionally required). 
221. For example, in Llewelyn v. Oakland County Prosecutor's Office, a federal 
district court granted a movie exhibitor's motion for a preliminary injunction against 
a county attorney who had been seizing copies of a film and making arrests on the 
basis of a zoning ordinance that prohibited the exhibition of obscene films within 
1,000 feet of a residence. 402 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich. 1975). In so ruling, the 
court stated that the First Amendment precluded the court from finding that the 
"public interest" would be harmed by the showing of a film yet to be found obscene 
because "it may be assumed that the Constitution is the ultimate expression of the 
public interest." Id. at 1393. 
222. Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 493 (emphasis added). 
223. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, the Court held that Arizona's juvenile delin-
quency process denied a juvenile due process of law. 
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"Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foun-
dation of individual freedom. It is the basic and essential 
term in the social compact which defines the rights of the 
individual and delimits the powers which the state may 
exercise. "224 
The notion that a prosecutor's obligation is to further 
the public interest, rather than private vengeance, is rein-
forced by the Supreme Court's decision in Imbler v. 
Pachtman.225 In Imbler, the Supreme Court held that a 
public prosecutor has absolute immunity to civil rights ac-
tions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983.226 Thus, in re-
jecting the contention that prosecutors should enjoy only 
qualified immunity, the Court stated as follows: 
A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judg-
ment both in deciding which suits to bring and in con-
ducting them in court. The public trust of the 
prosecutor's office would suffer if he were constrained 
in making every decision by the consequences in terms 
of his own potential liability in a suit for damages.227 
As the Court stated later in Imbler: "[Q]ualifying a prose-
cutor's immunity would dis serve the broader public inter-
224. Id. at 20 (footnote omitted); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. at 541 ("The right to due process 'is conferred, not by legislative grace, but 
by constitutional guarantee .... "') (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part». 
225. 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
226. TItle 42 U.S.C § 1983, originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871. 17 Stat. 13, reads as follows: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured 
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Significantly, federal prosecutors are also absolutely immune from civil suit for con-
stitutional violations. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). But see Burns v. 
Reed, 111 S. Ct. 1934 (1991) (prosecutors have only qualified immunity when sued 
for constitutional violations arising out of legal advice given to police). Judges have 
immunity under Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
227. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-25. As the Court further stated: "The affording of 
only a qualified immunity to the prosecutor also could have an adverse effect upon 
the functioning of the criminal justice system. Attaining the system's goal of accu-
rately determining gUilt or innocence requires that both the prosecution and the 
defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evi-
dence." Id. at 426 (footnote omitted). 
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est. It would prevent the vigorous and fearless 
performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the 
proper functioning of the criminal justice system. "228 In 
holding that a public prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity 
from § 1983 actions, the Court also reiterated the "well set-
tled" common law rule that a public prosecutor is abso-
lutely immune from suits for malicious prosecution.229 
According to the Court: 
The common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based 
upon the same considerations that underlie the com-
mon-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting 
within the scope of their duties. These include concern 
that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a 
deflection of the prosecutor's energies from his public 
duties, and the possibility that he would shade his deci-
sions instead of exercising the independence of judg-
ment required by his public truSt.230 
While the public has a separate interest in effective law 
enforcement,231 this interest cannot be advanced at the ex-
pense of individual rights.232 For example, several members 
of the Supreme Court have noted that criminal entrapment 
is not "countenanced" because the "obligation" to avoid 
"enforcement of the law by lawless means ... goes beyond 
the conviction of the particular defendant before the court. 
Public confidence in the fair and honorable administration 
228. Id. at 427-28 (footnote omitted). 
229. Id. at 424; see also Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam) (af-
firming a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that a special 
assistant to the Attorney General of the United States is absolutely immune from a 
civil action for malicious prosecution). 
230. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422-23 (footnote omitted); see also Gannett Co., Inc. v. 
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 384 n.12 (1979) ("The responsibility of the prosecutor as a 
representative of the public surely encompasses a duty to protect the societal inter-
est in an open trial. But this responsibility also requires him to be sensitive to the 
due process rights of a defendant to a fair trial."). 
231. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804 (1982) (noting the "public interest 
in effective law enforcement"). 
232. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 566 
(1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) ('''The public interest in the suppression of crime, 
for example, cannot be weighed against a constitutional provision that accused per-
sons may not be denied the right to counsel."') (quoting Laurent Frantz, The First 
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE LJ. 1424, 1441 (1962)). 
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of justice ... is the transcending value at stake. "233 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has recognized that conflict of interest 
provisions are "designed to prohibit government officials 
from engaging in conduct that might be inimical to the best 
interests of the general public. "234 
D. Conviction Reliability and Prosecutorial 
Accountability 
In the United States, prosecutors have broad discretion 
in determining which cases to prosecute.235 Prosecutors 
also enjoy almost unlimited discretion in deciding who and 
when to investigate,236 what offense to be charged,237 the 
timing of an indictment or complaint,238 and determining 
the place of trial,239 Because prosecutors have such wide 
discretion, prosecutorial misconduct is an obvious concern 
and is, in fact, a significant problem in the criminal justice 
233. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 u.s. 555, 594 n.19 (1980) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in reSUlt)). 
234. United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 548 
(1961). Because public prosecutors, unlike private prosecutors, have absolute im-
munity from suit and are therefore free to advance the positions that they believe 
are in the public interest, prohibiting private prosecutors will undoubtedly further 
the public interest. Cf Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
235. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985); Wayte v. United States, 470 
U.S. 598 (1985); see also Melilli, supra note 207, at 672 (footnotes and citations omit-
ted) ("In exercising the charging function, the prosecutor enjoys broad, indeed virtu-
ally unlimited, discretion. Indeed, the prosecutor has been fairly described 'as the 
single most powerful figure in the administration of criminal justice."'). 
236. United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663 (9th CiT. 1986). 
237. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985). 
238. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977). 
239. United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 
U.S. 1047 (1983). In addition, prosecutors have the discretion to arrest, plea bar-
gain, grant immunity, and make bail and sentencing recommendations. Katherine 
Lowe, Project, Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States 
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal 1991-1992, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 1029-32 (1993). 
Because most of these decisions are made outside the courtroom, very little of the 
prosecutor's discretionary authority is subject to judicial supervision. Indeed, it is 
well-settled that judicial deference "to a prosecutor's broad discretion to initiate and 
conduct criminal prosecutions" is generally guided by "the recognition that the deci-
sion to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Id. at 1029 (citing 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) and Town of Newton v. Rumery, 
480 U.S. 386,396 (1987)). 
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system.240 Given the fact that misconduct does occur 
among public prosecutors, whose sworn duty is to serve 
"justice" and the "public interest," the potential for miscon-
duct among private prosecutors, whose salaries are being 
paid by interested parties, is of particular concern.241 
In other areas of the criminal justice system, the 
Supreme Court has attempted to maximize the reliability of 
criminal convictions.242 For example, in In re Winship, 243 
the Supreme Court held that due process requires the pros-
ecution to prove every element of the crime charged "be-
yond a reasonable doubt. "244 According to the Court: 
"The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the 
American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime in-
strument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on fac-
tual error."245 Likewise, in Strickland v. Washington,246 the 
240. See Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial Misconduct, and 
Due Process: There's More to Due Process Than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1298, 1322 (1988) (citations omitted) ("Courts and commentators have ex-
pressed frustration and concern over the frequent occurrence of prosecutorial mis-
conduct."); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and 
Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629 (1972). 
241. One historian has argued for a return to a system of private prosecution 
based upon the principle of "self-government." STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 114, 
223; see also id. at 230 ("The world of private prosecution ... was relatively demo-
cratic, flexible, expandable, and familiar."). However, that same historian details 
the corruption, misconduct, and abuses inherent in such a system. See Gerald 
Caplan, Criminal Justice in the Lower Courts: A Study in Continuity, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1694, 1703 (1991) (footnote omitted) (Steinberg's "examples evidence garden 
variety judicial misconduct-impulsive, arbitrary, biased, and no cause for nostalgia 
or romantic reminiscences about revitalizing democracy in twentieth-century 
America. Even to an ardent popUlist, to one highly suspicious of lawyers, the power 
of citizen prosecutors to 'define crime' would be unacceptable.") (reviewing Stein-
berg's book) (citing STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 1, 26, 56, 61, 77,106,230); see also 
Caplan, supra, at 1694 (Steinberg's study of private prosecution in nineteenth-cen-
tury Philadelphia provides "an unsettling account-an unpleasant reminder of the 
misconduct and bias which have plagued the administration of justice throughout 
this nation's history."); STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 47 (some private prosecutions 
were "manipulative"); id. at 230 (stating that the system of private prosecution was 
"corrupt, easily manipulated, harsh, and sometimes even cruel"). 
242. Discovering truth is the primary function of the adversary system. United 
States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980). 
243. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
244. [d. at 364. 
245. [d. at 363. 
246. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prove an "ineffective assistance of counsel" claim, 
the Supreme Court has held that a defendant must show that counsel's performance 
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Supreme Court held that a defendant must not receive "in-
effective assistance of counsel." In so holding, the Supreme 
Court emphasized the importance of reliable convictions: 
"The bench-mark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness 
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. "247 
Similarly, in Taylor v. Louisiana,248 the Court held that a 
defendant's constitutional rights were violated by the exclu-
sion of women from the jury pool because the jury venire 
must be composed of a "fair cross section of the commu-
nity" in order to ensure the fairness of a defendant's convic-
tion.249 Finally, in cases such as Tumey, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly held that considerations of fairness dictate 
was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. [d. at 687; 
see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (same). Significantly, the requirement 
that prejudice be shown to establish an "ineffective assistance" claim does not lead 
to the conclusion that prejudice also has to be shown to reverse a conviction ob-
tained by a private prosecutor. First, whereas prejudice is required with respect to 
ineffective assistance claims because the government has no control over defense 
counsel's errors, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, it is prosecutorial conduct that is at 
stake in the private prosecutor context. Second, while ineffective assistance claims 
do not involve conflict of interest issues, the use of private prosecutors directly im-
plicates such concerns. Indeed, under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), preju-
dice to a defendant is presumed if it is demonstrated that defense counsel "actively 
represented conflicting interests" and that "an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected" the lawyer's performance. [d. at 348, 350; see also Burger v. Kemp, 483 
U.S. 776, 783 (1987) (same); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (conflicts of interest affect-
ing counsel's performance are presumptively prejudicial). Because prosecutors, in 
representing the public interest, have an affirmative obligation to represent the in-
terests of a defendant as a member of the general public, private prosecutors are 
presumptively prejudicial to defendant's rights under Cuyler because they actively 
represent conflicting interests. Finally, unlike ineffective assistance claims, where 
the Supreme Court is concerned with whether defense counsel's performance was 
actually deficient, the mere appearance of impropriety is the critical concern in eval-
uating the propriety of private prosecutors. 
247. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The Strickland Court stated that "[t]he purpose. 
of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the 
assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." [d. at 691-
92. 
248. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). 
249. The right of a defendant to challenge prospective jurors for cause to ensure 
an impartial jury is also well established. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 
(1892). 
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that potentially biased judges not be allowed to sit in 
judgment,25o 
The notion that fair procedure is critical to the truth-
seeking function of the adversary system was specifically 
recognized by the Supreme Court in In re Gault. 251 In 
Gault, a majority of the Court stated as follows: 
"The history of American freedom is, in no small mea-
sure, the history of procedure." But in addition, the 
procedural rules which have been fashioned from the 
generality of due process are our best instruments for 
the distillation and evaluation of essential facts from the 
conflicting welter of data that life and our adversary 
methods present. It is these instruments of due process 
which enhance the possibility that truth will emerge 
from the confrontation of opposing versions and con-
flicting data. "Procedure is to law what 'scientific 
method' is to science."252 
Thus, to ensure the reliability of criminal convictions, 
the use of private prosecutors must be strictly prohibited. 
Such prosecutors have strong incentives to please their pri-
vate clients, and consequently, the potential for 
prosecutorial misconduct is particularly high. Specifically, 
private prosecutors may charge an accused inappropriately, 
fail to deliver complete Brady materials, seek a harsher 
punishment than is deserved, or engage in misconduct at 
trial. Because the discretion of prosecutors is virtually un-
checked and nearly impossible to monitor, the only way to 
ensure the reliability of convictions is to prohibit the use of 
private prosecutors.253 
Significantly, the use of private prosecutors also under-
mines prosecutorial accountability. Although two scholars 
have mused, in a conclusory fashion, that private enforce-
ment of criminal laws against murder or fraud "might be 
250. Tumey. 273 U.S. at 532. 
251. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
252. [d. at 21 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
253. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972) (due process is required to 
minimize "substantially unfair or mistaken deprivations"); TRIBE, supra note 159, 
§ 10-7, at 667 (same). 
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salutary,"254 even these scholars concede that the use of 
public prosecutors increases prosecutorial accountability. 
According to their recent article: 
Executive branch control over federal criminal law en-
forcement permits greater discretionary enforcement 
and greater accountability. In a world of limited re-
sources, prosecutorial discretion allows the government 
to gauge the relative seriousness of particular crimes 
and the relative threat posed by individual criminals. 
Few would equate sound policy with the maximum en-
forcement authorized by law, even if sufficient funds ex-
isted. A decision not to enforce may represent as 
significant a policy determination as one to enforce. 
Moreover, accountability concerns suggest that the indi-
vidual making such determinations be subject to the 
political process. Accountability benefits not only the 
public as a whole, but the criminally accused whose very 
liberty is at stake. 
* * * * 
The shortcomings of exclusive private enforce-
ment-which have always existed-have ... become 
more glaring with the growth of the country and of fed-
eral criminal law. For instance, there is little reason to 
entrust" private citizens with the prosecution of vic-
timless crimes like drug use or gambling. Even for 
crimes with identified victims such as murder or theft, 
centralized enforcement may well generate benefits. 
The potential for harassment is minimized through the 
process of publicly controlled prosecutions. Further-
more, public prosecutors can temper justice with mercy, 
and only a centralized executive can modulate enforce-
ment of the laws as social conditions change. If the 
President devotes too few resources to combatting drug 
use or insider trading, he or she is responsible at elec-
tion time for decisions to enforce as well as not to 
enforce.255 
254. Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen Sun-
stein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1803 (1993) [hereinafter Krent & Shenkman]. 
255. [d. at 1803 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1803 n.37 ("Because only the 
sovereign can deprive a citizen of liberty, the need for accountability in criminal 
prosecution is probably greater than in the civil context. The concern for accounta-
bility might explain in part the evolution toward public prosecution."); see also Evan 
Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 
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As a theoretical matter, the concept of prosecutorial 
accountability strongly militates against the use of private 
prosecutors. In fact, if a private prosecution is botched, the 
doctrine of double jeopardy greatly reduces prosecutorial 
accountability because the government cannot re-prosecute 
an individual after an acquittal is obtained.256 Thus, while 
public prosecutors are directly accountable to the electorate 
when a prosecution goes awry, elected prosecutors are only 
indirectly accountable-to the extent they did not appropri-
ately supervise a prosecution-for the conduct of private 
prosecutors. ' ' , 
E. From "Supervisory Authority" in Young to the 
Constitutional Preclusion of Private Prosecutors 
In Young, the Supreme Court relied on its supervisory 
authority in issuing its ruling "to avoid the necessity of 
reaching any constitutional issues."257 Obviously, this ap-
proach does not preclude and probably only foreshadows a 
constitutional bar with respect to the use of private prose-
cutors. Indeed, although some lower courts have used their 
"supervisory powers" to prohibit private prosecutors,258 
other lower courts already have held that the practice vio-
lates due process. For example, in Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen & Enginemen v. United States/59 the 
appointment of an interested prosecutor was characterized 
as a due process violation by the Fifth Circuit. Likewise, in 
Ganger v. Peyton,260 the Fourth Circuit ruled that a due pro-
cess violation existed where a part-time prosecutor was 
prosecuting a man for assaulting his wife while simultane-
ously representing the wife in a divorce proceeding.261 
368 (1989) ("[B]ecause prosecutors within the executive branch are accountable to 
the President and, through her, ultimately to the people, they are presumably less 
likely to enforce the law oppressively or overzealously."). 
256. Krent & Shenkman, supra note 254, at 1804 n.40. 
257. Young, 481 U.S. at 809 n.21. 
258. Polo Fashion, Inc. v. Stock Buyers Int'l, Inc., 760 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987). 
259. 411 F.2d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 1969) (cited in Young, 481 U.S. at 808 n.19). 
260. 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967). 
261. [d. at 714-15; see also Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 
1985), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 911 (1990) (citing Ganger) (a private prosecutor having 
a civil interest in the case so infects the prosecution with the possibility that "private 
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The notion that the use of the Supreme Court's "super-
visory powers" in Young merely foreshadows a constitu-
tional preclusion of private prosecutors is· supported by 
several Supreme Court rulings. Thus, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly exercised its supervisory authority with re-
spect to a given issue prior to creating a due process right in 
connection with that issue. For example, in United States v. 
Hale,262 the Supreme Court exercised its supervisory power 
to reverse a conviction based on a defendant's silence after 
being given Miranda warnings. Subsequently, in Doyle v. 
Ohio,263 the Court adopted the right to remain silent as a 
due process right. Likewise, in Offutt v. United States,264 the 
Supreme Court, pursuant to its supervisory authority, re-
versed a criminal contempt conviction on the grounds of ju-
dicial bias. Just a year later, in In re Murchison,265 the 
Supreme Court held that conducting a criminal contempt 
trial before a personally affronted judge violates due 
process.266 
The Supreme Court's pattern of using its supervisory 
authority with respect to a given issue before adopting a 
due process right with regard to that issue was recognized 
by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Peterson v. Peterson.267 
In Peterson, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that state 
courts may not impose sentences greater than six months 
for contempt unless a jury trial has occurred or been 
waived. In so holding, the Peterson court anticipated that 
the Supreme Court's "supervisory authority" decision in 
Cheff v. Schnackenberg268 was likely to be extended to a 
constitutional rule and applied to the states through the 
vengeance has been substituted for impartial application of the criminal law, that 
prejudice to the defendant need not be shown"); id. at 27 (harmless error analysis 
inapplicable). 
262. 422 U.S. 13 (1975). 
263. 426 U.S. 610 (1976). 
264. 348 U.S. 11 (1954). 
265. 349 U.S. 133 (1955). 
266. Accord Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (the Court stated that 
certain minimum due process protections apply to juveniles tried under the Juvenile 
Court Act, without explicitly adopting them as due process rights); In re Gault, 387 
U.S. 1 (1967) (due process clause applies to juvenile delinquency hearings). 
267. 153 N.W.2d 825, 828 n.3 (Minn. 1967). 
268. 384 U.S. 373 (1966). 
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Fourteenth Amendment. According to the Peterson court: 
"It is realistic to think that the United States Supreme 
Court's new rule, although now stated to be in the exercise 
of its supervisory power, may be extended to the Sixth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution and made applica-
ble to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. "269 In 
fact, the Chejfholding, based upon the Supreme Court's su-
pervisory authority, was later made a due process right.270 
Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit 
the government from depriving an individual "of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law."271 "[T]hese 
procedural safeguards have their historical origins in the 
notion that conditions of personal freedom can be pre-
served only when there is some institutional check on arbi-
trary government action."272 Indeed, in Marshall v. ferrieo, 
Ine.,273 the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the due process 
guarantee "entitles a person to an impartial and disinter-
ested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases."274 This re-
quirement of neutrality was said to safeguard the two 
central concerns of. procedural due process: "the preven-
tion of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the promo-
tion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in 
the decision making process. "275 As the Supreme Court 
further emphasized in Marshall: 
The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life, 
liberty, or property will not be taken on tl1e basis of an 
erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the 
law. At the same time, it preserves both the appearance 
and reality of fairness, "generating the feeling, so im-
portant to a popular government, that justice has been 
done," by ensuring that no person will be deprived of 
his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he 
269. Peterson, 153 N.W.2d at 828. 
270. Compare Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (establishing a right 
to a jury trial for nonpetty contempts under the Court's supervisory authority) with 
Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (the right to a jury trial was adopted as a due 
process right). 
271. U.S. CoNST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § l. 
272. TRIBE, supra note 159, § 10-7, at 664. 
273. 446 U.S. 238 (1980). 
274. [d. at 242. 
275. [d. (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-62, 266-67 (1978». 
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may present his case with assurance that· the arbiter is 
not predisposed to find against him,z76 
Thus, an "essential safeguard" of due process is the 
participation of an "independent adjudicator."277 This is so 
because the purpose of due process is to ensure the most 
accurate decision possible, with protections like notice, 
hearing, right to counsel, and cross-examination all contrib-
uting to that goaP78 Because of the heavy emphasis the 
American system of justice places upon the accuracy of re-
sults, especially in criminal cases,279 an appearance. of fair-
ness is also extremely vital to due' process.280 As the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated: "justice must satisfy 
the appearance of justice. "281 , The appearance of fairness 
value is so critical to due process because it "generate[s] the 
276. Id. at 242 (citations omitted) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring» ... 
277. Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 475 ("It is our position that the par-
ticipation of an independent adjudicator is such an essential safeguard, and may be 
the only one."); id. at 477 ("the use of an 'independent' adjudicator is a sine qua non 
of procedural due process"). According to Redish and Marshall: 
Review of historical evidence demonstrates that the right to an independ-
ent adjudicator was considered a crucial element of procedural justice by 
the common law, by those that established the law of the colonies, and, 
perhaps most important, by the Framers of the United States Constitution. 
This historically fundamental role adds significant weight to the conclusion 
that the right to an independent adjudicator constitutes the floor of due 
process. 
Id. at 479. 
278. Id. at 476. 
279. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due process requires that the prose-
cution prove the gUilt of the defendant "beyond a reasonable doubt"). 
280. According to Beth Nolan: 
Justice requires the appearance of justice for the same reason that conflict-
free representation requires the appearance of conflict-free representation: 
in both cases, those outside the process must believe that the process is fair. 
It is a question of confidence in government. The appearance standard 
accepts that seeing is believing: if the public sees the process as unjust, or 
unfair, it cannot be expected to believe otherwise. 
Nolan, supra note 60, at 55-56 (footnote omitted); see also David Harris, The Ap-
pearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of 
the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 790 (1993) (footnote omitted) 
("[T]he appearance of justice will affect public perception of the system's legitimacy. 
A system consistently seen as unjust will eventually lose the allegiance of its citizens. 
If people perceive the courts as less than fair decision makers, the moral force courts 
depend on to ensure compliance with decisions they make diminishes."). 
281. E.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Offutt v. United States, 348 
U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
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feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice 
has been done. "282 
Because fairness and the perception of fairness have 
always been integral aspects of due process analysis,283 Mar-
tin Redish and Lawrence Marshall have rightfully recog-
nized that the "mechanical" balancing approach of 
Mathews "runs counter to the purpose and function" of the 
due process clauses.2B4 Thus "the due process clauses were 
devised as protections of individual rights, and "must not be 
subordinated to government interests that are short of 
overwhelming. "285 According to Redish and Marshall: 
We have been unable to envision even one situation in 
which the values of due process can be achieved without 
the participation of an independent adjudicator. More-
over, in defining the term "independence," even the 
slightest hint of bias or undue influence must, as a gen-
eral matter, disqualify a particular decision maker. 
Only when it is all but impossible to rectify bias should 
a potential lack of independence be tolerated.286 
Because prosecutors are such major participants in the 
criminal justice system, the values of due process require 
that prosecutors be independent adjudicators. Indeed, be-
cause private prosecutions are already so rare,287 and be-
282. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
Of all the values informing the due process guarantee, the perception-of-
fairness value most clearly dictates use of a truly independent adjudicator. 
Whether or not it can be proven that a particular decision maker allows her 
personal interests to sway her resolution of a dispute, the perception-of-
fairness value demands that she be enjoined from deciding the case if she 
has some identifiable potential bias. Few situations more severely threaten 
trust in the judicial process than the perception that a litigant never had a 
chance because the decision maker may have owed the other side special 
favors. 
Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 483. 
283. See JOHN NOWAK, RONALD ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITU· 
TIONAL LAW 557 (2d ed. 1983) (stating the essential guarantee of due process is 
fairness). 
284. Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 504. 
285. 1d. 
286. 1d. (footnote omitted). 
287. Stumbo v. Seabold, 704 F.2d 910, 911 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that private 
prosecutor statutes are "rarely used"); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 129, § 13.10.1, 
at 759 (noting that a few jurisdictions continue to allow the "barbaric" practice of 
private prosecutions). 
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cause prosecutorial bias can be easily eliminated by 
prohibiting private prosecutors, due process requires that 
private prosecutors for interested parties be eliminated. 
Under Mathews v. Eldridge,288 a court is directed to 
consider the value of the individual's interest, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation, and the government interest at 
stake, including the expense and administrative burden of 
different procedures.289 In assessing the constitutionality of 
private prosecutors, even under the "mechanical" balancing 
approach of Mathews, the conclusion is inescapable that the 
use of private prosecutors violates due process. First, it is 
unquestionable that an individual has an important stake in 
not being prosecuted by an interested prosecutor. As the 
Supreme Court stated in Young: 
Between the private life of the citizen and the public 
glare of criminal accusation stands the prosecutor. That 
state official has the power to employ the full machinery 
of the state in scrutinizing any given individual. Even if 
a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in 
criminal investigation and adjudication is a wrenching 
disruption of everyday life. For this reason, we must 
have assurance that those who would wield this power 
will be guided solely by their sense of public responsi-
bility for the attainment of justice.290 
That an individual has an important interest in not being 
erroneously deprived of liberty was reiterated in In re Win-
ship,291 where the Supreme Court held that due process re-
quires that a prosecutor prove each element of a crime 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." According to the Court: 
"The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake in-
terests of immense importance, both because of the possi-
288. 424 u.s. 319 (1976). 
289. [d. at 335. While the Mathews test is usually applied in civil cases, it has 
also been used to test the sufficiency of criminal procedures. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68,77-82 (1985) (applying Mathews test and holding that an indigent defendant 
is entitled to access to a psychiatrist if the defendant's sanity is a significant factor); 
see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677-81 (1980) (applying test to right 
to de novo hearing of suppression motion); Wofford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 
1507-08 (11th Cir. 1984); Shepard v. United States Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 322, 326-
29 (2d Cir. 1976). 
290. Young, 481 U.S. at 814. 
291. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
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bility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and 
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction. "292 
With respect to the second Mathews factor, prosecu-
tion by a private prosecutor greatly increases the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of individual liberty. Because pri-
vate prosecutors are employed by-and receive compensa-
tion from-interested parties, the use of such prosecutors 
allows influences other than "justice" or the "public inter-
est" to enter into prosecutorial decisions. Thus, the use of 
private prosecutors not only increases the risk that exculpa-
tory evidence will be withheld from defendants, but the use 
of such prosecutors greatly increases the risk that an ac-
cused will be treated unfairly throughout the criminal 
process. 
Finally, against the highly significant factors of the indi-
vidual's interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation, the 
third Mathews factor requires that the government's inter-
est be considered. In particular, Mathews requires a court 
to consider the expense and administrative burden of dif-
ferent procedures. In balancing this interest, it is clear that 
the elimination of private prosecutors would only slightly 
increase a state's expense in administering the criminal jus-
tice system. Although private prosecution was once com-
mon in the United States,293 the use of such prosecutors has 
become increasingly rare,294 with some states having elimi-
nated the practice altogether. In considering the critical in-
terest an individual has in receiving fair treatment from a 
prosecutor, any additional expense incurred by the state 
due to the elimination of private prosecutors must be 
292. [d. at 363. As the Supreme Court stated in Ake: 
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an 
individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling. Indeed, the 
host of safeguards fashioned by this Court over the years to diminish the 
risk of erroneous conviction stands as a testament to that concern. 
Ake, 470 U.S. at 78. 
293. See supra notes 11-29 and accompanying text. 
294. See supra note 287. 
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deemed insignificant.295 Thus, even under Mathews, the use 
of private prosecutors is unconstitutional. 
With respect to the Mathews analysis, two Supreme 
Court cases decided in the early 1980s, where the Court 
found no due process violations, are clearly distinguishable. 
In the first case, Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,296 a constitutional 
challenge was brought against § 16( e) of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act after a restaurant management corporation 
was assessed civil penalties of $103,000 for violations of 
child labor laws by a regional administrator of the Employ-
ment Standards Administration ("ESA") of the Depart-
ment of Labor. Section 16( e) allowed sums collected as 
civil penalties for the unlawful employment of child labor to 
be returned to ESA in reimbursement for the costs of de-
termining violations and assessing penalties.297 Although 
this provision was alleged to create an "impermissible risk 
and appearance of bias" by encouraging the ESA "to make 
unduly numerous and large assessments of civil penal-
ties,"298 the Supreme Court rejected this challenge, stating 
that "[t]he biasing influence ... discern[ed] in § 16(e) is ... 
too remote and insubstantial to violate the constitutional 
constraints applicable to the decisions of an administrator 
performing prosecutorial functions. "299 
In so holding, the Supreme Court in Marshall noted 
that no official's salary is affected by the levels of the penal-
295. "[T]he Court has had occasion to recall even recently that 'procedural due 
process is not intended to promote efficiency' and that a procedural safeguard must 
be afforded 'if that may be done without prohibitive cost. .. • TRIBE. supra note 159. 
§ 10-13. at 717 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) and Goss v. 
Lopez. 419 U.S. 565,580 (1975) (emphasis added». In Ake, the Supreme Court held 
that indigent criminal defendants must be provided access to a psychiatrist if insanity 
is likely to be a significant issue at trial or if the state presents psychiatric testimony 
of the defendant's future dangerousness at a capital sentencing proceeding. In so 
holding. the Supreme Court rejected the argument that providing such assistance 
would result in a "staggering burden" to the State of Oklahoma. Ake. 470 U.S. at 
78. According to the Court: "In such a circumstance. where the potential accuracy 
of the jury's determination is so dramatically enhanced. and where the interests of 
the individual and the state in an accurate proceeding are substantial. the State's 
interest in its fisc must yield." [d. at 83. 
296. 446 U.S. 238 (1980). 
297. [d. at 239. 
298. [d. at 241. 
299. [d. at 243-44. 
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ties and that the sums collected as child labor penalties 
amounted to substantially less than one percent of ESA's 
annual budget.3°O Furthermore, the Supreme Court empha-
sized that ESA never spent its full congressional appropria-
tion, and that sums not spent were actually returned to the 
Treasury.30t Finally, aside from noting that civil penalties 
were never allotted to regional offices on the basis of the 
total amounts of penalties collected by particular offices,302 
the Court emphasized that it is ultimately an administrative 
law judge, not a regional administrator of the ESA, who 
performs the function of adjudicating child labor viola-
tions.303 The Supreme Court concluded as follows: 
[W]e need not say with precision what limits there may 
be on a financial or personal interest of one who per-
forms a prosecutorial function, for here the influence al-
leged to impose bias is exceptionally remote. No 
government official stands to profit economically from 
vigorous enforcement of the child labor provisions of 
the Act. The salary of the assistant regional administra-
tor is fixed by law. The pressures relied on in such cases 
as Tumey v. Ohio are entirely absent here.304 
Thus, "'[u]nder a realistic appraisal of psychological ten-
dencies and human weakness,' "305 the Supreme Court held 
that it was "exceedingly improbable" that the assistant re-
gional administrator's enforcement decisions would be "dis-
torted" by improper influences or bias.306 
In the second case, Schweiker v. McClure,307 the 
Supreme Court also rejected a due process challenge to the 
300. [d. at 245 & n.6. 
301. [d. at 246. The amounts returned to the Treasury substantially exceeded 
the sums collected under § 16(e) in all relevant years. [d. at 246 (footnote omitted). 
302. [d. 
303. [d. at 248. Administrative law judges perform de novo review of ESA as-
sessments, and administrative law judges were not entitled to reimbursement in con-
junction with § 16(e). [d. at 245, 248 n.10. 
304. [d. at 250 (footnote and citations omitted). According to the Supreme 
Court: "[W]e need not say whether different considerations might be held to apply 
if the alleged biasing influence contributed to prosecutions against particular per-
sons, rather than to a general zealousness in the enforcement process." [d. at 250 
n.12. 
305. [d. at 252 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
306. [d. at 252. 
307. 456 U.S. 188 (1982). 
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system of providing federal reimbursements to insurance 
carriers under a Medicare provision providing medical in-
surance benefits. Under the challenged scheme, Congress 
authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
contract with private insurance carriers to administer the 
payment of qualifying claims. While the Secretary pays the 
carriers' costs of claims administration, the carriers, in turn, 
act as the Secretary's agents. If a carrier determines that a 
claim meets certain criteria, the carrier pays the claim out 
of a government trust fund. On the other hand, if a carrier 
denies a claim, the claimant is entitled to a "review determi-
nation," whereby the claimant can submit arguments of fact 
and law and written evidence. Claimants involved in a dis-
pute that is $100 or more are entitled to an oral hearing 
presided over by an officer, chosen by the carrier, who has 
not participated personally in the case prior to the hearing 
stage. The hearing officer's decision is not appealable.308 
At the trial level, a federal judge in California ruled 
that these hearing procedures violated the constitutional 
guarantee to due process because of the risk of erroneous 
deprivation of Medicare benefits created by the carriers' 
hearing officers' "prior involvement and pecuniary inter-
est. "309 The district court also held that due process re-
quired additional procedural protection, with the trial court 
ordering that a de novo hearing of record was required 
before an administrative law judge of the Social Security 
Administration. In rejecting these holdings, the Supreme 
Court refused to rely on the district court's "generalized as-
sumptions of possible interest," which placed "special 
weight on the various connections of the hearing officers 
with the private insurance carriers."310 In the words of the 
Supreme Court: 
The difficulty with this reasoning is that these connec-
tions would be relevant only if the carriers themselves 
are biased or interested. We find no basis in the record 
for reaching such a conclusion . . .. [T]he carriers pay 
all . . . claims from federal, and not their own, funds. 
308. Id. at 190. 
309. Id. at 192. 
310. Id. at 196 (footnote omitted). 
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Similarly, the salaries of the hearing officers are paid by 
the Federal Government. Further, the carriers operate 
under contracts that require compliance with standards 
prescribed by the statute and the Secretary. In the ab-
sence of proof of financial interest on the part of the 
carriers, there is no basis for assuming a derivative bias 
among their hearing officers.311 
581 
Thus, in reconsidering the three factors weighed by the trial 
court as required by Mathews v. Eldridge,312 the Court in 
Schweiker found that no showing was made that the proce-
dures prescribed by Congress and the Secretary were 
unfair.313 
Unlike ~he situations in Marshall and Schweiker, an at-
torney hired by a victim or a victim's family has a direct 
financial incentive to further the client's real or perceived 
interests and to do exactly as the client desires. This incen-
tive exists because the monetary success of private lawyers 
or law firms depends, in large part, upon the business of 
current clients or referrals from those clients.314 Thus, if a 
private prosecutor's client does not believe that a case is 
being vigorously prosecuted (or, more significantly, if the 
private prosecutor does not "win" the case), the dissatisfied 
client may simply hire another attorney to prosecute the 
case or will not use or recommend the private prosecutor in 
the future.315 As a result, "under a realistic appraisal of 
psychological tendencies and human weakness"-to use the 
311. Id. at 196-97 (citations and footnote omitted). 
312. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (con-
taining a discussion of the three Mathews factors). 
313. Schweiker, 456 U.S. at 200. 
314. Sally J. Schmidt, Selling Your Lawyers On Client Surveys, THE AMERICAN 
LAWYER MANAGEMENT SERVo (1990-2000 ed.), vol. 1, at 10.17 (research shows that 
a firm's current clients can be responsible for up to 80% of its business through on-
going work or referrals); Ronald M. Martin, The Empowered Law Firm, PRACTIC. 
ING LAW INST. (Total Quality Management for Law Firms 1993: Thrning Awareness 
Into Action), available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database (July-Sept. 1993) (60% of 
a lawyer's new business comes from the recommendation of current or former cli-
ents) [hereinafter Martin]. 
315. Client loyalty to lawyers and law firms has significantly declined in recent 
times because of the increasing supply of lawyers and legal services. See Martin, 
supra note 314 ("There is now what the economists call a 'mature market' where 
there is low demand because there is an enormous supply of lawyers. This has 
eroded client loyalty and given the clients enormous power to determine how and in 
what ways legal services will be delivered."). 
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language of Marshall-it is not "exceedingly improbable" 
that significant decisions made by a private prosecutor will 
be "distorted" by the pressures created by his or her indi-
vidual client.316 Indeed, because a private prosecutor's in-
terest in obtaining a conviction is anything but remote,317 
316. Private clients often have great influence over their attorneys. For exam-
ple, courts have recognized that payment of fees by a client can affect a lawyer's 
loyalties. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1981) ("Courts and commen-
tators have recognized the inherent dangers that arise when a criminal defendant is 
represented by a lawyer hired and paid by a third party, particularly when the third 
party is the operator of the alleged criminal enterprise."); see also supra note 315 
(describing how client loyalty has declined in recent times); Nolan, supra note 60, at 
52 ("The human-nature rationale for regulation of potential conflicts of interest ac-· 
cepts that the ability of individuals to rise above their conflicting loyalties (even 
when it is theoretically possible to do so) is limited."). In Wood, an attorney, paid by 
the employer, represented two employees in a criminal prosecution for distributing 
obscene material. Under those facts, the Court held that the record was unclear 
"whether counsel was influenced in his basic strategic decisions by the interests of 
the employer who hired him," although the record did demonstrate at least the 
"possibility of a conflict of interest." Wood, 450 U.S. at 272. Consequently, the 
Court remanded for a determination, pursuant to the due process guarantee, as to 
whether the employees' convictions were tainted by an attorney's conflict of inter-
est. [d. at 273-74. 
317. The Supreme Court has stated that some interests are so "minute, remote, 
trifling or insignificant" that they do not create due process violations. See Tumey, 
273 U.S. at 532; see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (noting 
that a judge's interest that was "highly speculative and contingent" would not violate 
due process). Although the Supreme Court stated in dicta in Commonwealth Coat-
ings v. Continental Casualty Co. that Tumey required a decision to be set aside 
where "the slightest pecuniary interest" existed, the Supreme Court has since de-
clined to read Tumey "as constitutionalizing any rule that a decision rendered by a 
judge with 'the s'tightest pecuniary interest' constitutes a violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause." Commonwealth Coatings v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 
148 (1968); Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825 n.3. Because of the strong financial incentives 
that private prosecutors have to obtain convictions, such prosecutors do not impli-
cate merely "minute" or "remote" interests. As the Supreme Court stated in 
Tumey: 
, The mayor received for his fees and costs in the present case $12, and from 
such costs under the prohibition act for seven months he made about $100 
a month, in addition to his salary. We can not regard the prospect of re-
ceipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling 
or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought 
before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or 
innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should 
weigh against his acquittal. 
[d. at 531-32. 
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the due process clause prohibits the use of private 
prosecutors.318 
In Young, the Supreme Court noted that "the fact that 
the judge makes the initial decision that a contempt prose-
cution should proceed is not sufficient to quell concern that 
prosecution by an interested party may be influenced by 
improper motives."319 The Court stated the following: 
A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in mat-
ters such as the determination of which persons should 
be targets of investigation, what methods of investiga-
tion should be used, what information will be sought as 
evidence, which persons should be charged with what 
offenses, which persons should be utilized as witnesses, 
whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on 
which they will be established, and whether any individ-
uals should be granted immunity. These decisions, criti-
cal to the conduct of the prosecution, are all made 
outside the supervision of the court.320 
In light of the enormous discretionary powers that prosecu-
tors wield, the prosecutorial function cannot be entrusted to 
private counsel representing purely private interests. 
The significance of this principle is best illustrated in 
the context of states that retain capital punishment. In such 
states, because prosecutors make the charging and plea bar-
gaining decisions, it is literally true that the life or death of 
an accused could rest in the hands of a private prosecutor. 
In light of vengeful desires that victims' families frequently 
feel, private prosecutors will often experience pressure 
from victims' families not to plea bargain and to seek the 
death penalty. In fact, because attorneys have an ethical 
318. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1974) (due process requires 
that the "potential for vindictiveness" not enter into prosecutorial decisions). Under 
Article III of the Constitution, "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated TImes, re-
ceive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The salary provisions of Article 
III, designed to protect the judiciary's independence, were based on the conclusion 
that "[i]n the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence 
amounts to a power over his will." THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 583 (A. Hamilton) 
(E. Earle ed. 1937); see also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
319. Young, 481 U.S. at 807. 
320. [d. 
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obligation to zealously represent their clients' interests,321 if 
a murder victim's family wants the death penalty imposed, 
a private prosecutor may have an ethical obligation not to 
plea bargain and to seek the death penalty irrespective of 
what justice would otherwise require.322 
In the past, courts have articulated several reasons for 
retaining the right to employ a private prosecutor. For ex-
ample, in State v. Atkins,323 the West Virginia Supreme 
Court listed the following reasons for retaining the right to 
employ a private prosecutor: (1) there may be occasions 
when the public prosecutor is in need of assistance to carry 
out her duties effectively; (2) there may be occasions when 
the employment of a private prosecutor would satisfy the 
public's concern that a given case not be accorded perfunc-
tory treatment; and (3) the victim's family may wish to sat-
isfy itself that the case is being vigorously prosecuted.324 
Other stated rationales for retaining the use of private pros-
ecutors include the protection of property rights,325 reserv-
321. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer (1983) (preamble) ("As 
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the ad-
versary system."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 1.7 cmt. 
(1983) ("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client."); 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 1.2(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall 
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation .... "); Ol-
son v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1988) (an attorney must follow the client's 
specific instructions); Foothills Dev. Co. v. Clark County Bd., 730 P.2d 1369 (Wash. 
App. 1986) (an attorney must follow the client's specific instructions). But cf 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 1.2 cmt. (1983) ("At the same 
time, a lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply because 
a client may wish that the lawyer do so."). 
322. In states that allow private prosecutors, it is often stated that private prose-
cutors are bound by the same standards of conduct as public prosecutors, presuma-
bly requiring private prosecutors to disregard the wishes of their clients when 
"justice" or the "public interest" so requires. Aside from the ethical tension that this 
standard creates (and regardless of whether private prosecutors can actually refuse 
to honor their clients' wishes), incentives will always exist in close cases to err on the 
side of a private client, rather than with the accused. This situation is especially true 
given the subjective nature of "justice" and the "public interest." 
323. 261 S.E.2d 55 (W. Va. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980). 
324. [d. 
325. Handley v. State, 106 So. 692, 695 (Ala. 1925). 
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ing public prosecution for non-petty offenses,326 as well as 
the saving of time and resources.327 
Whatever superficial appeal these reasons have had for 
some courts, none of the reasons outweigh the due process 
concerns raised by private prosecutors. First, the govern-
ment's interest in preventing a slight increase in expendi-
tures necessitated by a rule prohibiting private prosecutors 
pales in comparison to the defendant's interest in not being 
prosecuted by someone with a conflict of interest.328 In-
deed, because private prosecutions are already so rare,329 
justifying the use of such prosecutors on the ground that 
they save the government's financial resources is a com-
plete ruse. State public defenders' offices have always been 
more financially overburdened than public prosecutors' of-
fices,330 and the general public, acting through its elected 
326. People ex reI. Allen v. Citadel Management Co., 355 N.Y.S.2d 976 (N.Y. 
Crim. Ct. 1974); see also People v. Black, 282 N.Y.S. 197, 201 (Ostego County Ct. 
1935) (minor infractions do not necessitate "heavy artillery" of district attorney or 
Attorney General). 
327. See United States v. Crawford Enter., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 370, 380 (S.D. Tex. 
1986), order affd and appeal dismissed, 826 F.2d 392 (1987) ("To require a govern-
ment prosecutor to present facts supporting criminal contempt and a private attor-
ney to present facts supporting civil contempt would be an injudicious use of the 
court's, government's and the private attorney's time and resources."). Because the 
American system of justice recognizes "higher values than speed and efficiency," the 
use of private prosecutors, even in the contempt context where such individuals may 
possess a greater understanding of the underlying facts, is inappropriate. Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
328. The fact that prohibiting private prosecutors may produce more intangible 
benefits while allowing private prosecutors may produce real cost savings, however 
small those may be, does not preclude a rule barring private prosecutors. According 
to two scholars: 
By their very nature, procedural safeguards impose administrative costs 
and burdens on the government that would not otherwise exist. At the 
same time, the benefits of such safeguards are not always immediately rec-
ognizable. Often it is not clear that the ultimate outcome in a particular 
case will be more just or efficient when specific procedures are employed 
than when they are not. In an important sense, then, the benefits of proce-
dural due process-at least when measured from a purely efficiency stand-
point-are prophylactic in nature. 
Redish & Marshall, supra note 159, at 473. Significantly, even the use of private 
prosecutors involves public costs. Thus, in states that allow private prosecutors, 
public prosecutors are still required to supervise and control the activities of private 
prosecutors. 
329. See supra note 287. 
330. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993) ("Public Defender of-
fices are grossly under-funded."). According to one law review article, a politician 
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representatives or via referendum, is always free to devote 
additional resources to law enforcement activities. 
The argument that private prosecutors are necessary to 
assist public prosecutors to more vigorously enforce the law 
must also fail. Once again, the general public is free to 
devote more financial resources to law enforcement activi-
ties if it desires. In fact, the public interest will sometimes 
demand that certain anachronistic laws, like penal laws 
prohibiting adultery, actually not be enforced. Conversely, 
if crimes worthy of more vigorous prosecution, such as child 
abuse or sexual assaults, are not being appropriately prose-
cuted by the local district attorney, the lax enforcement can 
become a campaign issue and the neglectful public prosecu-
tor can be thrown out of office.331 
"at best, has little to gain by advocating large expenditure for the defender office, 
and at worst, much to lose." Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Profes-
sional Responsibility, and Competent Representation, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 473, 482. 
331. Notably, even if a local district attorney refuses to prosecute a worthy case, 
many state laws already provide the victim or the victim's family with alternate rem-
edies. See generally Sidman, supra note 11, at 764-65, 790 (describing statutes, which 
exist in a majority of states, that permit the appointment of special temporary prose-
cutors to be paid with government funds or that authorize courts to appoint counsel 
to replace the district attorney when he or she fails to perform his or her duties or 
has an interest in the proceedings); cf. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Stan-
dard 3-2.1 cmt. (1979) ("Private prosecution ... should be distinguished from the 
process available in some jurisdictions whereby a private citizen may file a complaint 
if the prosecutor refuses to act."); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-
2.1O(a) (1979) ("Procedures should be established by appropriate legislation to the 
end that the governor or other elected state official is empowered by law to suspend 
and supersede a local prosecutor upon making a public finding, after reasonable 
notice and hearing, that the prosecutor is incapable of fulfilling the duties of of-
fice."); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 3-2.1O(b) (1979) ("The gover-
nor or other elected official should be empowered by law to substitute special 
counsel in the place of the local prosecutor in a particular case, or category of cases, 
upon making a public finding that this is required for the protection of the public 
interest."). For example, in State ex rei. Wild v. Otis, when the elected officials re-
fused to prosecute a case, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that an aggrieved 
citizen might (1) petition the district court to appoint a special prosecutor, (2) appeal 
to the governor, who then might order the Attorney General to commence prosecu-
tion, or (3) seek mandamus. 257 N.W.2d 361, 364-65 (Minn. 1977), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 1003 (1978); see also Kentucky v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ky. 1989) 
(Leibson, J., dissenting) (if county attorney is incapable, unable, or unwilling to 
prosecute, the aggrieved citizen can apply for relief to the "prosecutors advisory 
council" created by Ky. REV. STAT. § 15.705 (MichielBobbs-MerriIl1988». Under 
federal law, the U.S. Attorney can appoint a disinterested private attorney to prose-
cute a case. 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-3(c) (1993); 28 U.S.C. § 543 (1988). 
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In prohibiting private prosecutors, victims' rights will 
not be compromised. Victims or their families may already 
express their feelings of outrage at the sentencing stage,332 
and victims, whether of assault, robbery, or otherwise, are 
free to testify at trial regarding their sense of violation at 
the hands of the alleged wrongdoer. Although victims' 
rights are of critical importance, the use of private prosecu-
tors in the name of victims' rights cannot be tolerated. Pri-
vate prosecutors have significant adverse effects on 
defendants' constitutional rights, and such prosecutors are 
completely unnecessary to vindicate the rights of victims. 
Finally, contrary to the suggestion that private prosecu-
tors benefit law enforcement activities by providing addi-
tional resources, the use of private prosecutors actually 
creates castes within the criminal justice system. Thus, 
whereas wealthy citizens can afford to pursue questionable 
criminal prosecutions by hiring private prosecutors, poor 
individuals, who are statistically more likely to be racial mi-
norities,333 cannot afford access.334 In this vein, the 
332. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (admission of testimony of mur-
der victim's mother during the sentencing phase of a capital case did not violate the 
defendant's due process rights); see also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 
(1949) (sentencer has wide discretion in types of information used to determine 
sentence). 
333. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 395 (1993). 
334. According to one source: 
Under a system of private prosecution, the prosecution of criminal offenses 
depends upon the ability and willingness of the victim or other interested 
individuals to bring prosecutions, which the poor and powerless are less 
able and willing to do. Accordingly, one of the reasons for establishing the 
office of public prosecutor might have been to ensure that poor victims as 
well as rich victims would be able to obtain redress for crimes committed 
against them or their property. 
Gittler, supra note 11, at 130 (footnote omitted). Notably, one historian has argued 
that private prosecution, at least in nineteenth-century Philadelphia, "represented 
the dignity and citizenship of Philadelphia's poor and working classes at least as 
much as it represented their oppression." STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 114. Ac-
cording to Steinberg: 
Private prosecution was, for [the citizen litigants of Philadelphia], a demo-
cratic form of law enforcement and criminal justice, involving in great num-
bers citizens of all social and economic groups with state officials who 
responded directly and personally (if not always satisfactory) to their re-
quests .... Through private prosecution, even the poor, many of them 
disenfranchised, had a stake in the legal and political process, received 
something palpable from it, and asserted that democracy in America was 
something special. 
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Supreme Court has consistently held that rich and poor 
alike must be afforded "equal justice" under the Constitu-
tion. As Justice Douglas wrote for the Supreme Court in 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,335 where Virginia's 
poll tax was struck down: "Lines drawn on the basis of 
wealth or property, like those of race ... are traditionally 
disfavored. "336 
Although. poor individuals have been afforded only 
"minimal protection" by the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts,337 the poor have retained special protection within 
the context of the criminal justice system. For example, in 
Griffin v. Illinois,338 the Supreme Court utilized the equal 
protection and due process clauses to strike down a law re-
quiring criminal appellants to pay for trial transcripts. As 
the Supreme Court stated in Griffin: "There can be no 
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on 
the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must be 
offered as adequate appellate review as defendants who 
Id. at 231. 
However, Steinberg's thesis, especially as applied in modem times, has several 
flaws. First, because modem-day public prosecutors are elected, every citizen-
whether rich or poor-already has a responsive official with whom to lodge com-
plaints. Second, because courts are. unlikely to allow non-lawyers to assist in bring-
ing criminal prosecutions, the high cost of legal services in modem society precludes 
the poor, as a practical matter, from hiring private prosecutors. Finally, a system of 
private prosecution favors the rich, not the poor. Indeed, Steinberg himself ac-
knowledges that the poor, even in nineteenth-century Philadelphia, were sometimes 
oppressed by the private prosecution system. Id. at 86 ("Bouvier [a Philadelphia 
court recorder] explicitly accused the poor of being responsible for petty litigation 
and implied that, if they had not been poor, they would have been like other Ameri-
cans who brought civil actions against one another. Instead they initiated criminal 
cases involving themselves, the only objects of value they possessed."); id. at 26 
(footnote omitted) ("A newspaper court reporter marveling in 1848 at how 'the mis-
erable outcasts of society' race to the alderman's office over their petty quarrels, 
'each endeavoring to ... have their opponents arrested before they were taken into 
custody themselves' and, in so doing, 'expend ... the greatest portion of the money 
that falls by accident within their grasp."'). 
335. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
336. Id. at 668; see also Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (a California 
law making it a misdemeanor to knowingly bring a non-resident indigent into the 
state was struck down). 
337. See TRIBE, supra note 159, § 16-35, at 1626 n.4; Bradley R. Hogin, Equal 
Protection, Democratic Theory, and the Case of. the Poor, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 39 
(1989). Compare Frank I. Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). 
338. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
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have money enough to buy transcripts. "339 Likewise, in 
Gideon v. Wainwright,340 the Supreme Court held that every 
indigent criminal defendant accused of a felony is entitled 
to appointed counsel. The guarantee of appointed counsel 
was subsequently broadened in Argetsinger v. Hamlin341 to 
include all prosecutions which resulted in imprisonment for 
any term. More recently, the Supreme Court has held that 
an indigent criminal defendant has a right to the assistance 
of a psychiatrist at state expense if the defendant's sanity 
will be a significant factor at trial or if the state presents 
psychiatric testimony during a capital sentencing proceed-
ing.342 As Professor Laurence Tribe has observed: "Partic-
ularly noteworthy in all of these cases is the Court's 
willingness to mandate what amounts to state purchase of 
private services-legal or medical-for private citizens."343 
One of the most striking features of public prosecution 
in the United States is that wealthy and poor individuals 
alike have equal access, at least theoretically, to the crimi-
nal justice system. Thus, while imperfections concededly 
exist, public prosecutors should treat criminal assaults on 
welfare recipients as seriously as they treat assaults on 
white-collar executives. In contrast to this egalitarian sys-
tem, allowing private prosecutors creates situations in 
which the criminal justice system treats wealthy individuals 
better than poor individuals. Because the use of private 
prosecutors runs contrary to the concept of "equal jus-
339. [d. at 19; see also Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (entitling defendants 
to effective assistance of counsel on first appeal of right); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 
1 (1981) (state must pay for blood test of indigent defendant in paternity action); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (requiring indigent to pay court costs to 
obtain divorce violates due process); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (in-
digent convicted criminal defendants are entitled to counsel on first appeal of right). 
340. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In Gideon, the Court held that the "noble ideal" of 
"fair trials before impartial tribunals" cannot be realized "if the poor man charged 
with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him." [d. at 344. 
341. 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
342. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). The Ake Court viewed its holding as 
consistent with "the belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of 
his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a 
judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake." [d. at 76. 
343. TRIBE, supra note 159, § 16-40, at 1635. 
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tice,"344 the Constitution prohibits the use of such 
prosecutors.345 
In several cases, courts have noted that private prose-
cutors are bound by the same standards of professional con-
duct as public prosecutors.346 According to the West 
Virginia Supreme Court, "[t]his rule blunts, if it does not 
entirely dissipate, the major criticism of private prosecutors, 
that they will be overzealous to convict and consequently 
ignore the public prosecutor's fundamental obligation to do 
justice."347 However, what these courts fail to recognize is 
that private prosecutors cannot possibly adhere to the same 
standards of professional conduct as public prosecutors; the 
conflicts of interest that arise for private prosecutors are 
simply irreconcilable. A private prosecutor, who is being 
paid handsomely to convict someone, cannot also, without 
at least some subtle bias, fairly represent the interests of 
that person and consider the "public interest" in treating 
that person justly. 
In a normal prosecution, a public prosecutor can en-
gage in prosecutorial misconduct by, among other things, 
pursuing plainly impermissible lines of questioning or argu-
344. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." Although the federal government is not governed by the Four-
teentl1 Amendment, an equal protection requirement is also imposed under the Fifth 
Amendment's due process clause because "it would be unthinkable that the same 
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government." Bolling v. 
Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (footnote omitted). 
345. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (equal protection is violated where pun-
ishment is limited to a fine for those able to pay it but is converted to imprisonment 
for those unable to pay it); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,244 (1970) (equal pro-
tection guarantee requires that maximum term of imprisonment be the same for all 
defendants regardless of economic status); see also CHRISTOPHER SMITH, COURTS 
AND THE POOR 12-40, 73-143 (1991) (detailing the lack of access the poor have to 
the criminal justice system and summarizing Supreme Court precedent in that area). 
346. E.g., New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747, 751 n.7 (D. N.J. 1991); 
Kentucky v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882, 883-84 (Ky. 1989); Cantrell v. Common-
wealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1985), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 911 (1990); Kerns v. Wol-
verton, 381 S.E.2d 258, 261 (W. Va. 1989); State v. Worley, 369 S.E.2d 706, 718 (W. 
Va. 1988); Kennedy v. State, 342 S.E.2d 251, 258 (W. Va. 1986); State v. Riser, 294 
S.E.2d 461, 465 (W.Va. 1982); State v. Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55, 58 (W. Va. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980); State ex rei. Moran v. Ziegler, 244 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 
1978). 
347. State v. Atkins, 261 S.E.2d 55, 58 (W. Va. 1980), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 
(1980) (footnote omitted). 
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ment, interrupting defense counsel's examination of wit-
nesses, or acting unfairly toward defense counsel, the 
accused, or defense witnesses.348 Although abolishing pri-
vate prosecutions will not mean the end of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the abolition of such prosecutors will at least 
reduce the number of such incidents.349 While public prose-
cutors may, at times, become overzealous in their desire to 
obtain a conviction, the Young Court correctly recognized 
348. WOLFRAM, supra note 129, § 13.10.4, at 766 (citations omitted). 
349. That private prosecutors engage in misconduct is demonstrated by the case 
of Hughes v. Bowers. 711 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 558 (11th 
Cir. 1990). In Hughes, the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after 
a private prosecutor represented to defense counsel that no policies of insurance 
existed which might serve to impeach one of the state's key witnesses. However, 
when defense counsel later discovered the existence of an impeaching insurance pol-
icy, the defendant's petition for habeas corpus was granted, with the court holding 
that the participation of a private prosecutor, hired by the victim's family, rendered 
the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. In so holding, the court emphasized that 
the private prosecutor, in addition to participating in the criminal prosecution, also 
represented a member of the victim's family on a claim brought pursuant to the 
concealed policy of insurance. The court stated as foJlows: 
An actual conflict of interest arose when the defense moved for production 
of insurance policies. The special prosecutor had a duty to disclose the 
policy but had a conflicting interest to conceal it. He chose to conceal it. 
By any standard, this deliberate, affirmative concealment from the court 
and the defense of important evidence constitutes a serious act of misbe-
havior which disregarded the rights of the defendant. The special prosecu-
tor abdicated his duty to seek justice rather than conviction, and Hughes's 
trial was rendered fundamentally unfair. 
[d. at 1584. 
Likewise, in Stumbo v. Seabold, 704 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying 
Kentucky law), the Sixth Circuit held that a defendant's trial was rendered funda-
mentally unfair by a private prosecutor's misconduct in accusing the defendant of a 
conspiracy that was unsupported by the evidence and in referring to the defendant 
as "Johnny Murder Boy." Even courts that have approved of the use of private 
prosecutors have warned of the dangers of overzealous private prosecutors. E.g., 
State v. Addis, 186 S.E.2d 415, 417 (S.C. 1972) ("We are not unaware of the fact that 
sometimes private counsel, assisting the solicitor, has a tendency to become eager in 
the prosecution. It therefore becomes the duty of the trial judge, as well as the 
solicitor, to be solicitous of defendant's rights, working to the end that defendant's 
rights be fully protected."); cf State of New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747, 
748 (D. N.J. 1991) ("Individuals can and do utilize such criminal proceedings to 
bolster a related civil proceeding or merely for vindictive or harassing purposes."); 
New Jersey v. Kinder, 701 F. Supp. 492 (D. N.J. 1988) ("While there is the possibility 
of frivolous suits and vindictive behavior by some complaints, abuses are checked 
and deterred by the Court's discretion and by the various other remedies available 
for malicious prosecution."). 
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that this "problem ... is personal, not structural."350 Unlike 
the potential personal deficiencies with public prosecutors, 
the problem created by private prosecutors is structural in 
nature. Thus, unlike public prosecutors, private prosecu-
tors have additional structural incentives to seek convictions 
rather than justice.351 For example, under Brady v. Mary-
land352 a prosecutor is obligated to provide defense counsel 
with exculpatory evidence on the issue of either guilt or 
punishment. The determination before trial of what is ma-
terial and exculpatory is necessarily left to the prosecutor, 
and courts rely on prosecutors to exercise their broad dis-
cretion responsibly.353 Confidence that a prosecutor will 
exercise judgment responsibly is not possible when there is 
the presence of a private party's interest in addition to that 
of doing justice.354 
350. Young, 481 U.S. at 809 n.18; see also Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers 
Int'!, Inc., 760 F.2d 698, 705 (1985), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987) (In disapproving 
the use of an interested contempt prosecutor, the court stated that overzealousness 
"does not have its roots in a conflict of interest. When it manifests itself the courts 
deal with it on a case-by-case basis as an aberration. This is quite different from 
approving a practice which would permit the appointment of prosecutors whose un-
divided loyalty is pledged to a party interested only in a conviction."). The fact that 
private prosecutors create structural defects in the criminal justice system makes 
prosecutorial misconduct cases, which require a showing of prejudice, irrelevant. 
Thus, cases such as Darden v. Wainwright and Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, where the 
relevant inquiry is "whether the prosecutors' comments so infected the trial with 
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process," address only 
situations involving personal misconduct. Darden, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); Don-
nelly, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). 
351. According to one court: 
The question of what constitutes an "impartial" prosecutor demands clari-
fication. A prosecutor is not "partial" simply because she zealously seeks 
conviction. Rather, "partiality" in this context is similar to a conflict of 
interest in the sense that the prosecutor has a personal interest or stake in 
the outcome of the criminal prosecution. Thus, "partiality" refers not to 
"personal" zeal but to "structural" problems where personal interests (in-
cluding non-pecuniary interests) generate a structural conflict of interest. 
New Jersey v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747, 750 (D. N.J. 1991). 
352. 373 u.S. 83 (1963). 
353. Cf United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (prosecutor has 
discretion to determine whether illegal aliens may be deported or must be kept in 
United States to testify at trial). 
354. For example, in Hughes v. Bowers, a private prosecutor failed to disclose 
Brady material, and his prosecutorial misconduct resulted in the defendant's habeas 
corpus petition being granted. 711 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 1989), affd, 896 F.2d 
558 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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A federal district court case, United States ex rei. Miller 
v. Myers,355 provides a good illustration of why interested 
private prosecutors are violative of defendants' due process 
rights. In that case, a defendant charged with burglary was 
represented by an attorney who was simultaneously repre-
senting the owner of the allegedly burgled establishment in 
another matter. In reversing the defendant's conviction on 
the grounds that the conflict of interest violated the defend-
ant's constitutional right to counsel, the court stated that 
"[i]t takes no great understanding of human nature to real-
ize that the individuals who had been burglarized might 
be less than happy and might go so far as to remove the 
attorney from their good graces if this defendant were 
acquitted. "356 
Judge Friendly's opinion in Wright v. United States357 
supports the notion that the use of private prosecutors 
should be barred in all circumstances. In Wright, Judge 
Friendly first stated that the word "disinterested" should 
describe situations where a prosecutor does not have an in-
terest which constitutes "an additional and impermissible 
reason in forwarding the prosecution."358 Because of the 
practical impossibility of showing that a private prosecutor 
for an interested party actually prejudiced a defendant/59 
Judge Friendly then concluded that the mere appearance of 
impropriety must be sufficient to establish a due process vi-
olation. According to his opinion in Wright, "the practical 
impossibility of establishing that [a prosecutorial conflict of 
interest] has worked to the defendant's disadvantage dic-
355. 253 F. Supp. 55 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
356. [d. at 57. 
357. 732 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). 
358. [d. at 1056 n.7. 
359. Several courts have held that a defendant's conviction will not be over-
turned absent a showing that the conduct of a private prosecutor actually 
"prejudiced" the defendant's trial. See, e.g., Powers V. Hauck, 399 F.2d 322, 325 (5th 
Cir. 1968) (The use of a special prosecutor is not improper where "the special prose-
cutor is not guilty of conduct prejudicial to the defendant, and the rights of the 
defendant are duly observed."); Hughes V. Bowers, 711 F. Supp. 1574 (N.D. Ga. 
1989), affd, 896 F.2d 558 (11th Cir. 1990) ("To demonstrate a denial of due process, 
the petitioner ... must show evidence of specific misbehavior on the part of the 
prosecutor which prejudiced the defendant."); State V. Cockrell, 309 P.2d 316, 320 
(Mont. 1957); State V. Ray, 143 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). 
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tates the adoption of standards under which a reasonable 
potential for prejudice will suffice. "360 Because private 
prosecutors always have "an additional and impermissible 
reason" to forward a prosecution, namely, they represent 
private interests, the mere appearance of impropriety must 
be sufficient to establish a due process violation. In the 
Supreme Court's own words, "justice must satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice. "361 
Indeed, while due process considerations prohibit the 
use of private prosecutors, civil proceedings provide inter-
ested parties with an adequate, and more appropriate, legal 
remedy. For example, if a murder has occurred, a wrongful 
death statute will provide an interested party with a forum 
to seek civil redress, while the due process clause safe-
guards the rights of the accused in the criminal proceeding. 
This distinction between criminal and civil liability dictates 
that private prosecutors be prohibited. According to one 
commentator: 
[O]ur legal system generally considers criminal behav-
ior to be more opprobrious than civil misconduct and 
criminal sanctions to be both quantitatively and qualita-
tively more severe than civil sanctions. The structural 
check against oppressive prosecution in the form of friv-
olous suits or excessive punishments that is created by 
executive oversight and discretion ought to be much 
more stringent in the criminal than the civil context, just 
as due process safeguards are more stringent against er-
roneous conviction than erroneous civilliability.362 
360. Wright, 732 F.2d at 1056. 
361. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 571-72 (1980) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954» 
("To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process 'satisfy the ap-
pearance of justice' .... "). 
362. Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 
YALE L.J. 341, 371 (1989) (footnotes omitted) (citing WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN 
SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 12-16 (2d ed. 1986) (listing distinctions between civil and 
criminal sanctions) and Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401, 402-06 (1958) (same» [hereinafter Caminker]; see also Richard Epstein, 
Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL 231 (R. Bar-
nett & J. Hagel eds. 1977) (distinguishing between civil and criminal law). Unlike 
private prosecutions, qui tam actions are statutorily created and allow a private citi-
zen to receive part of a fine or penalty, usually 50%, for successfully suing a wrong-
doer. A qui tam action is not a criminal prosecution; rather, it is a "remedial" 
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Even if the Supreme Court refuses to declare the use 
of private prosecutors unconstitutional in all cases, an inter-
ested prosecutor's participation at trial must invalidate any 
conviction obtained for any serious offense.363 Thus, even if 
private prosecutors are permitted for minor offenses or 
crimes, it must be a per se violation of a defendant's due 
process rights when a private prosecutor participates in any 
proceeding which could result in significant jail time. In 
this regard, the case of State of New Jersey v. Kinder364 is 
particularly instructive. In Kinder, a federal district court in 
New Jersey held that a municipal court rule allowing a de-
fendant to be prosecuted through the use of a private attor-
ney did not violate the defendant's due process rights, 
where the defendant was charged with simple assault and 
battery and, if convicted, would not receive. a criminal rec-
ord or a jail term exceeding six months.365 According to the 
Kinder court: 
proceeding that imposes only civil sanctions. United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 
317 U.S. 537,549 (1943); see also Caminker, supra, at 370 ("qui tam lawsuits seek 
only civil remedies and bring only private enforcement machinery to bear"); cf 
Robert W. Fischer, Comment, Qui Tam Actions: The Role of the Private Citizen in 
Law Enforcement, 20 UCLA L. REV. 778, 786 (1973) (footnote omitted) ("The over-
whelming weight of authority supports the view that qui tam actions are civil ac-
tions."). To the extent any qui tam statutes permit the pursuit of criminal remedies 
by private parties, such statutes must be declared unconstitutional. Cf. United 
States ex rei. Kelly v. Boeing Co., No. 92-36660 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 1993), 62 U.S.L.W. 
2165 (rejecting a due process challenge to a qui tam provision of the False Claims 
Act, but noting that a criminal prosecution might require a higher level of 
prosecutorial disinterest than would be necessary in a civil enforcement action under 
the False Claims Act). 
363. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional law that due process rights 
increase as the consequences of the governmental action to the individual become 
more severe. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (defendant entitled to 
legal representation when defendant faces imprisonment); Baldwin v. New York, 
399 U.S. 66 (1970) (serious offenses require a trial by jury); 'Bloom v. Illinois, 391 
U.S. 194 (1968) (criminal contempt defendants have the right to a jury trial if the 
contempt charged is serious); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3172(2) (1985) (statutory right to 
speedy trial under Speedy Trial Act applies only to serious offenses). A criminal 
contempt is considered serious if the sentence is for more than six months. Cheff v. 
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966). 
364. 701 F. Supp. 486 (D. N.J. 1988). 
365. See id. at 490 (distinguishing Young on the ground that the defendants in 
that case were given sentences ranging up to five years); see also id. at 491 ("The 
United States Supreme Court has itself recognized that the full panoply of proce-
dural protections is not required where lesser charges are involved and minimal pun-
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It is important to emphasize that this is not a case 
involving an offense arising under federal laws subject 
to prosecution by federal authorities. Nor is this a pros-
ecution for a felony or misdemeanor which can result in 
a criminal record, a lengthy jail term and a loss of certain 
privileges of citizenship. This is not a prosecution for 
criminal contempt which also involves the possibility of 
a lengthy jail term in addition to the more concrete con-
flicts of interest which exist when an attorney prose-
cutes a person in a criminal matter while simultaneously 
representing that person's opponent in an underlying 
civil matter. This is also not a case where the public 
prosecutor has declined to prosecute the defendant af-
ter expressly finding that there is no probable cause for 
such action. In all of those cases, I have no doubt that a 
private attorney would be precluded by the United States 
Constitution from conducting a criminal 
prosecution. 366 
Because of the "death is different" jurisprudence that has 
been developed, the use of private prosecutors is particu-
larly inappropriate in cases involving capital crimes.367 As 
ishment is authorized.") (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to 
jury trial does not apply to crimes with possible punishments of six months or less». 
366. Kinder,701 F. Supp at 492 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
367. "Because sentences of death are 'qualitatively different' from prison 
sentences, this Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner 
sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as is hu-
manly possible that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, 
or mistake." Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1982) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring); see also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 492-93 (1990); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 167 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is by now axiomatic ... that 
the unique, irrevocable nature of the death penalty necessitates safeguards not re-
quired for other punishments."); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1985); 
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) ("[T]he qualitative difference of 
death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scru-
tiny of the capital sentencing determination."). 
Even in the nineteenth century, the propriety of a private attorney prosecuting 
a capital crime was questioned: 
Prominent attorney David Paul Brown's memoirs often refer to criminal 
cases that were conducted by private counsel. A major concern of his was 
to advise lawyers to abandon prosecutions if they discovered that they were 
dishonest and, as a rule, not to prosecute a capital charge-"never take 
blood money." Brown implied that capital offenses and other "great public 
wrongs" should be conducted by the public prosecutor .... 
STEINBERG, supra note 11, at 81. 
See also GEORGE W. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS (1902): 
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Justice Stevens stated in Barclay v. Florida,368 "A constant 
theme of our cases . . . has been emphasis on procedural 
protections that are intended to ensure that the death pen-
alty will be imposed in a consistent, rational manner."369 
CONCLUSION 
In Young v. United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,370 
the United States Supreme Court issued a stern warning in 
deciding that private attorneys for interested parties could 
not prosecute criminal contempt actions. Although the 
Young Court relied on its "supervisory authority" to reach 
this result, the Supreme Court's decision used broad, 
sweeping language that makes the opinion resemble a due 
process ruling. While Justice Blackmun's concurrence in 
Young was the only vote that would have established a con-
stitutional right to a disinterested prosecutor, the broad lan-
guage of Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Young 
strongly suggests that decision merely foreshadows a 
Supreme Court ruling forbidding the use of private prose-
cutors in all criminal cases. Therefore, in the wake of 
Young, state legislatures immediately should abolish the 
practice of allowing private prosecutors. 
It not infrequently happens that private counsel are employed to assist 
the state. This is now generally regarded as an allowable practice, but for 
many years an attorney accepting such a retainer, particularly when his fee 
was paid by private parties, was considered as having violated an ethical 
canon of the profession. This was always the case when the charge in-
volved a capital crime. "Never take blood money," say the old writers, and 
if we are to credit the biographies of the ancient worthies they never did. 
In fact, the old Ciceronian idea seems at one time to have thoroughly per-
vaded the bar, and numerous admonitions have come down to us that 
where life or death is the issue, "it is always more honorable to defend than 
to prosecute." 
[d. at 142 (citing BROWN'S FORUM, Vol. 2, p. 40); id. at 143 ("There is something 
revolting to the moral sense in the spectacle of counsel selling his talents to enable 
an individual to satisfy his thirst for vengeance, and this, in most cases, is just what 
counsel does when he accepts a private retainer to assist the prosecuting officer."). 
368. 463 U.S. 939 (1983). 
369. [d. at 960 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 
420, 427 (1980) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he penalty of death may not be imposed 
under sentencing procedures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will 
be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."). 
370. 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
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On the judicial front, at least until the Supreme Court 
addresses the constitutional implications of private prosecu-
tors, lower courts should eliminate the use of such prosecu-
tors through constitutional means371 or, alternatively, via 
their "supervisory authority."372 In particular, state courts 
should hold that it is a per se violation of a defendant's con-
stitutional rights if a private prosecutor for an interested 
party participates in any way in the criminal trial of that 
defendant.373 Thus, a private prosecutor should be abso-
lutely prohibited from sitting with the public prosecutor at 
counsel's table during trial, and should not be allowed to 
examine witnesses, make objections, conduct opening or 
closing argument, or engage in courtroom activity of any 
371. According to one commentator: 
[A] state court might conclude that the appointment of the private, inter-
ested attorney does violate fourteenth amendment due process. Argu-
ments for this result are found in the "harmless error" analysis advanced by 
the Court in Young. Even though the Court's reversal was in reliance upon 
its supervisory authority to avoid the necessity of reaching the constitu-
tional issues, the Court applied a constitutional standard in deciding that 
this error could not be considered harmless. 
Braswell, supra note 3, at 163 (footnote omitted). 
See also id. at 162 ("[A] recent trend in state constitutional law is that state 
courts are frequently interpreting their respective constitutions to 'guarantee rights 
that the Supreme Court has held that the federal Constitution does not secure.' ") 
(quoting Barbara Kritchevsy, Justiciability in Tennessee, Part One: Principles and 
Limits, 15 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1-2 nn.1-2 (1984». 
372. Young, 481 U.S. at 808 n.l8 (court can exercise its inherent supervisory 
power to disqualify certain individuals from acting as prosecutors); State v. Marshall, 
586 A.2d 85 (N.J. 1991) (court can disqualify prosecutor for "nefarious" interest); 
see Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 777 S.W.2d 882, 885 (Ky. 1989) (Leibson, J., dissent-
ing) ("we should decide whether the proper performance of the supervisory author-
ity entrusted to us by the Kentucky Constitution" requires the elimination of the use 
of interested private prosecutors). In addition, courts should use their authority to 
control who appears before them to prohibit the use of private prosecutors. Cham-
bers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (courts have inherent authority "to manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases," includ-
ing the authority to control who may appear before the court) (citing Link v. Wa-
bash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962»; see also State of New Jersey v. Imperiale, 
773 F. Supp. 747, 756 (D. N.J. 1991) (court has inherent authority to control who 
appears before it); Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963) (per curiam) 
(Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals have broad powers of supervision over fed-
eral proceedings). 
373. As the Supreme Court has previously acknowledged, certain errors may 
involve "rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as 
harmless error." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); 
Thmey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (impartial judge». 
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kind.374 Indeed, because structural problems are created by 
the possibility that private prosecutors will engage in mis-
conduct or misuse their discretion,375 any violation of the 
rule barring private prosecutors requires the automatic re-
versal of a defendant's conviction without a showing of 
prejudice.376 
With respect to pre-trial activity, courts should also 
prohibit private attorneys for interested parties from inter-
fering in the criminal process. For example, as the West 
Virginia Supreme Court held in Kerns v. Wolverton,377 a pri-
vate attorney for an interested party should not be allowed 
to appear before or participate in a grand jury proceeding. 
The Kerns court stated that "the presence of a private pros-
ecutor in a grand jury room is inconsistent with the tradi-
tional view that the grand jury should be impartial and 
independent, and thus free of even the possibility that 
outside pressure or influence will infiltrate the process. "378 
374. In Young, the Supreme Court stated in dicta that a private party's attor-
ney's "familiarity" with the underlying facts "may be put to use in assisting a disin-
terested prosecutor in pursuing the contempt action, but cannot justify permitting 
counsel for the private party to be in control of the prosecution." Young, 481 U.S. at 
807 n.17. This language should not be construed to allow an interested party's attor-
ney to participate in a criminal proceeding or prosecute a criminal case, with the 
only requirement being that the attorney playa subordinate role to that of the pub-
lic prosecutor. Instead, the "assist" language should be read narrowly, allowing an 
interested party's attorney only to familiarize the public prosecutor with his or her 
version of the facts consistent with the party's First Amendment rights. A private 
attorney should not be allowed to "assist" the public prosecutor with any aspect of 
the criminal process because of the discretionary and unreviewable nature of prose-
cutors' work. 
375. Obviously, prosecutorial misconduct or the misuse of prosecutorial discre-
tion hinders the discovery of truth, which is the primary function of the court and 
the fundamental purpose of the adversary system. E.g., United States v. Havens, 
446 U.S. 620 (1980). 
376. Some constitutional errors create "structural defects in the constitution of 
the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards." Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 319 (1991). "The existence of such defects-deprivation 
of the right to counsel, for example-requires automatic reversal of the conviction 
because they infect the entire trial process." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 61 U.S.L.W. 
4335, text accompanying n.4 (1993) (citing Fulminante). 
377. 381 S.E.2d 258 (W. Va. 1989). 
378. 1d. at 262; see id. (footnote omitted) ("Obviously, the presence of a private 
prosecutor before a grand jury could only serve to enhance the public perception 
that a grand jury is an instrument controlled by the desires of the prosecution."); 38 
AM. JUR. 2d Grand Jury § 35 (1968) ("The presence and participation in grand jury 
proceedings of a person assuming the role of a private prosecutor, retained by 
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Likewise, courts should find a violation of a defendant's 
constitutional rights, requiring a retrial, if a private attorney 
for an interested party participates in anything more than 
de minimis activities outside the courtroom at the request 
of the public prosecutor.379 This rule recognizes that pri-
vate attorneys, hired by victims or their families, have in-
centives, financial or otherwise, to conceal exculpatory 
evidence that they uncover during the course of a criminal 
investigation. For example, if a public prosecutor asks a 
private attorney to investigate some aspect of a crime, the 
outside interests for the purpose of obtaining an indictment against particular indi-
viduals, is generally considered highly improper."); Nichols v. State, 87 S.E. 817 (Ga. 
App. 1916) (same); Flege v. State, 142 N.W. 276 (Neb. 1913) (same); Cantrell v. 
Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1985) (same). 
379. See Kerns v. Wolverton, 381 S.E.2d 258, 262 (W. Va. 1989) ("The participa-
tion of a private prosecutor in the pretrial stages of litigation should be viewed with 
a wary eye, as it is at this point that the public prosecutor exercises 'virtually un-
checked and unreviewed discretion' with respect to matters occurring outside of the 
courtroom."). But cf Scheldberger v. State, 204 Wis. 235, 235 N.W. 419 (1931) 
(although private prosecutors are not permitted under Wisconsin law, a private at-
torney was allowed to take witnesses' statements and do investigatory work). Signif-
icantly, the Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures 
by the State does not apply to actions by private individuals. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 
643 (1961). E.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 
(1921); United States v. Andrews, 618 F.2d 646, 648-52 (10th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Winbush, 428 F.2d 357, 359 (6th Cir. 1970); People v. Randazzo, 34 Cal. 
Rptr. 65, 69-71 (Cal. App. 1963); People v. Moreno, 135 Cal. Rptr. 340, 342 (Sup. Ct. 
1976); State v. Clark, 454 So. 2d 232, 234-37 (La. App. 1984); District Attorney for 
Plymouth District, 434 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Mass. 1982); Waters v. State, 575 A.2d 
1244, 1246 (Md. 1990); State v. Jenkins, 259 N.W.2d 109, 111-12 (Wis. 1977). Ac-
cordingly, "when a private individual obtains incriminating matter from an accused, 
no matter how improperly, and such matter comes into the possession of the govern-
ment without a violation of the accused's rights by government authority, the exclu-
sionary rule does not prohibit its use at trial." Waters, 575 A.2d at 1246; State v. Von 
Bulow, 475 A.2d 995, 1012 (R.I. 1984); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 
166 (1986) ("The most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure 
evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the 
Due Process Clause."); State v. Clark, 743 P.2d 822, 826 (Wash. App. 1987). A pri-
vate search or seizure only triggers Fourth Amendment protections if the private 
individual whose actions are in question, "in light of all the circumstances of the 
case, must be regarded as having acted as an 'instrument' or agent of the state." 
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487. To be an instrument or agent of the state, a private party 
must be involved directly as a participant in the search or indirectly as an "encour-
ager" or instigator of the private citizen's actions. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 
788,791 (9th Cir. 1981); Clark, 743 P.2d at 826. A government may not exceed the 
scope of a private search unless it has the right to make an independent search. 
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980); Von Bulow, 475 A.2d at 1018. 
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private attorney may have incentives, because of the associ-
ation with the interested client, not to turn over exculpatory 
evidence that is discovered during that investigation. Be-
cause the participation of an interested party's attorney in 
pre-trial activity also creates structural problems with the 
criminal process, the harmless error rule should not apply 
to such pre-trial activity.380 
In the United States, victims and their families are un-
deniably legitimate participants in the criminal justice sys-
tem. Victims and their families have a right to observe, 
monitor, and participate in criminal proceedings, and such 
individuals must have access to, and communication with, 
the public prosecutor. However, while victims and their 
families have many rights, including the ability to testify 
about the impact of a crime at the sentencing phase,381 the 
constitutional rights of an accused must not be compro-
mised. Criminal prosecutions are the process by which in-
dividuals are deprived of their life or liberty. The dire 
consequences of such prosecutions require that an accused 
receive due process before any adverse action is taken. By 
infecting the criminal justice system with impermissible in-
centives, private prosecutors create structural flaws in the 
system which violate the Constitution's due process guaran-
tee. Because private prosecutors represent, or, at the very 
least, are perceived to represent, interests other than "jus-
tice" or the "public interest," the use of private prosecutors 
must be forbidden. In the words of President John F. Ken-
nedy, "the basis of effective government is public confi-
380. A criminal defendant's constitutional rights are not affected by the pre-trial 
activity of a private attorney who is not acting at the request of a public prosecutor. 
This rule recognizes that a public prosecutor has no control over private attorneys or 
private investigators. However, evidence obtained through private means must re-
main subject to the usual constitutional rules once it is turned over to the prosecu-
tor's office. See Von Bulow, 475 A.2d at 1012 (citation omitted) (when the 
government significantly expands a prior private search without first procuring a 
search warrant and no recognized exception to the warrant requirement exists to 
justify such expansion, the independent governmental search is subject to the pro-
scriptions of the Fourth Amendment). 
381. Compare Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (invalidating a state law 
providing for victim impact statements at sentencing trials in capital proceedings) 
with Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991) (overruling Booth and holding that a 
state has a legitimate interest in presenting relevant victim impact evidence in a 
capital sentencing proceeding). 
602 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:511 
dence, and that confidence is endangered when ethical 
standards falter or appear to falter."382 
382. Special Message to Congress on Conflict-oJ-Interest Legislation and on 
Problems of Ethics in Government, 152 PUB. PAPERS 326 (Apr. 27, 1961). 
